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Introduction
1
 
 
This thesis summarises what I, in the last 10 years, have learned about the origins of and 
the potentially efficient ways to address one of the critical energy policy issue in 
Hungary (and in some aspects the wider Central and South East European region), that 
is unilateral import dependence and wholesale market inefficiencies in the natural gas 
sector. 
The roots of present natural gas sector vulnerabilities go back to Soviet times, when the 
combination of major government funded infrastructure investments and very low gas 
product prices created fast increasing demand for natural gas in Hungary. After the 
commissioning of the once Russia-Hungary (today Ukraine – Hungary) gas 
interconnector in 1974, a wave of centrally subsidised gas distribution network 
development took place in the country. Industrial and household customers also 
invested huge amounts into switching their industrial, heating and cooking technologies 
from wood, coal and oil to natural gas. Finally, the share of natural gas based electricity 
generation grew far the largest among new EU member states in Hungary by 2005, the 
top year for its natural gas consumption. Figures 1–3 illustrate the penetration of gas 
infrastructure and consumption in the last four decades.  
                                                 
1
 For the references in this section, see the list after the final new study. 
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Figure 1. Primary fuel structure of Hungary, 1965–2013. – development of the share of gas 
 
 
Figure 2. Development of domestic gas consumption, production, import (left axis) and the length 
of the gas distribution network (right axis) of Hungary, 1970–2013. 
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Figure 3. Per capita natural gas based electricity generation in new EU member states  
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 
While the environmental benefits of a fuel switch from oil and coal to gas are 
unquestionable and the comfort of gas usage is also superior to its alternatives, natural 
gas penetration has perhaps gone too far in Hungary. When its gas consumption reached 
historic high in 2005, in Europe it was Hungary that relied most on natural gas to serve 
its primary energy demand. By 2011, the percentage of households with natural gas 
reached almost 90% in Hungary, the second highest behind The Netherlands with 93% 
(See ACER 2013).  The key difference in the development of their natural gas markets 
for these two “gas addict” countries is that while The Netherlands is the largest natural 
gas net exporting country (the only other is Denmark) in the EU, domestic gas 
production could not serve more than 30% of consumption in case of Hungary since 
1999. The rest had, and still has to be made up from imports. 
The lack of import supplier, alternative to Russia, made import driven gas market 
development risky in two major ways for Hungary.  
Unilateral gas import dependence on Russia first created a price risk, inherent in such a 
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the Soviet Union until 1996.
2
 That year MOL, the Hungarian Oil and Gas Company 
entered into a long term gas purchase contract (in the followings: LTC) with Gazprom. 
This contract included a gas pricing formula that established a starting gas price for the 
two partners and then linked the change in gas price to price changes of oil products 
with transparent market prices.
3
 Given the lack of transparent gas wholesale markets in 
Europe, this pricing method provided for a certain level of transparency and 
predictability for the contracting parties. However, they obscured the relationship 
between gas purchase costs for MOL (that is Hungarian customers) and the cost of 
Gazprom to supply gas for the Hungarian market. Prices were not based on the interplay 
of demand and supply but on prices of substitutes for natural gas.  
To get an idea of the magnitude of monopolistic rents the Russian supplier has recently 
gained from oil-indexed gas sales to Hungary, we can compare oil-indexed and 
European spot gas prices depicted on Figure 4. As for an example, between October 
2012 and September 2013 the Russian supplier sold 5 Billion cubic meters (Bcm) of 
natural gas on LTC basis to its Hungarian partner. Assuming a 100% oil indexed price 
for this amount of gas, the Russian supplier might had realized an average HUF 36/m
3
 
rent on these sales compared to the situation if it had to sell this amount at European gas 
hubs (e,g, the Central European Gas Hub at Baumgarten, Austria). Thus the annual 
amount of rent from oil indexed sales to Hungary can be estimated at around HUF 180 
Billion, or € 600 million.    
                                                 
2
 In 1958 the so called "Bucharest price formula" was introduced in the Soviet bloc, according to which 
trading prices were fixed for 5 years, based on the average global market prices of the preceding five-year 
period. This system was, however, revised after the oil crisis of 1973. As the Soviet Union wanted to 
profit from increasing hydrocarbon prices, in 1975 it introduced a new sliding price formation practice 
with yearly price corrections. (Stern, 2012, p. 63) 
3
 According to the 2005/2006 energy sector inquiry of the European Commission, light fuel oil and 
gasoil, and heavy fuel oil had a combined weight of more than 95% in the indexation of long-term 
contracts for gas supply to Eastern Europe. (EC, 2007, p. 104). 
 13 
 
Figure 4. The development of oil-indexed, spot, and mixed natural gas prices, January 2008 – 
December 2013. 
Source: REKK analysis 
High relative gas wholesale prices combined with the almost universal use of gas by 
households for heating and cooking purposes created a case for chronic high level 
policy struggle around gas prices during, at least, the last three election campaigns. 
Arguments and government decisions about end customer gas price changes (increases 
or decreases) for household customers became a priority battle ground in the fight for 
votes (Kaderják, 2005a; REKK 2013a, 2014).           
Beyond price risk, the lack, up to the commissioning of the Hungarian-Austrian Gas 
Pipeline (in the followings: HAG) in 1994, and later the limited capacity of alternative 
supply infrastructure to ship natural gas imports created serious gas supply security risk 
for the country. This risk manifested in more than 310 million m
3
 of non-served gas 
during the 2009 January gas crisis. The present (winter of 2014-15) gas supply security 
risk for Hungary, posed by the unfolding political and military conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine is also largely due to import driven gas market development and the lack of 
sufficient infrastructure diversification for the country
4
. 
In the last decade the most significant motivation for change on the Hungarian gas 
market has been the EU policy drive towards opening up national natural gas markets 
                                                 
4
 For a preliminary quantitative analysis on the potential impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on CEE 
gas supply security see Kaderják et al. (2014). 
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and integrating them into a single European one. It is not by chance that the history of 
competition on the Hungarian natural gas market dates back to the first half of 2004 
when the country joined the EU. Since then for Hungary (and for many other new 
member states) the energy policy dilemma has been, and still is, how to combine 
competition and (price) regulation under highly concentrated supply side conditions to 
get the best social outcome when implementing EU gas market rules.  
This thesis contains three of my former publications, some with co-authors, and an 
additional new study. What links these four studies together is their strive to understand 
the vulnerabilities of the Hungarian gas market in a wider, regional context, to identify 
policy options available for addressing those vulnerabilities and to offer a consistent 
methodology to support the economic analyses and evaluation of those policy options.  
A. Vulnerabilities of the 2004 new member states’ gas markets, including Hungary  
The first paper included in this thesis (Kaderják et al. 2007a; in Hungarian: Kaderják et 
al. 2007b), published in the second volume of the European Review of Energy Markets, 
was motivated by a larger study for the European Commission to answer the question, 
what specific risks the 2004 EU enlargement brought about for the EU energy sector.
5
 
The major conclusion of the study was that, by that time, unilateral gas import 
dependence on Russia had become the number one energy security issue for the 
continental 2004 new Member States and this would be a new issue for EU energy 
policy to deal with in the future. The paper included in this thesis further elaborate on 
gas (and also electricity) sector related supply security issues of 2004 new member 
states. By applying different measures of natural gas dependency and natural gas import 
dependency, it provides specific conclusions on natural gas sector related vulnerabilities 
of our region as follows. 
 Natural gas dependency of continental 2004 new member states is significantly 
higher than the EU average. 
 Hungary and Latvia have a combined issue of high gas dependence for electricity 
generation and high economic dependence on gas. 
 Natural gas import dependency is significantly higher in new member states than in 
the old ones. 
                                                 
5
 The full study was published by REKK in Kaderják and La Belle (2008).  
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 Diversification of sources of gas imports is much less for new than for old member 
states. 
 A combined result is a high level and unilateral natural gas import dependency on 
Russia of the continental new EU member states.
6
  
 The dominance of joint ventures of Russian Gazprom with German companies 
(particularly E.ON Ruhrgas) in the ownership of gas sector assets adds to the 
dominance of Russia in gas supplies throughout the Central and East European 
region and the Baltic states. 
At the time of the publication of the study the legitimacy of its imbalanced concern for 
the vulnerabilities of new member states’ gas industries was quite unclear for some of 
my Western colleagues. Russia was perceived as a long standing and all time reliable 
gas supplier to Europe. But soon after the publication of the paper, unfortunate real life 
developments started to confirm its conclusions. Since the early 2006 Russia-Ukraine 
gas dispute natural gas started to play an important role in energy supply security related 
discussions and policy decisions in the EU. Skyrocketing oil and related natural gas 
prices before the outbreak of the 2008 economic crisis made EU institutions 
increasingly aware of the vulnerability of the community to growing oil and natural gas 
imports from third countries. But since the January 2009 gas crisis natural gas has 
clearly dominated the energy policy debate in the EU, as far as supply security is 
concerned.   
B. Lessons from a real-life experiment  
The up to date largest-ever real life experiment to test the vulnerabilities of enlarged 
Europe’s natural gas market took place between 7th and 19th January, 2009. During 
these days the transit of Russian gas to Europe through the Ukraine was halted. This 
was the most serious European gas crisis to have happened since the start of Russian gas 
transmission to Europe decades earlier. A daily average of 380 million cubic meter 
(Mcm) or a total of 5 billion cubic meter (Bcm) of Russian gas delivery through 
Ukraine to the EU and South East Europe was lost during these days.
7
 Gas industries 
and customers of Central and South East Europe (CSEE), including many of the new 
                                                 
6
 From the 2007 accession countries Romania is an exception to this conclusion, due to its significant 
local natural gas production. However, the statement is valid for Bulgaria.     
7
 Simpson, J. (2009), January 2009 – Russia – Ukraine gas dispute. IEA presentation for the Gas 
Coordination Group, February 23.  
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member states of the EU, were hit particularly strong by the crisis. The share of lost gas 
supply for the countries of the region from Austria to Greece due to the gas cut 
accounted for 50-100% (except for Poland and Romania). Several countries had to 
introduce forced load shedding measures. The official economic loss estimate from lost 
load was close to 2 billion Euros for the most affected countries. If the crisis did not 
coincide with a major economic recession, the economic loss it caused could have been 
significantly larger.  
Originally I prepared the second paper that is included in this thesis (Kaderják, 2011b) 
as a chapter for a book that was edited by the then head of unit for energy supply 
security of DG Energy of the European Commission. Although the book was published 
only in 2011, Monsieur Jean-Arnold Vinois and E-Control, the Austrian energy 
regulatory agency together organized a workshop already on April 3, 2009 in Vienna to 
start reconstructing what exactly happened during those two dramatic weeks and to start 
understanding the lessons from it for EU energy policy purposes. I was asked to make a 
presentation at this workshop about the impacts of the crisis on the most affected 
countries of CSEE. This original motivation encouraged me and my colleagues to start 
work on better understanding the causes of differences in the success of managing the 
gas crisis and minimizing the damage to final customers in the most affected countries.  
The paper is about the lessons I learned, by the comparison of country experiences with 
the January 2009 crisis, about the nature and vulnerability of the new member states’ 
gas markets.  It also provides an assessment of the policy reactions at the EU and 
member states’ level to the crisis that, since then, have paved the development of the 
EU’s renewed gas supply security (and market integration) policy. The most important 
lessons were the followings.      
 EU market integration and supply security in natural gas are twin developments. 
Liquid gas wholesale markets can be successful in managing crisis situations as 
supply shocks through price adjustments up to a given point.
8
 The more the new 
member states’ gas markets integrate with the Western European markets, the higher 
level supply security they will enjoy. Diversification of supply sources and routes 
are key for the success of the market integration process. 
                                                 
8
 A later event, the supply shock caused by a cold spell in the winter of 2012 confirmed this conclusion 
(see Henderson and Heather, 2012)  
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 The use of existing EU natural gas infrastructure was inefficient during the crisis. 
However, the EU gas industry discovered the possibility of bi-directional use of 
some existing pipelines and interconnectors during the crisis. The implementation of 
physical bi-directional operation (or reverse flow) capabilities on all major gas 
interconnectors in the EU could extremely improve the efficiency in the use of the 
existing gas infrastructure – at a very low cost (GTE+, 2009). This lesson was 
transformed into a very important obligation by the recent gas supply security 
regulation of the EU (Regulation 994/2010/EC).  
 The efficiency in the use of the existing gas infrastructure was further decreased by 
regulatory problems, like discriminative access rules to interconnection or gas 
storage capacities.    
 The crisis also revealed the insufficient physical interconnectivity of the new 
member states’ natural gas systems and the consequent lack of gas market 
cooperation among them. The new EU infrastructure regulation (Regulation 
347/2013/EC) clearly acknowledges this problem and calls for the identification and 
implementation of missing gas infrastructures in the Eastern new member states.  
Apparently the discussions following the 2009 January gas crisis resulted in a deeper 
EU-wide understanding of specific problems the natural gas industries of some new 
member states were, and still, facing. Recent EU level legislation to increase gas supply 
security and market integration, plans to further develop critical EU energy 
infrastructures, and the process establishing a gas target model reflect a proper policy 
response to those concerns.
9
 
C. Economic analysis of a proposed policy option to improve market integration in 
new member states: new infrastructure 
While the former two papers are about diagnosis, the third former publication included 
in this thesis (Kaderják et al., 2013) is about methodology and policy analysis to support 
answering the following question: What can we tell about the relative efficiency of 
                                                 
9
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 312/2014 of 26 March 2014 establishing a Network Code on Gas 
Balancing of Transmission Networks; Commission Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 of 14 October 2013 
establishing a Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems and 
supplementing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009; Commission Decision on amending Annex I to Regulation 
(EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks (2012/490/EU); 
Guidance on best practices for congestion management procedures in natural gas transmission networks 
[SWD (2014) 250]; CEER Vision for a European Gas Target Model. Conclusion Paper (1 December 
2011). 
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proposed new gas infrastructure investments in promoting gas market integration in the 
Central and South East European region? The paper introduces the Danube Region Gas 
Market Model (DRGMM), a network and contract constrained multi-country 
competitive equilibrium model that had been developed by a team of REKK 
researchers, including myself.
10
 The paper applies the DRGMM to estimate the impacts 
of new gas infrastructure investments on market integration, social welfare and supply 
security in the countries of Central and South East Europe. Individual projects, project 
packages (e.g. the North-South gas corridor for Central and Eastern Europe as proposed 
by the European Commission) and international pipeline projects (like Nabucco West) 
are evaluated according to a market integration measure introduced by the paper, called 
the Regional Cost Convergence Index (RCCI). Estimates on price spill-over effects of 
new infrastructures are also presented. The model can support cost benefit analyses 
required by the new EU infrastructure regulation (Regulation 347/2013/EC) to identify 
EU projects of common interest.
11
   
D. From oil-indexed to hub-based gas wholesale pricing in Hungary  
While in the three former analytical publications included in this thesis the focus of 
analyses was regional, the final new study concentrates on the Hungarian natural gas 
wholesale market. The primary objective of the study is to identify the principal 
conditions for a transition from monopolistic (oil-indexed) natural gas wholesale pricing 
to hub-based pricing in Hungary. The major hypothesis of the paper is that the major 
obstacles to efficient gas wholesale competition and related pricing to develop are (i) 
the exclusive control over a pivotal infrastructure (namely the Ukraine-Hungary 
interconnector), (ii) high level market concentration and (iii) the foreclosure of the 
Hungarian gas wholesale market by blocking interconnection capacities with regulated 
third party access.  
The paper introduces the leverage function to support the consistent analysis of 
available government measures to undermine dominant market positions based on the 
control of pivotal infrastructures. It is also about simulating the wholesale price impacts 
                                                 
10
 The principal author of the model is András Kis.  
11
 The model has been used for policy purposes in this regard. The energy priority area of the Danube 
Region Strategy used the presented modelling results to establish priorities in new gas infrastructure 
investments for the Danube Region and also published the paper The Danube Region Gas Market Model 
and its Application to Identifying Natural Gas Infrastructure Priorities for the Region (www.rekk.eu). 
Later the model was used for cost benefit analyses by the Energy Community to identify Projects of 
Energy Community Interest (PECIs) in the gas sector of South East Europe (Energy Community, 2013).  
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of policy measures to remove the obstacles to efficient gas wholesale competition in the 
country. In order to assess the efficiency of available supply side, production and 
infrastructure development related policy measures t, controlled experiments or 
simulations are  carried out with a contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition gas market model, the European Gas Market Model.  
The simulation results provide strong support for the research hypotheses. They could 
reproduce the hypothetic functional form between leverage and related gas wholesale 
price outcomes. It was found that under contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition those policies resulting in a leverage value at around –0.2 are sufficient to 
manage an almost full transition from oil-indexed to hub based gas wholesale pricing in 
Hungary. To encourage domestic production and the implementation of the Slovakia-
Hungary interconnector seem to be the most effective policies to arrive at hub-based 
wholesale prices. Simulations also confirmed that a market and regulatory setting 
characterised with strong leverage, low market concentration and no cross border 
capacity blocking results in a gas wholesale price closest to hub-based prices. The 
results of the paper provide the basis for well-founded policy recommendations to 
manage a successful transition to market based gas wholesale pricing in Hungary.  
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1 Abstract 
 
This paper considers security of supply of energy and how the EU enlargement in 2004 
affected security of supply for the EU. Security of supply depends on accessibility to 
primary energy sources, on system adequacy and on market adequacy. We concentrate 
on the longer term aspects of supply security, namely access to primary fuels and 
system adequacy in the gas sector and we consider some statistical measures. Regarding 
import fuel dependency, we conclude that the 2004 enlargement brought abundant local 
solid fuel sources into the EU; and brought in two completely import oil dependent 
nations, Cyprus and Malta.  Regarding gas dependency, we conclude that natural gas 
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dependency of continental 2004 new member states are significantly higher than the EU 
average; Hungary and Latvia have a combined issue of high gas dependence for 
electricity generation and high economic dependence on gas; that gas import 
dependency is significantly higher in new member states than in the old ones; and that 
diversification of sources of gas imports is much less for new than for old member 
states. Natural gas import dependency is a major energy policy issue for continental new 
EU members. We consider the asset and supply ownerships for gas markets in the 
region. A key issue also is the dominance of joint ventures of Russian Gazprom with 
German companies (particularly E.ON Ruhrgas) in the ownership of gas assets and in 
gas supplies throughout the central and east European region. 
 
2 Introduction 
 
Since the oil market crisis of the 1970’s, energy supply security has always been a key 
energy policy issue to discuss and, to a limited extent, act on at a European level. The 
recent proposal of the European Commission [1] identifies the continent’s increasing 
dependence on imported hydrocarbons, the insufficient mechanisms to ensure solidarity 
between Member States in the event of an energy crisis and the still missing 
predictability and efficiency of the internal energy and gas markets to host the necessary 
future investments as the three major security of supply challenges for Europe. 
Regarding the first two issues, the Commission also acknowledges that ‘several 
Member States are largely or completely dependent on one single gas supplier.’ This 
‘single gas supplier’ refers largely to Russia and we can suspect that among the 
‘several’ Member States there are many from those ten which joined the European 
Union in 2004.  Indeed it seems to be the 2004 enlargement that brought the issue of 
unilateral natural gas import dependence onto the supply security agenda of the EU. 
 
Security of supply depends on accessibility to primary energy sources, on system 
adequacy and on market adequacy. In turn, system adequacy includes both production 
and network adequacy. In the following analyses we concentrate on the longer term 
aspects of supply security, namely access to primary fuels and system adequacy in the 
gas sector. We provide an assessment of how the primary energy import dependency of 
the 2004 new member states compares to that of the old members. Special attention is 
paid to comparing the characteristics of gas import dependency of the old 15 member 
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states to that of the relevant continental new ones.
2
  
 
We can differentiate three sub-groups of 2004 new member states along technical or 
operational lines: 
 
 the CENTREL group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) and Slovenia, 
who have strong interconnections to continental western Europe in electricity and 
gas; sometimes referred to as the EU-5 group, 
 the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), having no direct interconnections to 
UCTE countries; sometimes referred to as the EU-3 group, and 
 Cyprus and Malta, being isolated systems; sometimes referred to as the EU-2 group. 
EU-5 and EU-3 together are sometimes referred to as EU-8, and old member states are 
referred to as EU-15.  
 
We will rely on two simple (although disputable) assumptions throughout this paper. 
Regarding primary energy sources, we assume that ceteris paribus less reliance on 
imported fuel and more diversity in fuel sourcing will increase supply security. For 
infrastructure, we associate higher capacity or capacity reserves with a higher level of 
supply security. We disregard the cost efficiency aspect of supply security throughout 
this paper.  
 
First we assess and compare the new and old member states with regard to their primary 
energy balances and to the diversity in meeting their fuel demand. Special attention is 
paid to a deeper analysis of gas (import) dependency by country groups. Then gas 
infrastructure adequacy is analysed. Next a review of initiatives to improve supply 
security in new member states is provided. We conclude with a summary evaluation of 
the impact of the 2004 enlargement on EU wide energy security with regard to the 
aspects under investigation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Cyprus and Malta do not have natural gas sectors.  
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3 Access to primary energy sources 
 
We start with examining the primary energy mix of the different country groups of the 
EU-25 (all members, old and new). Five main primary energy sources are considered: 
solid fuels, oil, natural gas, nuclear and renewable energy sources. The following 
characteristics are compared for EU-15 (old members), EU-5 (Central European), EU-3 
(Baltic States), and EU-2 (isolated systems: Cyprus and Malta):
3
  
 
(1) gross inland consumption (sometimes used as primary energy supply), 
(2) domestic energy production, 
(3) net imports, and  
(4) fuel structure for electricity generation.  
 
3.1 Gross inland consumption of primary energy sources 
 
The left axis of Figure 1 below depicts the share of different primary energy sources in 
gross inland consumption, while the right axis shows the change in gross inland energy 
consumption from 1990 base values for the different country groups (1990 = 1.00).    
 
The gross inland energy consumption of the old member states plus Cyprus and Malta 
has been steadily increasing. Cyprus and Malta together produced by far the largest 
increase in consumption among the groups under investigation: an almost 60% increase 
in the period under investigation.  
 
Oil is the most important fuel source for these countries. In fact, Cyprus and Malta are 
almost 100% dependent on imported oil to serve their energy needs. It is worth 
mentioning that for EU-15 the share of oil and solid fuels in primary energy 
consumption has decreased in the last 15 years while the share of natural gas has 
increased from 17% to about 25%. The popularity of gas based electricity generation
4
 
plays a crucial role here. 
                                                 
3
 The source of the data and of the concept definitions is, unless otherwise stated, EUROSTAT and the 
European Commission’s Statistical Pocketbook (2006).  
4
 Gas based electricity generation has become more important in the last decade for at least two reasons: 
first, changes in efficient plant size in electricity generation (and reductions in unit cost) and second, to 
help meet CO2 standards. 
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On the contrary, gross inland energy consumption has decreased in both the EU-5 and 
EU-3 countries in the last 15 years. While this decrease is modest in the case of EU-5, 
the consumption of the Baltic countries sharply dropped between 1991 and 1992 and 
continued to decrease until 2000, when gross inland consumption was only 45% of 
1990 consumption. Since then demand has started to recover.   
 
For EU-5 the most important primary energy source is solid fuels, that is mostly 
domestically produced coal and lignite in Poland and the Czech Republic. However, the 
share of solid fuels has decreased from 60% in 1990 to approximately 45% recently, 
while both oil, natural gas and nuclear have increased their share in gross final 
consumption.  
 
The primary fuel mix of the Baltic States (EU-3) seems to be the most balanced. It can 
be noted that regarding the EU-8, the level of penetration of nuclear fuel in EU-8 is 
similar to that in EU-15, and the importance of gas in the primary fuel mix of EU-15 
and EU-8 is almost identical.  
 
Figure 1. Gross inland energy consumption 
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3.2 Domestic production 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the trends of primary energy production for the four country 
groups. The left hand axis depicts the share of the five primary energy sources in total 
production, while the right hand axis shows the change in total production from 1990 
base values (1990 = 1.00).   
It can be seen that both the composition of fuels and the trend in production differ 
considerably between the country groups. Primary energy production of EU-15 
countries increased by approximately 10% between 1993 and 1996, but has decreased 
moderately since then. The importance of solid fuels was decreasing in the past decade, 
and has been replaced mostly with nuclear and gas.  
Solid fuel Czech and Polish coal mining dominate the fuel production of the EU-5 
countries, while solid fuel (Estonian oil shale) and nuclear are typical for the EU-3. 
Malta and Cyprus have only renewable local primary energy sources to rely on.   
In the Baltic countries we can see significant changes over the period. There is no 
domestic gas production. Their solid fuel production has been partly replaced by nuclear 
and renewable sources, and the share of renewable sources has increased from 15% to 
more than 30%.  
Figure 2. Domestic production of primary energy 
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3.3 Net imports 
 
After domestic production, we now look at the net import characteristics of the country 
groups. Figure 3 below indicates that for all the country groups except for the Baltic 
States, oil accounts for the largest amount of net imports. Since 1995 natural gas 
imports show the largest increase: approximately 100% increase for the EU-15, 50% for 
EU-5 and 25% increase for the Baltic States (EU-3).  
 
The net imports of oil of the Baltic countries show an almost 50% fall in the early 
nineties. The same also applies to natural gas net imports, but the latter recovered more 
quickly. We can say that the recent increase in demand for primary fuel imports was 
supplied largely by oil and natural gas.  
 
The two islands are totally import dependent on oil. Their net imports are around 3-3.5 
Mtoe recently, which is approximately 30% more than in 1991. 
 
Figure 3. Net imports of energy sources 
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3.4 Fuel structure of electricity generation 
 
The fuel structure for electricity generation has a special relevance for energy supply 
security, since the availability of and secure sourcing of the different fuels significantly 
affect security of supply and the cost of generation. With the increasing reliance of 
Europe on natural gas as a fuel for electricity generation the security issues of the 
natural gas and electricity industries become very integrated.  
How did the 2004 enlargement change the European situation in this respect? Before 
turning to the more in-depth analyses on fuel import dependency, let us briefly review 
the relevant basic statistics for the EU-25.   
Regarding the fuel structure of generation, the striking feature of Figure 4 below is that 
while the dominant fuels in the EU-15 and the EU-3 are coal and nuclear, solid fuels 
play a much more prominent role in Central and Eastern Europe: while decreasing 
slightly over time, solid fuels are still the basis for almost 70% of generated electricity. 
Given that the bulk of the coal used is produced locally, the import dependency of EU-5 
generation as compared to EU-15 seems less of a problem than at first sight. This 
picture is further strengthened by the fact that gas based generation in old member states 
(EU-15) on average has risen to 21% while its share in EU-5 is only around 8% and in 
EU-3 is 14%. 
Dependency on nuclear generation is highest in the Baltic States (or more precisely, in 
Lithuania). Given that a precondition of EU enlargement was to gradually phase out the 
only major nuclear plant of the Baltic (the 1300 MW capacity of the Ignalina nuclear 
power plant in Lithuania), this issue is very relevant from a security of electricity supply 
perspective.  
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Figure 4. Electricity generation by fuel types 
 
 
 
3.5 Aggregate measures of diversity in meeting fuel demand 
 
We sum up the previous sections by providing aggregate measures to compare the 
diversity of meeting fuel demand for the country groups under investigation. 
 
Diversity in meeting the fuel demand of a country or a country group, including 
imports, is the principal element of supply security. Diversity itself is made up of at 
least three subordinate properties [2].  
 
 Variety refers to the number of different types of fuel to meet gross fuel demand.   
 Balance refers to the pattern in the apportionment (spread) of that quantity across 
the relevant fuel categories.  
 Disparity refers to the nature and degree to which the categories themselves are 
different from each other (substitution).  
 
We calculate two versions of the Shannon-Wiener index (henceforth ‘Shannon index’) 
to measure the diversity of meeting fuel use for the regions under investigation. 
 
The Shannon index is similar to the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, but, as Stirling 
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demonstrates, it is not sensitive to the applied logarithm and it is also more robust, 
because it holds the additivity property [2]. The general form of the Shannon index is as 
follows:  
           
 
   
 
where pi is the share of fuel type i in gross inland fuel consumption and n is the number 
of different fuels used.  
 
Figure 5 depicts the Shannon index for the four country groups under investigation. The 
dotted (red) line above indicates the maximum value for the index in the case of five 
different fuel types (solid fuels, oil, gas, nuclear, renewable energy sources).
1
  
 
The higher the value of the Shannon index, the higher the diversification in meeting fuel 
consumption. It can be seen that the diversification is highest in the EU-3 region, which 
has been at almost the maximum value in the last few years. For the period under 
investigation the value of the index for old member states remained high and stable. 
Diversification of the EU-5 countries has been steadily improving and in 2004 it almost 
reached the level typical for the EU-15 group. Naturally, Malta and Cyprus are the least 
diversified countries with respect to their fuel imports. We can conclude that the general 
Shannon index indicates no significant difference in the fuel diversity of EU-8 and old 
member states (EU-15), thus we can conclude that in the aspect of fuel diversity the 
2004 EU enlargement did not significantly change the security of supply situation of the 
EU. 
 
                                                 
1
 In the case of five alternative primary energy sources, the maximum value of the Shannon index is 
         
 
 
     . 
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Figure 5. Shannon index 
 
 
Beyond diversity, import dependence is also a major determinant of supply security. 
The general form of the Shannon index is unable to account for the extent of as well as 
the diversity in imports to meet local demand. In order to account for that, we followed 
the proposal of Hirschhausen, and Jansen calculated an enhanced version of the 
Shannon index [3][4]. The idea behind this index is that supply security is affected not 
only by the share of net imports in the final consumption of fuels, but also by the 
diversification of import sources. Hence, in the case of this index the higher the number 
of sources of imports at a given import rate, the higher the diversification of fuel supply. 
Formally, the index takes the following form: 
            
 
   
 
where  is a correction factor for each type of primary energy source. The correction 
factor takes into account the share of net imports in the total consumption of a given 
energy source, and the rate of diversification of the import sources.  
For the calculation we assume that the world markets for solid fuels, oil and nuclear fuel 
are highly competitive since there are a number of alternative sources as well as 
transportation routes available for customers. Trading in gas however is more limited by 
the physical infrastructure. In the case of renewable sources, the level of international 
ic
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trading is very low, so we disregard the potential for diversification in this regard.   
 
 
Due to the above reasons, the correction factors of solid fuels, oil, nuclear and 
renewable sources are set equal to 1, and the correction factor of natural gas only is 
calculated in the following way:               
    
    
 , where      is the share 
of net imports in gas consumption,      is the Shannon index of gas import flows,  
    
is the maximum of the Shannon index, and                    
 
    , where       
is the share of imports of gas from region j in the total imported gas for the given 
country group.
2
 Figure 6 contains the results for the period 1997-2004.  
 
 
Figure 6. Import corrected Shannon index 
 
 
It seems apparent that the index value for the old member states (EU-15) is more 
resistant to the inclusion of the gas import issue into the index calculation. On the other 
hand EU-3 and EU-5 Shannon index values drop significantly. This is mainly the result 
of the fact that the gas import diversity of the EU-5 member states is much lower than 
that of the old member states. They have only five big trading partners, of which the 
                                                 
2
 The following exporting countries were considered: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Montenegro, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Malaysia, United Arab 
Emirates, Iran, Oman and Qatar. 
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share of the Russian Federation is very high. On the other hand, old member states have 
significant inland sources of gas (imports from EU member states, in particular the 
Netherlands and the UK). Furthermore, their imports from outside the EU come mostly 
from three different regions: Norway, the Russian Federation and Algeria. Supplies 
from these three account for approximately 80% of EU-15 total net gas imports. 
 
The drop in the Shannon index for EU-8 indicates the issue of their very high gas import 
dependency on Russian gas supplies. Since we consider this as the single most 
important supply security issue that the 2004 enlargement of the EU brought to the EU, 
we further analyse it at the country level in the next section.    
 
3.6 Measuring import dependency on natural gas 
 
The natural gas industry is young in continental Europe. Its history goes back only four 
decades with the development of the major physical infrastructure linking production 
sites and consumption centres. Infrastructure development has traditionally been based 
on long term contracts for gas delivery. In this period the inland gas production of some 
EU-15 countries was significant. Gas supply has gradually been diversifying for old 
member states (Netherlands, Norway, UK, North Africa, LNG etc). In sharp contrast to 
that, for new Member States the development of the natural gas industry, including the 
physical infrastructure, was completely based on cooperation with the Soviet Union and 
within the COMECON block.  
 
In a subsequent section, we discuss network operation and adequacy, and in this section, 
we analyze gas import dependency. First we consider more systematically the fuel 
import dependency of new member states compared to old ones. From a security of 
supply point of view, increased reliance on and decreased diversity in fuel imports poses 
a higher risk.  
 
Figure 7 indicates the status of new member states’ fuel import dependency. Import 
dependency from gas is higher than the EU-25 average for all those new members that 
use natural gas. This also applies to oil with the exception of Hungary and Estonia. The 
bulk of oil and gas imports for EU-5 and EU-3 countries are provided by Russia through 
pipeline systems. Taking all types of fuels into account, only Poland, the Czech 
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Republic, Estonia (because of their solid fuel sources) and Lithuania (because of its 
nuclear energy) perform better than the EU average for measures of import dependency.  
 
Figure 7. Net imports / total consumption* in new members, 2004 
 
* Definition: Import Dependency = Net Imports / (Bunkers + Gross Inland Consumption). Source: 
Commission Pocketbook (2006).  
Note: A simplified formula, not taking bunkers into account, is used occasionally. This variant gives 
higher values for import dependency by overlooking maritime transport. Negative numbers indicate that 
the country is a net exporter. Values over 100 % are possible due to changes in stocks. 
 
Next we apply a measure that is generally used to measure the oil dependency of 
national economies [5]. This index is a combined one, and it can be expressed as 
follows:  
 
(net gas import/total GDP) = (net gas imports/total gas used) * (total gas used/total 
energy consumption) * (total energy consumption/total GDP).  
 
Therefore, it is a combination of import dependency, gas dependency and energy 
intensity. Figure 8 depicts the development of these values for the new member states 
and compares it to the EU-25 average.   
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Figure 8. Natural gas dependency of the economies of new Member States* 
 
*in year 2000 euro 
 
The message of Figure 8 is that gas dependency of the economies of continental new 
member states is higher than that of the old member states by orders of magnitude. The 
Slovakian, Hungarian, Latvian and Lithuanian economies use 15-25 times more gas to 
produce a unit of GDP than the rest of EU members. On the other end, Poland and 
Slovenia are the least dependent economies on gas from the continental new member 
states group (but still more dependent than the EU average).  
 
It is also worth having a look on the importance of gas in electricity generation by new 
member states. Figure 9 below shows that the combined issue of gas dependency of the 
economy and of electricity production is most apparent in Hungary and Latvia, and has 
become increasingly so over the period. The importance of gas in electricity generation 
for the rest of new members is below the EU-25 average. 
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Figure 9. The share of gas in electricity generation by new Member States 
 
 
Finally, the level of net gas imports to total gas consumption is depicted on Figure 10.  
Here we can see that the gas import dependency of the new member states is well above 
the average for the whole EU (EU-25).  
 
Figure 10. Net gas imports to total gas consumption 
 
Note: Values over 100 % are possible due to changes in stocks 
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Table 1. Central and Eastern European new Member States’ pipeline gas imports 2006 (bcm/%) 
Country 
PIPELINE GAS IMPORTS 2006 (bcm / year) 
Algeria France Germany Norway Russia Other Total 
Czech 
Republic 
   
2.9 
(30%) 
6.8 
(70%) 
 
9.7 
(100%) 
Estonia     
1 
(100%) 
 
1 
(100%) 
Hungary   
0.8 
(8%) 
 
7.7 
(75%) 
1.8 
(17%) 
10.3 
(100%) 
Latvia     
1.5 
(100%) 
 
1.5 
(100%) 
Lithuania     
3.3 
(100%) 
 
3.3 
(100%) 
Poland   
0.4 
(4%) 
0.4 
(4%) 
5.4 
(61%) 
2.7 
(30%) 
8.9 
(100%) 
Slovakia     
6.4 
(100%) 
 
6.4 
(100%) 
Slovenia 0.4 (36%)    
0.6 
(55%) 
0.1 
(9%) 
1.1 
(100%) 
EU-10 
0.4 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
1.2 
(3%) 
3.3 
(8%) 
32.7 
(77%) 
4.6 
(11%) 
42.2 
(100%) 
Source: IEA, BP, Other 
 
Although in terms of the gas molecules all imported gas supplies to all east and central 
European countries come from Russia, in commercial terms, some countries have 
managed to diversify some of their gas imports. For the group under investigation gas 
imports from Russia have reduced from 86% of all their gas imports in 1999 to 77% in 
2006.  
 
Even though it lies on the route of the Brotherhood Pipeline from Russia via Ukraine, 
and all gas flows are in an east-west direction, the Czech Republic has nevertheless 
been able to diversify some of its gas imports. From taking 82% of its gas from Russia 
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in 1999, the Czech Republic in 2006 had reduced that to 70% and took 30% of its gas 
supply from Norway. Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have also diversified some of their 
gas supplies.  
 
The three Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, plus Slovakia (lying right next 
to Ukraine) in 2006 still took 100% of their gas supplies from Russia. 
 
In summary, of the group of 2004 new member states gas import dependency seems to 
create the least problems for Poland. At the other end, Hungary and Latvia seem to be 
the most exposed economies regarding security of gas supply.  
 
Regarding import fuel dependency, we can conclude that the 2004 enlargement: 
 
 Brought the EU-5 region with abundant local solid fuel sources into the European 
Union;  
 It brought two completely import oil dependent nations, Cyprus and Malta into the 
Union. 
 
With regard to gas dependency, we can conclude that:   
 
 Natural gas dependency of the economies of continental 2004 new member states 
(EU-8) are significantly higher than the EU average.  
 Hungary and Latvia have a combined issue of high gas dependence for electricity 
generation and high economic dependence on gas. 
 Gas import dependency is significantly higher in new member states than in the old 
ones. 
 Diversification of sources of gas imports is much less for new than for old member 
states.  
 
As a result of the above combination of factors, gas import dependence on Russia has 
become the number one energy security issue for the continental 2004 new member 
states. 
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4 Gas network adequacy and future investment plans 
 
The physical structure of the gas networks together with the fact that Russia has not 
implemented a regulated third party access regime to its gas transmission networks 
(which would allow gas transits through Russia, Ukraine or Belarus) partly explains the 
restricted possibilities for diversification of sources of gas imports for EU-8.   
 
Gas networks in continental new member states reflect the East-West gas transmission 
routes connecting major Russian gas fields to markets in central and western Europe 
(Germany, Italy and points further west). North-South connections and consequent 
cooperation across these member states are essentially missing. The current physical gas 
infrastructure in the new EU-8 does not allow for much diversity of sources of gas 
supply.
3
  
 
From a security of supply perspective, there are at least three aspects of the 
infrastructure that have to be investigated. First, whether the capacity of the current 
infrastructure is sufficient to serve present and forecast demand. Second, how future 
investment plans might change the capacity as well as the ability of the infrastructure to 
support diversification. Since the owners of gas TSOs have a decisive say over their 
willingness to enter into new gas infrastructure development projects, our third aspect 
relates to the ownership structure of gas TSOs in EU-8.    
 
4.1 Gas network adequacy 
 
This section provides an assessment of gas transport and storage capacity for EU-8 and 
considers some basic conditions for diversifying into bringing LNG into the region. 
 
4.1.1 Gas transport capacity at the end of 2005 
 
The capacities of the main international gas pipelines at the border points of EU-8 
                                                 
3
 Note also that for EU-5 new member states there is a fundamental difference between how the 
operations of their electricity as opposed to the gas systems changed as a result of the reorientation 
process from Russia to the EU. While, as a consequence of UCTE harmonization, the cooperation of the 
electricity system of EU-5 essentially halted with Russia back in the middle of the 1990s, in the case of 
gas the political changes had in fact no effect on how the gas transmission system has been operated since 
then. 
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countires are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 2. Capacities at EU-10 Cross Border Nodes (End 2005) 
Pipeline Location From To 
Max Flow rate 
mcm/ 
hour 
bcm/ 
year 
Gasum Oy Imatra Russia Finland 0.80 7.0 
LV-LT Kiemenai Latvia Lithuania 0.22 1.9 
Bel-Lit Kotlovka Belarus Lithuania 1.20 10.5 
Yamal Kondratki Belarus Poland 3.72 32.6 
EuRoPol Mallnow Poland Germany 3.00 26.3 
Brotherhood Velke Kapusany Ukraine Slovakia 12.75 111.7 
Brotherhood Drozdowicze Ukraine Poland 0.70 6.1 
Brotherhood Beregdaroc Ukraine Hungary 1.72 15.1 
Stegal Lanzhot Slovakia Czech 6.50 56.9 
Stegal Hora Svate Kateriny Czech Germany 1.83 16.0 
Megal Waidhaus Czech Germany 3.97 34.8 
TAG, HAG Baumgarten Slovakia Austria 6.00 52.6 
HAG Mosonmagyarovar Austria Hungary 0.50 4.4 
SOL Murfeld Austria Slovenia 0.42 3.7 
SOL Rogatec Slovenia Hungary 0.20 1.8 
TAG Gorizia Slovenia Italy 0.19 1.7 
Source: Mercados 
 
These various pipeline systems are the main transit pipelines to western Europe: 
Brotherhood from Russia through Ukraine to the Slovak Republic and its various 
offshoots (STEGAL and MEGAL through the Slovak and Czech Republics, TAG and 
WAG through Slovak Republic to Austria, HAG from Austria to Hungary) and Yamal 
from Russia via Poland to Germany. There are some direct pipeline routes to Finland 
and to Baltic countries. 
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These pipeline routes were established in Soviet times and the main Brotherhood and 
offshoot pipelines date from the mid 1980s.  The pipeline system is therefore 
approximately 20 years old now. More recent developments have been the Yamal 
pipeline but Yamal II is now in doubt because of the forthcoming Baltic sea pipeline 
route connecting Russia directly with Germany. 
 
In terms of network adequacy, the Brotherhood pipeline operated in 2005 at about 70% 
load factor.  With a capacity of 111.7 bcm a year and gas flows of 81.3 bcm on the 
Brotherhood pipeline at the Ukraine – Slovak Republic border, there was an average 
load factor in 2005 of 73%.  This is a well used pipeline but there is sufficient spare 
capacity now to cope with any demand spikes. 
 
4.1.2 Storage 
 
An important way of balancing gas supplies and also in reducing reliance on a single 
source of piped natural gas is through using gas storage.  The following table shows 
working gas capacity for the EU-15 and EU-8 countries for three spot years.  They show 
that while the EU-8 countries have been increasing their gas storage, it has been more or 
less in line with EU-15 storage increases and in line with the growth in domestic 
demand. 
 
Table 3. European Gas Storage 
Country 
Working Capacity 
(mmcm) 
End 1998 
Working Capacity 
(mmcm) 
End 2002 
Working Capacity 
(mmcm) 
End 2005 
Austria 2,630 3,020 2,820 
Belgium 854 636 655 
Denmark 770 700 810 
France 10,490 10,800 10,800 
Germany 15,450 18,830 18,934 
Italy 9,110 12,747 12,792 
Netherlands 72 2,478 2,478 
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Spain 1,274 1,414 2,366 
UK 3,114 3,645 3,759 
Total EU15 43,764 54,270 55,414 
    
Czech Republic 1,700 2,059 2,285 
Slovak Republic 1,700 2,740 2,740 
Hungary 3,200 3,340 3,400 
Poland 1,100 1,460 1,795 
Total EU10 7,700 9,599 10,220 
Source: IEA; EU-8 1998, Cedigaz 
 
The conclusion is that EU-8 member states have not fundamentally increased gas 
storage capacity as a response to the EU enlargement process, or for any other reason 
except as a balancing tool to manage domestic demand. 
 
The ownership unbundling of gas storage from the transportation assets has recently 
been completed in Slovakia and Hungary, which might come to allow an increased 
competition in gas storage, to set against the massive gas storage in Ukraine.   
 
The gas storage capacity in the EU-8 countries, and indeed in the whole EU25, is 
dwarfed by that of Ukraine.  Against the approximately 50 bcm of working gas capacity 
in the EU25 in 1998, Ukraine alone had 36 bcm, and half of that in one storage field. 
 
4.1.3 LNG 
 
None of the EU-8 countries currently have any LNG import terminals.   
 
LNG terminals for EU-8 countries have to be on the Baltic coast (so only Poland and 
the three Baltic Republics could be LNG importers). The problem that all these 
countries face is that LNG cargoes will have to pass through the Skagerrak (the straits 
between Denmark and Sweden). These straits are very narrow and congested.  They 
also pass by very populated areas (Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark, and Malmö, a 
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major city in Sweden), and at the narrowest point (some four km) they pass by the 
towns of Helsingor and Helsingborg.  As well as congestion through the straits the 
Danish Government in particular wants to keep the transport of dangerous highly 
inflammable liquids (oil and LNG) to a minimum. 
 
4.2 Future investments – The fight over controlling the gas infrastructure 
 
EU-25 demand for natural gas is increasing strongly and new gas supplies and pipeline 
capacity is needed. On the other hand, new member states’ companies and national 
governments have initiated several projects with the aim of having physical 
infrastructure in place to support gas import diversification. These two factors combined 
have led to a considerable amount of activity now in developing new gas pipeline and 
storage projects.  
 
Indeed, what we see is a developing sharp competition over new infrastructure 
development opportunities and for control over the existing strategic assets. Russia is 
playing a leading role in this race. Russia wishes to secure its future market share in 
Europe partly through participating in infrastructure development projects. Control over 
strategic infrastructure (present and future) is perceived as a way to manage gas supplies 
to the developing European gas retail markets, Russia wishes to ensure that its gas 
supplies can reach profitable western European markets without being diverted en-
route. Control over key transit infrastructure can also serve Russian interests in 
channelling Central Asian, Middle East and Caucasian gas supplies to western Europe 
through Russian Gazprom-controlled pipelines. The maintenance of gas import 
dependency of the EU-8 on Russian (or Russian controlled) supplies can provide a 
profitable quasi-monopoly position for Russia in the region. Finally it may help to re-
vitalize or maintain Russian political influence in this part of the former Soviet block [6] 
[7].  
 
The means that Russia employs to reach its strategic goals are diverse. They include 
proposing and developing new major pipeline routes (e.g. North European Baltic Sea 
pipeline project: NEBP) and the upgrading of existing ones (e.g. upgrading Brotherhood 
pipeline); the takeover, mostly in tandem with Eon-Ruhrgas, of significant stakes in EU-
8 gas infrastructure (see later); and blocking non-Russian initiatives diversification 
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projects by putting forward alternative ‘phantom’ proposals (e.g. Blue Stream 2).  
 
4.2.1 Initiatives to increase security of supply in new Member States 
 
In this section we discuss briefly those major initiatives that EU-8 member companies 
and / or governments (in cooperation with other partners) have been proposing to 
improve their access to external natural gas sources and thus to improve their security of 
supply.
4
  
 
4.2.1.1 Nabucco gas pipeline 
 
The most ambitious gas infrastructure project with a potential major positive impact on 
the diversity of new member states’ gas infrastructure and security of supply is the well-
known EU top priority NABUCCO pipeline project. If realised, this pipeline could 
bring an additional 30 Bcm/year of natural gas to the European market at Baumgarten in 
Austria.  
 
It is important to emphasize that this project could serve several EU-level policy goals 
at the same time. It could provide Europe with direct physical access to vast Middle 
East, Central Asian and Caucasus gas reserves; it could fundamentally change gas-to-
gas competition on new member states’ gas markets; and it could contribute to 
increased cooperation of the EU with the supply countries.  
 
4.2.1.2 Adria LNG 
 
The idea of building an LNG re-gasification terminal at Krk island close to the Adriatic 
coast of Croatia and supply this gas to the Croatian, Italian, Austrian and Hungarian 
markets has a history of 10 years. Due to gas market developments the activity of the 
project company Adria LNG has been re-vitalized recently. If completed, the project 
could bring 8-14 Bcm/year additional gas to the region by 2011.  
 
The Adria LNG Study Company is a joint venture by OMV, Total, RWE Transgas, and 
                                                 
4
 We do not cover the efforts for contractual diversification. See preliminary results of these efforts in 
Table 1.  
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INA to set up an LNG terminal in Croatia. Adria LNG also signed an alliance 
agreement with EON Ruhrgas in 2006. Due to the current state ownership in INA and 
OMV, government support from Austria, Croatia and also from Hungary seems vital for 
accomplishing this project. The Croatian and Hungarian governments have recently 
expressed their support for the project several times. 
  
4.2.1.3 LNG in Poland5 
 
The Polish oil and gas company PGNiG (Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo) 
and a consulting consortium are working on a detailed feasibility study and technical 
and economic assumptions for imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Poland. The 
purpose of the study is to develop a comprehensive concept for LNG supply to Poland. 
 
One of the key elements of the study is to verify the profitability of LNG terminal 
construction in the Polish Coast. The expected throughput capacity of the terminal is 3-5 
Bcm with an option of further expansion.  
 
The broad range of topics covered by the study includes a number of detailed analyses 
to be undertaken by PGNiG together with the consulting consortium. The specific topics 
will include gas demand, LNG sourcing capabilities, transportation options, potential 
terminal locations in Poland and technical concepts for the terminal. The feasibility 
study will also comprise an economic part in the form of a detailed financial model, as 
well as organizational and socio-economic analyses.  
 
At the beginning of 2006 PGNiG signed letters of intent with the ports in Gdansk and 
Swinoujscie with a view to cooperation in location studies.  
 
4.2.1.4 Polish – Norwegian - Danish gas cooperation6 
 
In June 2007, Polish and Norwegian authorities are reported to have agreed on the 
financial terms for a pipeline to channel natural gas from Norway's offshore fields to 
                                                 
5
 Source: PGNiG homepage: http://www.en.pgnig.pl/firma/1865.htm. Downloaded: August 11, 2007 
6
 Source: http://www.polandbusinessnetwork.pl/news/index.php?contentid=143568. Downloaded: August 
11, 2007 
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Poland, which is trying to lessen its reliance on Russian energy. The commercial terms 
of the proposed plan are still to be agreed on. The planned gas pipeline from Norway to 
Poland is due to run via Denmark. 
 
In May 2007, the Polish gas company PGNiG reached a deal on the pipeline with 
Denmark's Energinet.dk. In March, as part of the project, PGNiG also agreed with 
ExxonMobil to purchase a 15% stake in three Norwegian offshore gas exploration and 
production licences. 
 
4.2.1.5 Security gas storage development in Hungary 
 
In order to decrease gas supply security risks, especially in winter peak load periods, the 
Hungarian Parliament has passed legislation that requires the Hungarian Hydrocarbon 
Storage Association to build a security gas storage facility with a minimum of 1.2 Bcm 
annual working gas capacity and a daily 20 million cubic metres (Mcm) off-take 
capacity. The estimated project cost is €400 million. MOL, the major Hungarian oil and 
gas company, won the investment tender. The storage facility should be operational by 
2010. Conditions and pricing of access to this specific storage facility will be regulated 
by the Minister for economy and transport.  
 
4.2.2 Russian initiatives 
 
Regarding gas from Russia, there are two major existing pipeline routes.  For a number 
of years now it has been increasingly realised that there is room for a North European 
Baltic Sea pipeline route of some form. Of the various projects under consideration, the 
NEGP has won out and is now the project under development. 
 
The other North European supply route was pioneered by Yamal I, from the Yamal field 
in western Siberia in Russia through Poland to Germany.  Yamal I is in operation and 
Yamal II can now be developed.  Because of the NEGP Baltic Sea project though, 
Yamal II is now on hold. 
 
Plans for diversification of gas infrastructure of new member states face some 
opposition from Russia which is obviously keen to protect its own supply monopoly for 
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the region. These efforts have been supported by acquisitions of strategic gas assets in 
the region. 
 
4.2.2.1 Changing ownership of EU8 gas infrastructure 
 
In 1990, in the former Soviet system, the central and east European region could be 
described as being dominated by national single vertically integrated gas companies (as 
in much of western Europe), but in central and eastern Europe, national gas companies 
were under a strong degree of control by Soviet Gazprom.  During the 1990s and still 
continuing now (2007), the region has seen a wide transfer of ownership of these 
previous national companies.  The following table shows in a summary form the main 
players and owners in the gas industries of each of the EU8 member states.  It shows the 
result of 15 years of activity and privatisation. 
 
Table 4. Summary of EU-10 Gas Industry Structure (2006) 
Country National Gas 
Company 
Ownership Amount of 
Unbundling 
New Entrants Gas Supply 
2006 
Estonia 
 
 
 
 
Eesti Gaas Gazprom (37%) 
E.ON (33%) 
Fortum (17%) 
Others (13%) 
Võrguteenus (TSO 
and DSO) 
 
24 smaller DSOs 
(DSO, supply) 
None Russia-100% 
Latvia 
 
Latvijas Gaze Gazprom 
E.ON 
None None Russia-100% 
Lithuania 
 
 
 
 
 
Lietuvos Dujos 
AB 
 
Dujotekana UAB 
Gazprom 
E.ON 
State Property 
Fund 
Lietuvos Dujos 
AB (TSO, DSO, 
supply) 
 
Dujotekana UAB 
(supply) 
 
6 local DSOs 
None Russia-100% 
Czech 
Republic 
 
RWE Transgas 
Net 
RWE RWE Transgas 
Net (TSO) 
 
Wingas (one 
consumer) 
Russia-70% 
Norway-30% 
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8 DSOs 
(6 RWE, 2 E.ON) 
 
105 small DSOs 
Slovak 
Republic 
 
 
 
Slovensky 
Plynarensky 
Priemysel (SPP) 
State (51%) 
E.ON (24.5%) 
GdF (24.5%) 
Option to 
Gazprom 
None None Russia-100% 
Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOL 
Földgázszállitó Rt 
 
MOL (100%) MOL 
Földgázszállító Rt 
(TSO) 
 
E.ON (storage, 
wholesale trading; 
a pending asset 
swap with 
Gazprom)  
 
6 regional DSOs 
(Budapest 
Municipality, 
Italgas, Gaz de 
France x 2, 
Bayernwerk, 
E.ON ) 
 
5 small DSOs 
 
14 other suppliers 
Panrusgaz 
(E.ON 50%, 
Gazprom 
50%) 
 
EMFESZ 
(Russian, 
Ukrainian) 
 
14 licensed 
suppliers 
Russia-75% 
Germany-8% 
Others-17% 
Poland 
 
 
 
PGNiG PGNiG (Polish 
State) 
None None Russia-61% 
Germany-4% 
Norway-4% 
Others-30% 
Slovenia  
 
 
Geoplin Geoplin 
(Slovenian) 
None None Algeria-36% 
Russia-55% 
Others-9% 
Source: Mercados 
Note: TSO = Transmission System Operator, DSO = Distribution System Operator 
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It can be seen that many gas companies of the new member states are owned by joint 
ventures of Russian Gazprom and German E.ON Ruhrgas in joint ventures, or with 
other German companies (RWE, Wingas and Bayernwerk).  There is also a small 
influence by Gaz de France and Italgas in the region. Of the whole region, every 
country that has allowed in foreign participation (which is every country except for 
Poland and Slovenia) has resulted in an E.ON Ruhrgas ownership of gas assets. Of these 
countries E.ON Ruhrgas made acquisitions in partnership with Gazprom in every 
country except for the Czech Republic (where another German company, RWE, has a 
100% ownership of the gas transport company and six of the eight distribution 
companies, the other two being owned by E.ON). It could be said that the region has 
exchanged Soviet dominance for combined German and Russian dominance of their gas 
industries. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
Natural gas import dependency has been identified as a major energy policy issue for 
those continental new EU members who joined the European Union in 2004. We have 
concentrated on an assessment of one component of the security of supply issue 
(namely the lack of diversification in sources of supply). It was demonstrated that the 
natural gas economies of old member states are significantly more diversified, and the 
security of supply issue has been increased and brought to the forefront of the EU’s 
energy policy agenda by the 2004 enlargement.  
 
A key issue also is the dominance of joint ventures of Russian Gazprom with German 
companies (particularly E.ON Ruhrgas) in the ownership of gas assets and in gas 
supplies throughout the EU-8 region. 
 
Without strong efforts to introduce effective competition, an area where European 
Commission regulation could be very important, the dominance of the region by 
Russian and German companies (that is to say, by joint ventures of E.ON and Gazprom) 
is likely to continue. Efforts to promote competition could, among others include: (1) 
ownership unbundling of gas TSOs; (2) unbundling gas storage from gas transmission 
and providing effective independent storage; (3) unbundling gas supply from asset 
ownership; (4) introducing effective regulated third party access within the EU-8; (5) 
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reaching agreement with Russia and with transit countries for the provision of regulated 
third party access to their gas transmission grids; and (6) promoting key diversification 
projects (such as Nabucco, LNG, gas storage projects).  
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The January 2009 gas crisis in Central Eastern and South-East 
Europe1 
 
Péter Kaderják2 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Between January 7th and 19th of 2009 the transit of Russian gas to Europe through the 
Ukraine was halted. This was the most serious European gas crisis to have happened 
since the start of Russian gas transmission to Europe decades earlier. A daily average of 
380 million cubic meter (Mcm) or a total of 5 billion cubic meter (Bcm) of Russian gas 
delivery through Ukraine to the EU and South East Europe was lost during these days.
3
 
Gas industries and customers of Central Eastern and South-East Europe (CSEE), 
including many of the new member states of the EU, were hit particularly strong by the 
crisis. The share of lost gas supply for the countries of the region from Austria to 
Greece due to the gas cut accounted for 50-100% (except for Poland and Romania). 
Several countries had to introduce forced load shedding measures. The official 
economic loss estimate from lost load is close to 2 billion Euros for the most affected 
countries. If the crisis did not coincide with a major economic recession, the economic 
loss it caused could have been significantly larger.    
    
Retrospectively, the January 2009 gas crisis can be viewed as an unprecedented short 
run supply security experiment that tested the vulnerability of the EU’s gas industry 
and, in particular, helped to detect the strengths and weaknesses of the gas industries of 
the CSEE region.   
 
There are some positive lessons of this experiment from a regional perspective. The 
discovery of the reverse flow capabilities of the European gas transmission grid opened 
                                                 
1
 Some parts of this paper rely heavily on Kaderjak, P. (ed) (2011), Security of energy supply in Central 
and South-East Europe, pp 234-257. Corvinus University of Budapest, REKK. Originally published in 
Vinois, J.A. (ed), The Security of Energy Supply in the European Union, pp. 193-219. Claeys and 
Casteels, 2011 
2
 Péter Kaderják is director of REKK, the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research at the Corvinus 
University of Budapest. E-mail: pkaderjak@uni-corvinus.hu. 
3
 Simpson, J. (2009), January 2009 – Russia – Ukraine gas dispute. IEA presentation for the Gas 
Coordination Group, February 23.  
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up formerly unproved supply diversification opportunities for the region through a 
better utilization of the existing infrastructure. Those countries with sufficient physical 
connections to the relatively liquid gas markets of Austria and Germany (Czech 
Republic and Slovenia) or to the LNG receiving terminal of Greece (Bulgaria) enjoyed 
the advantage of receiving reverse gas flows from these directions. It is also largely due 
to the accomplishment of reverse flows that despite former scepticism (“at the end, all 
molecules in the region come from Russia”), contractual diversification delivered 
during the crisis. 
 
The crisis also confirmed that gas market development and supply security goes hand in 
hand. The Austrian case illustrated how a well functioning gas market could mitigate a 
major supply shock in a fast and efficient manner. Moreover, those countries from CEE 
with a strong physical link to the German and Austrian gas markets (Czech Republic 
and Slovenia) could manage the crisis without customer restrictions.  
 
However, the crisis also revealed the asymmetries of the European gas industry as well 
as the most important weaknesses of the CSEE gas sector. While the gas transmission 
network of old EU members are relatively well interconnected, the current physical gas 
infrastructure of the CSEE countries does not allow for much diversity in gas supply 
sourcing. North-South interconnections and consequent cooperation across the region’s 
gas markets were missing at the time of the crisis and this made it impossible to help 
each other when it happened. There were also serious problems encountered in the 
regional utilization of existing underground gas storage assets to ease the supply shock 
of the crisis. Finally, crisis related planning, regulation and preparedness was 
insufficient in the rest of the countries.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to sum up the most important lessons from the 2009 gas 
crisis in CSEE and assess how the after crisis-efforts, both at the EU and at the national 
level, address the diagnosis that the crisis provided about the most important problems 
of the CEE gas markets. It comments on how the implementation of the new gas supply 
security regulation 994/2010 (Regulation) and some more recent initiatives at the EU 
level could improve the situation in CSEE. For this purpose, Section 2 provides a brief 
background on the gas industries of the most affected countries from Central Eastern 
and South-East Europe: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
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Republic, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
4
 Section 3 
provides major regulatory lessons from the crisis. Section 4 assesses to what extent the 
problems revealed by the crisis are addressed by EU and national level actions and 
Section 5 concludes.       
 
2 CSEE natural gas industry background 
 
The natural gas industry of the EU is characterized by important regional asymmetries. 
Among them the asymmetries in network topology and in gas supply sourcing between 
CEE new member states and Energy Community members on the Balkans versus the 
continental ‘old’ member states are important to understand for the study of the 2009 
gas crisis.
5
  
 
The gas transmission networks of old members are relatively well interconnected. 
Pipeline connections to all the three major supplying regions (Russia, Norway, North 
Africa) as well as a fast developing LNG infrastructure are available for them. This 
topology supports gas sector cooperation across member states and allows for a 
substantial diversification in supply sourcing. On the contrary, the gas transmission 
network topology in the Visegrad 4 continental new member states (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) reflect the East-West gas transmission routes 
connecting major Russian gas fields to markets in Central and South Europe (Germany, 
Italy) and points of delivery further to the West. North-South connections and 
consequent cooperation across these member states are missing. With regard to South 
East Europe, interconnections among the three different routes
6
 that provide Russian gas 
supplies to these countries were also missing at the time of the crisis.
7
 In sum, the 
current physical gas infrastructure of the Central and Southern East European (CSEE) 
countries does not allow for much diversity in gas supply sourcing.  
                                                 
4
 We exclude Poland and the Baltic states from the analysis since increased supplies through the Yamal 
pipeline system during the crisis prevented these countries from the worst of it.      
5
 See Kaderják, P., Cameron, P. and Tóth, A. I. (2007): Unilateral natural gas import dependence: a new 
supply security risk for Europe, in: European Review of Energy Markets, Volume 2, 57-92; and Pierre 
Noel. (2008). Beyond dependence: how to deal with Russian gas. European Council on Foreign Relations. 
6
 1) Russia-Ukraine-Romania-Moldova-Bulgaria-FYR of Macedonia; 2) Russia-Ukraine-Hungary-Serbia-
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 3) Russia-Ukraine-Slovakia-Austria-Slovenia-Croatia. 
7
 The first exceptions to this rule are the 4.5 mcm/day interconnector between Hungary and Romania that 
was commissioned in October 2010 and the 18 mcm/day interconnector between Hungary and Croatia 
commissioned in December 2010. However, these pipelines do not yet provide reverse flows. 
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A high level of unilateral gas import dependence on Russia is the other important 
characteristics of the CSEE gas sectors. While in 2006 the share of Russian gas in the 
primary gas supply of EU15 was an average of 20%, the same share for nine out of the 
ten
8
 Eastern European member states was above 50%, and for six above 80%.  
 
Due mostly to the asymmetries in network topology and gas supply sourcing, the 2009 
gas crisis had also a highly asymmetric impact on the EU gas economies as illustrated 
by Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Reduction in gas supply (imports + domestic production) on January 7, 2009 
 
Source: The presentation of Walter Boltz at REKK’s 1st workshop on Security of Supply in CSEE titled 
‘Regulatory reactions to the 2009 January gas crisis and the coming winter’. October 29, 2009. 
Budapest. www.rekk.eu/sos. 
 
Table 1 provides before-crisis data on the annual balance of gas consumption and 
supply sources for the most affected CSEE countries. Note that the aggregate size of the 
gas markets under study equals only about 70% of the German gas market. As we can 
see, natural gas based electricity generation accounts for more than 30% of gas 
consumption in Hungary and Austria, while gas consumption for industrial purposes 
plays a dominant role in Slovenia (57%) and Serbia (54%) and its share is over 30% in 
                                                 
8
 The exception is Romania, due to its significant domestic gas production. 
 54 
 
Austria, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Short-term fuel substitution in electricity 
generation or load shedding in the case of the rest of industrial activities is relatively 
easy and can be mandated by the gas TSOs or energy regulators. To apply demand side 
measures is more complicated in case of direct household gas use. Household 
consumption is dominant in the Czech Republic (42%) and Slovakia (44%) but its share 
is close to 30% in Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Romania. 
 
Table 1. Annual gas supply and demand data for the countries under study, 2007 
  Share of 
natural 
gas in 
primary 
energy 
use (%) 
Domestic 
produc–
tion 
Import Working 
gas 
storage 
capacity 
Annual gas consumption 
Bcm/year Bcm/year Bcm/year Bcm/year 
 Per source   
       
       
   Russian Other Total  House
–holds 
Electri–
city and 
heat 
Industry Total 
Austria 23 1.8 4.2 2.4 6.6 4.2 2.2 2.6 2.7 8.4 
Bulgaria 14 0.4 3 0 3 0.6 0.8 0.44 1.11 3.4 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
6 0 0.32 0 0.32 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.3 
Czech 
Republic 
16 0.09 6.75 2.25 9 2.90 3.8 0.45 3 9 
Croatia 26 2.9 1.05 
(export 
0.75) 
0 1.05 
(export 
0.75) 
0.62 
(10% is 
rented by 
Slovenia) 
1.08 0.4 0.72 3.3 
Greece 12 0.03 3.15 0.95 4.1 0.08 
(LNG) 
0.22 3.05 0.5 3.8 
Hungary 43 2.5 7.9 
(East) 
2.6 
(West) 
10.5 3.8 4 4.3 1.5 13 
Romania 36 11.3 5.7 0 5.7 2.8 4.7 3 4.3 17 
Serbia 13 0.25 2.14 0 2.14 0 0.65 ~0.45 1.3 2.4 
Slovakia 31 0 9 0 9 2.8 4 0.4 1.8 9 
Slovenia 14 0 0.66 0.54 1.12 0.11 
(rented) 
0.17 0.11 0.68 1.2 
Sources: IEA, Eurostat, Statistical Offices of Austria and the Republic of Slovenia, Srbijagas 
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Table 2 presents the availability of the three most important supply side options that 
were available for the CSEE countries to replace imported Russian gas during the crisis. 
These are a) alternative (non Russia contracted) imports; b) domestic production; and c) 
increased withdrawal from gas storage or an LNG receiving terminal. 
 
Table 2. Availability of supply side options for SOS countries to replace Russia contracted gas 
imports (based on 2007 data) 
 
IMPORT 
DIVERSIFICATION 
(Non-Russia 
contracted import /total 
import, annual) 
DOMESTIC 
PRODUCTION 
(production/winter 
peak load) 
STORAGE/LNG 
(withdrawal capacity 
/winter peak load) 
Austria 36% 16% 104% 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0% 0% 0% 
Bulgaria 0% 8% 35% 
Czech Republic 25% 0% 96% 
Croatia 0% 38% 45% 
Greece 23% 0% 110%* 
Hungary 25% 13% 69% 
Romania 0% 54% 43% 
Serbia 0% 6% 0% 
Slovakia 0% 0% 73% 
Slovenia 48% 0% n.d. 
*LNG receiving capacity 
Source: own calculations 
 
As it seems apparent, underground storage withdrawal is the most robust option for the 
rest of the countries, most prominently Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary. In addition, Greece has an LNG receiving capacity that exceeds its daily 
winter peak load. Domestic production is the most significant for Romania and Croatia. 
Short run ‘in-house’ resources, that is withdrawal capacity and domestic production 
together is enough to serve peak load of Austria for some time and enough to serve 97% 
of peak load in Romania, 96% in the Czech Republic, 83% in Croatia, 82% in Hungary 
and 73% in Slovakia given that those facilities operate at their peak capacity. On the 
difficult side are Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia. Five out of the 
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11countries had managed to reach a certain level of contractual diversification away 
from Russia in their gas sourcing. Alternative partners for them come from Norway 
(Austria, Czech Republic), Germany (Austria, Hungary), France (Hungary) Algeria 
(Slovenia) and LNG (Greece). 
 
3 The crises and major lessons from it 
 
Following a sharp debate between Russia and Ukraine in the fall of 2008 about the 
terms and conditions of gas transactions between the two countries
1
, including transit 
shipments of Russian gas through the Ukrainian pipeline system to the EU, the transit 
was halted between January 7th and 19th of 2009. A total of 5 Bcm of Russian gas 
delivery through Ukraine to the EU and South East Europe was lost during these days. 
While the below average temperatures during the rest of the crisis days had an upward 
pressure on the daily gas load, this effect was mitigated by a significant drop in the non-
household gas demand implied by the economic recession. Also, the weather in 
December 2008 was milder than the average and resulted in an oversupply of stored 
working gas on the European market during the crisis. Less favourable demand and 
storage supply conditions or a longer crisis could have had a much more detrimental 
impact on customers than what they experienced in January 2009. As a leading 
European energy regulator stated, “Europe did not have a shortage in gas when the 
crisis hit but instead had a difficult time to get the gas from where it was to places where 
it was needed”.2 
 
The European gas industry put enormous efforts into mitigating the impacts of this 
unprecedented supply shock and to minimize the impact of the cut on final customers. 
At the continental scale, the most important developments were the followings. Already 
at around January 7, the flow of the UK-Holland interconnector was reversed. In order 
to replace missing EU supplies through Ukraine, Russia increased gas shipments 
through the Yamal and Blue Stream pipelines. Three days later Germany increased gas 
                                                 
1
 About the chronology of the unfolding commercial and political dispute between Russia and Ukraine, 
the involvement and role of EU institutions and companies in resolving the problem as well as the details 
of the new long term agreement between Russia and Ukraine see Pirani, S., Stern, J. and Yafimava, K. 
(2009), The Russo-Ukrainan gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment. Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, February 2009, NG27. 
2
 Boltz, W. (2009), Regulatory reactions to the 2009 January gas crisis and the coming winter. In: 
Security of gas and electricity supply in Central and South-East Europe, Summary of the presentations of 
the first workshop, p. 14. www.rekk.eu/sos. 
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shipments to Croatia and additional spot LNG cargoes became available for Greece and 
Turkey. At around January 9, Hungary started to increase gas shipments for Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, just before the restoration of gas shipments through 
Ukraine, reverse flow was made possible to bring additional gas from the Czech 
Republic to Slovakia and from Greece to Bulgaria.
3
  
 
Table 3 presents country level data on how the different CSEE countries offset, if they 
could, the amount of missing Russian shipments by supply and demand side 
adjustments during the crisis. We find that a combination of transparent market 
transactions, in-house transactions of multinational gas companies, extraordinary 
nominations of TSOs (for which the right was provided by crisis action plans) and 
demand side regulatory measures like the implementation of forced load shedding for 
end customers made up the mix of institutional reactions that ensured the balance 
between load and supply during crisis days. We find a wide variation of the above 
measures across the region depending on the level of gas market development and crisis 
preparedness. 
 
Austria is the obvious example where the rest of the crisis management job was done by 
its well functioning balancing gas market. Its mechanism allowed replacing missing 
Russian imports very quickly 100%. The daily traded volume on the market during the 
crisis reached the average monthly volumes of 2008. A notable balancing gas price 
increase sent the appropriate signal for suppliers (i.e. storage operators, importers and 
electricity producers) to increase their market participation. In addition, cheap fuel oil 
prices relative to gas product prices prompted gas fired power plants to voluntarily 
switch from gas to fuel oil during crisis days.
4
 A well functioning LNG market helped 
Greece to manage its crisis situation since there were available additional LNG cargoes 
to contract during the crisis.  
                                                 
3
 Simpson, J. (2009), January 2009 – Russia – Ukraine gas dispute. IEA presentation for the Gas 
Coordination Group, February 23. 
4
 Boltz, W. (2009), Management of the gas supply disruption in Austria, January 2009 – experience and 
lessons learned. Presentation prepared at E-Control, January 21, pp 20-22. 
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Table 3. Adjustments to missing Russian shipments by supply and demand side measures during 
the crisis 
   
Missing 
Russian 
import 
Additional supply Customer restriction Official 
damage 
estimate 
Mcm/day (physical replacement)  (million Euro) 
    
   Local 
product
ion 
Storage Alternative 
import 
Fuel 
switch 
Industrial 
customers 
Household / 
Protected 
customers 
 
Austria 10 0 10 (Germany) yes no no - 
Bulgaria 7-9 0.2 1 2 (Greece) * Yes, 6-7 mcm/day 225 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
1,8 0 0 1.5-1.9** 
(Austria-
Hungary) 
Yes, until January 12 n.a. 
Czech 
Republic 
15 0,25 5-10 10 
(Germany) 
no no no - 
Croatia 4 5,7   yes yes no 270 
Greece 9.8 0 9.8 
(LNG) 
LNG yes no no - 
Hungary 24 3 21 transit yes – 7 yes – 2 no 80 
Romania 8-10 1 29 not possible yes reduced 
demand 
due to 
recession 
no - 
Serbia 10 0,7 0 4,7 
(Austria-
Hungary) 
yes yes yes 50 
Slovakia 17-20 not 
possibl
e 
14-16 3 – 4 yes yes no 1000*** 
Slovenia 0.9-1.2 not 
possibl
e 
1 
(Austria
) 
0.5-1 n.a. no no - 
*from January 19; **from January 9; ***possibly overestimated 
Source: own calculations 
Market and price mechanisms played a substantially less prominent role in other 
countries of the region to manage the crisis. This is mostly due to either the complete 
lack (e.g. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia) or the poor functioning of gas 
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markets. However, intra-company transactions proved to be partially successful 
substitutes for liquid markets in some cases. The prominent example was provided by 
E.ON. This company has gas industry assets in a number of the affected CSEE countries 
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) and could manage, in cooperation with the 
Austrian and Hungarian TSOs, to contract and ship additional gas for Hungary and the 
most exposed markets of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Figure 2.) after January 9. 
E.ON reports that the price of these additional shipments was the same as for its 
‘normal’ commercial transactions with these countries and thus the whole arrangement 
can be considered as a case for solidarity.
 1
  
  
Figure 2. Additional EON-arranged supplies to the region from January 9, 2009. 
 
Source: GTE and the presentation of Matthias Keuchel at a DEMOS workshop titled ‘The 2009 January 
gas crisis and a complex approach to supply security’. February 19, 2009. Budapest. 
Another example is that of RWE (see Figure 3). This German giant is having gas 
industry assets around the region including the gas transmission company of the Czech 
Republic (RWE Transgas Net at the time of the crisis). RWE Transgas managed to ship 
additional 10 Mcm/day of gas from its European portfolio compared to pre-crisis levels 
for the Czech (7 Mcm) and the Slovak (3 Mcm) markets from the peak of the crisis 
(January 12). On January 19 they could even manage to reverse the flow on the Slovak-
                                                 
1
 Preparations for a possible crisis with a significant impact on the CSEE markets were already started in 
the Essen centre of E.ON in December 2008. See: E.ON (2009), Mentőöv nyugatról. In: Földgáz 
Magazin, issue 2009/1, pp. 4-10. Budapest. 
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Czech interconnector and ship 4 Mcm into the Slovak market. These companies claim 
with good reason that strong energy companies (instead of liquid local markets) secured 
gas deliveries to the region during the crisis.        
 
Figure 3. Additional RWE-arranged supplies to the region from January 12, 2009. 
 
Source: GTE and the presentation of Thomas Kleefuss at the Conference on Energy Economics and 
Technology titled ‘Lessons learnt from the Ukrainian gas crisis: Diversification of supplies through 
Central European gas infrastructure’. April 3, 2009. Dresden.  
Finally, when markets and intra-company transactions are not present and/ or are not 
sufficient to manage a supply shock, extraordinary rights for the TSO can be provided 
by e.g. a crisis management action plan to balance demand and supply by the 
application of non-market based nominations. However, serious concerns were raised 
with regard to the application of this measure in some cases in January 2009. For 
example, during the entire crisis period the Hungarian government refrained from 
officially announcing a crisis situation and thus providing the extra nomination rights 
for the TSO. The reason was a fear from the potential of litigations that might have 
emerged from TSO decisions that overruled commercial contracts. This example 
  
61 
 
highlights the importance of establishing ex ante rules for liabilities and commercial 
settlements with regard to TSO decisions during crisis situations.  
It is also the TSO that is best positioned to manage customer restriction regulations. 
There have been reports from Hungary and Croatia about the partial malfunctioning of 
customer restriction regulations during the crisis. TSOs had limited access to the actual 
consumption data of restricted customers and thus had problems with enforcing demand 
side measures. Austria, on the other hand, had developed a detailed crisis management 
plan after the 2006 gas crisis and did manage the January 2009 crisis properly.  
 
We can also observe from Table 4 that in order to offset missing Russian gas and keep 
supply and load in balance during the crisis days, various demand side measures with 
various durations for different customer groups were put in place in the region. Fuel 
switching (from gas to oil) in electricity generation and gas based district heating was a 
commonly applied measure, in some cases on a voluntary basis (Austria) while in some 
others as part of the implementation of forced load shedding regulation (Hungary). 
Interruptible contracts of industrial customers also helped to reduce gas demand in 
Slovakia, Romania and Slovenia. Forced load shedding was limited to industrial users 
in Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia while in Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia 
household customers and public institutions were also restricted in their gas use for 
some time. Note that certain countries were successful in fully mitigating the shutoff for 
their customers (Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Romania and Slovenia), while 
Croatia’s customers suffered a significant load shedding despite the availability of 
additional local production possibilities. The effects of the cut-off of deliveries were the 
most severe in the case of Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
3.1. Lessons learnt 
 
Early studies of the 2009 gas crisis already emphasized the primary importance of the 
European gas infrastructure in responding to supply security situations of this sort by 
improving the efficiency in using existing and by building some missing pieces of it. 
Pirani and his colleagues claimed that Europe needed to react in terms of new gas 
infrastructure developments, concentrating in the short-term on CSEE providing 
‘...additional interconnection with neighbouring countries, North-West Europe and 
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Southern European countries with the capacity to import additional LNG supplies from 
existing terminals, plus additional storage close to these markets’.2  
 
The first assessment of the impacts of the gas crisis on South-East European countries 
by Kovacevic concluded that ‘…in South Eastern Europe the crisis [...] defined an 
energy efficiency and energy interconnection agenda for European utility stakeholders 
and policymakers’.3  
 
In its analysis the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research focused on identifying 
the most important components of relative success of the different CSEE countries in 
crisis management in order to identify policy and regulatory lessons from it.
4
 Success 
was associated with avoiding customer restrictions and the associated economic value 
of lost load. They claim that the reasons for successfully weathering the supply 
disruption in the case of Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovenia and Romania 
were the followings:  
 Efficient market mechanisms. There was a sufficient amount of bids during the crisis 
on the Austrian balancing gas market to replace missing Russian supply. In addition, 
significant industrial consumers in Austria voluntarily switched from using gas. This 
prevented any regulatory intervention and helped to manage the situations in Austria 
and Slovenia. Also Slovenia could get access to its gas stored in Austrian facilities 
thanks to the fact that cross border access conditions between the two countries 
proved to work. Finally, the availability of the LNG market helped Greece to 
manage its own situation and to help Bulgaria at the very end of the crisis.     
 Import diversification. The share of gas imported from non-Russian sources was 
48% in Slovenia, 36% in Austria and 25% in the Czech Republic at the time of the 
crisis. Although a majority of these are traditionally regarded as (only) ’contractual’ 
diversification (in other words, contracts concluded with a party other than Russia 
are generally also fulfilled with gas from a Russian source), the crisis revealed that 
                                                 
2
 Pirani, S., Stern, J. and Yafimava, K. (2009), The Russo-Ukrainan gas dispute of January 2009: a 
comprehensive assessment. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2009, NG27, p. 58. 
3
 Kovacevic, A. (2009), The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in  South Eastern Europe. Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, March 2009, NG 29. 
4
 Kaderjak, P. (2009), The January 2009 gas crisis: what happened in Central and South East Europe? 
Presentation at the ERGEG Gas Regional Initiative SSE meeting, Budapest, April 16. A more 
comprehensive report is provided in Kaderjak, P. (ed) (2011), Security of energy supply in Central and 
South-East Europe, pp 234-257. Corvinus University of Budapest, REKK. 
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the contracting parties were able to fulfil and in several cases temporarily even 
increase their deliveries beyond contracted amounts. The three countries have 
appropriate physical interconnections in the Austrian-German direction.  
 Successful reorientation of the typical flow directions and the establishment of 
technical conditions for West/East flows. The performance of the Austrian, German, 
Czech, Slovak and Hungarian TSOs in establishing West/East gas deliveries proved 
to be a crucial component to successfully replacing missing Russian supply. The 
management in these companies proved to be outstanding. The increased imports 
from the West played an important mitigating role in the January crisis because of 
this reorientation of gas supplies.   
 Sufficient domestic storage capacity, production and access to LNG. The ratio of 
domestic production to winter peak consumption, from amongst the studied 
countries, is the highest in Romania. This production and the availability of 
significant storage capacity prevented Romania from implementing restrictions on 
consumers. Storage capacity played a key role also in managing the crisis in Austria 
and the Czech Republic.  Greece could manage the crisis by relying on its LNG 
stocks and on contracting additional spot LNG.   
 
On the opposite, the gas industries of the countries suffering the highest consumer 
damages (Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) are far from the relatively liquid 
German/Austrian markets, lack domestic gas production and if they have any at all, 
their gas storage capacity is limited. They import exclusively Russian gas and the total 
consumption is supplied through a one-directional transit pipeline. These countries were 
prepared for a crisis only at a minimum level: they lacked alternative fuel stocks or if 
they had any, these were difficult to mobilise. Affected consumers often replaced the 
missing gas used for heating or district heating with electric heating. 
 
The crisis also revealed several regulatory problems with regard to gas supply security 
preparedness in the CSEE countries. Since regulatory fine tuning and a better utilization 
of demand side measures to offset gas supply shocks might be much cheaper supply 
security measures than infrastructure development, it worth to get improvement in the 
following areas: 
 Fuel switching provided the most immediate demand side option during the crisis. 
The exceptional situation that fuel oil prices were below natural gas prices during 
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the crisis period resulted in massive voluntary fuel switching in Austria. It also 
helped the easy enforcement of fuel switch regulation
5
 for electricity generation in 
Hungary. However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Bulgaria alternative fuel 
3 for weeks was available but logistic problems permitted fast switching.
6
   
 Interruptible contracts were not reported to play a significant role in crisis 
management. This might partly due to the lack of efficiently functioning gas 
markets where a shortage in supply would be reflected in sufficiently high market 
prices to encourage customers to sell their ability to be interrupted for suppliers. 
Other regulatory types of incentives are mostly lacking around the region.        
 There were shortcomings reported about the enforceability of forced load shedding 
for industrial customers in Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia. While the TSOs were 
responsible to enforce curtailments, they had no direct access to consumption data 
but only the DSOs. The TSOs did not have sufficient powers to punish non 
compliance of customers. Another piece of the problem was that the restriction 
decision had no relation to the cost the curtailment imposed on the customer. A 
consequence was that large industrial customers started to lobby immediately at the 
responsible ministries to get exemptions from the curtailment and many were indeed 
provided by it.  
 Financial liabilities from emergency situation TSO nominations hurting private 
contracts were not well defined. The litigation risks emerging from this uncertainty 
unnecessarily limited the pace of action of the TSO. 
 The rules for cross border access to gas storage facilities in crisis situations might 
be restrictive in certain instances. For example, the access to the strategic gas 
storage site of Hungary might be limited by the responsible minister.  
 Data availability and transparency regarding almost all the aspects of gas market 
functioning was insufficient at the time of the crisis all over CSEE.   
 
We conclude that the gas crisis revealed at least six major areas where action is needed 
to mitigate the serious gas supply security risk from lacking physical and market 
integration in CSEE. First, the efficiency in using existing gas infrastructure can and 
should be improved by establishing clear cross border and storage access rules, operable 
                                                 
5
 In Hungary gas based electricity generation companies are obliged to hold 8 days of fuel oil reserves on 
their sites and another 8 days close to their sites.   
6
 Kovacevic, A. (2009), The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in South Eastern Europe. Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, March 2009, NG 29, p. 14.  
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also during crisis periods, and by utilizing reverse flow capabilities of transmission 
pipeline systems. Second, crisis preparedness is to be improved in the form of better 
crisis prevention and management planning and regulation, including in particular the 
definition of TSO rights and responsibilities and according liability rules for crisis 
situations. Third, incentive schemes should be applied and invented to encourage as 
much voluntary fuel switching as possible in order to minimize enforced customer load 
shedding during a crisis. Fourth, gas market data availability should be improved. Fifth, 
improving the interconnectivity of the gas infrastructure of CSEE seems to be 
unavoidable in order to improve supply security and also the integration of the internal 
EU gas market. Finally, the crisis also revealed the shortcomings of missing regional 
cooperation in energy security matters.  
 
4 EU level efforts to address the problems revealed by the crisis 
 
The 2009 January gas crisis and the follow up discussions and analyses of those events 
at different European institutions clearly resulted in an understanding and recognition of 
the gas industry related problems of the new EU member states and the wider CSEE 
region. To the benefit of these countries, the crisis implied a strong, coordinated and 
exceptionally fast reaction from the responsible EU institutions.
7
 A prominent outcome 
of this reaction is the new gas supply security regulation 994/2010 of the EU that is 
discussed in detail by Vinois and Beyer in this volume. But beyond the Regulation, 
more recent initiatives, especially those with relevance to the future development of the 
gas infrastructure of the EU,
8
 seem to recognize the supply security concerns of CSEE 
and put forward meaningful obligations and proposals to accomplish the gas grid and 
                                                 
7
 The staff of the European Commission completed an assessment of the crisis as early as mid summer of 
2009 with a focus on the lessons from the crisis for European policy. This assessment was the basis for 
promulgating the proposal for the new gas supply security regulation. It put the emphasis on identifying 
means by which emergency preparedness and crisis response mechanisms could be improved at the 
Community level. The paper recognised the asymmetric impact of the crisis on Central and Eastern 
European member states and some Energy Community members and made efforts to draw the lessons 
from the experience of the most affected countries. It identified the most important elements of a 
reinforced future gas supply security policy as the follows: the strengthening of the internal gas market 
mechanism; improved market transparency; a reinforced European gas infrastructure with special 
reference to constraints, missing interconnections and the need for reverse flows; national action to 
enhance demand response measures; contractual diversification; improved cross border cooperation in 
times of crisis situations; and a reinforced role for the Commission to coordinate action to prevent and 
respond to gas crises. 
8 
Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond – a Blueprint for an integrated European energy 
network. European Commission, November 2010. Also see the Chapters by Catharina Sikow-Magny and 
Brendan Devlin in this volume.   
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market integration of the countries of this region. It seems that ten years after the 
successful integration of the electricity grid of CSEE into the European grid (UCTE), 
the integration of the gas grid of the region into the European system is now on the 
agenda of the Union. And it is difficult to overestimate the importance and relevance of 
such a policy for those member states which are struggling with all the supply security 
and price risks stemming from their unilateral gas import dependence on a single 
supplier. The rest of this section provides some specific comments how Regulation 
994/2010 and other recent initiatives could bring about an improved supply security 
situation for CSEE.  
 
4.1 Regulation 994/2010 
 
Gas supply security and gas market development and integration are twin issues for the 
CSEE countries and, to a great extent, both of them seem to boil down to versions of 
gas infrastructure reinforcement plans representing, in turn, specific gas supply entry 
point and capacity combinations for the region. The different infrastructure patterns 
create alternatives for the improvement of gas market liquidity and gas-to-gas 
competition through opening up diversification opportunities.
9
 This is why for CSEE 
the potentially most beneficial measures of Regulation 994/2010 are exactly those that 
put forward infrastructure standards for member states to meet.  
 
Reverse flows - Paragraphs 5-6 of Article 6 oblige TSOs to enable permanent bi-
directional capacity on all cross-border interconnections between Member States and to 
adapt the functioning of their transmission systems so as to enable physical gas flows in 
both directions on cross-border interconnections. Section 3.1 concluded that it was 
exactly the implementation of reverse flow possibilities that helped the most affected 
CSEE countries, except for Romania, to mitigate the adverse effects of the gas cut. A 
recent quantitative modelling study reports that even the present CSEE gas 
infrastructure, given its limited bi-directional flow possibilities, prohibits significant 
resilience against disturbances of the 2009 January kind, except for the East Balkan 
                                                 
9
 See Kaderjak, P. (ed) (2011), Security of energy supply in Central and South-East Europe, pp 258-281. 
Corvinus University of Budapest, REKK.  
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states.
10
 This outcome could improve considerably if the referred modelling took into 
consideration the effects of more fundamental reverse flow possibilities for the region 
foreseen by the new Regulation. Especially, the availability of Italian shipments 
(including LNG) and increased bi-directional capacities between Germany, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Austria could improve the utilization of existing infrastructure 
for the benefit of both supply security and market liquidity for the rest of the countries. 
The only concern to rise regarding the related pieces of the Regulation is that it provides 
TSOs with rather easy conditions to get, from any of the affected national authorities, an 
exemption to implement reverse flows (Article 7). Since rejecting to offer bi-directional 
cross border capacities has partly been a mean of integrated companies to protect their 
national markets, it is difficult to rule out this consideration to play a role in future 
decisions by national bodies, even in the light of future gas crisis risks.                   
 
The N-1infrastructure standard - Paragraph 1 of Article 6 requires each member state to 
upgrade its gas infrastructure so that the capacity of remaining infrastructure should 
guarantee a predefined level of service in the case of the fall out of the single largest gas 
infrastructure at a very high level of demand. Although a similar N-1 supply security 
principle has long been applied in the case of the electricity sector, the proposal to meet 
such a requirement in the case of the gas sector was opposed by many stakeholders in 
the course of discussions about the draft Regulation, mostly referring to the high costs 
of the needed upgrade.  
 
However, if we have a quick look at the present infrastructure conditions of the most 
affected countries, we might suspect the cost issue to be less pressing for the rest of the 
countries. Figure 4 provides the values for a measure called Residual Supply Index 
(RSI) for the countries under study (except for Greece) for the years 2008 and 2015.
11
 
The calculation of the index is very similar to the N-1 criteria included in Appendix I 
(2) of the Regulation. The difference is that in the calculation of RSI it is assumed that 
the capacity of the single largest gas infrastructure (denoted by Im in the Regulation) 
equals to the capacity of the largest import pipeline capacity. Also, RSI applies daily 
                                                 
10
 See Kaderjak, P. (ed) (2011), Security of energy supply in Central and South-East Europe, pp 140-142. 
Corvinus University of Budapest, REKK. 
11
 For more elaborated discussion on gas supplysecurity indexes for the CSEE region see Kaderjak, P. 
(ed) (2011), Security of energy supply in Central and South-East Europe, pp 32-36. Corvinus University 
of Budapest, REKK.  
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average winter consumption in the denominator instead of the extremely high demand 
figure (Dmax) required by the Regulation.
12
 The formula for calculating the RSI is the 
following:  
    
                              
     
 
where Cpeak is daily average winter consumption, Pdom is daily domestic production, Sext 
is daily storage extraction, Lext is daily LNG extraction, Itotal is the total pipeline import 
capacity and Ilargest is the import capacity of the largest single pipeline. 
 
Figure 4. Residual supply index, current and forecast 
Source: Eurostat, ENTSO-G, IEA, REKK calculations 
 
The results indicate that Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia could most probably 
meet the N-1 criteria already with their pre-crisis infrastructures, whereas Croatia, 
Hungary and Romania were quite on a narrow margin in 2008. To meet N-1 seems to be 
the most difficult – and probably costly – for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia and Serbia. Figure 5 also shows the expected future improvements in the RSI 
value according to planned infrastructure upgrades, which are especially marked in the 
case of Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia.  
                                                 
12
 Dmax: total daily gas demand (in mcm/d) of the calculated area during a day of exceptionally high gas 
demand occurring with a statistical probability of once in 20 years. 
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The Regulation allows member states for meeting the N-1 criteria by including market-
based demand-side measures as well as through international cooperation at the regional 
level. The 2009 January crisis demonstrated significant opportunities for the region in 
both regards. As it was pointed out, voluntary fuel switching, especially in the case of 
power generation and district heating units, was widespread in a number of countries. 
Better incentives and regulation could further improve the situation in this regard. On 
the other hand, the cross border cooperation of Slovenia and Austria and also Hungary 
and Serbia during the crisis clearly demonstrated the sizable benefits (cost savings) that 
a more conscious regional cooperation to utilize existing gas industry assets could bring 
in mitigating future gas crisis risks. The implementation of a low cost
13
 reverse flow 
option from Greece to Bulgaria close to the end of the crisis was another promising 
example in this regard. 
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the N-1 standard makes it necessary that member 
states, after exhausting the opportunities in applying demand-side measures and 
regional cooperation, will have to upgrade their infrastructures to meet a minimum level 
of gas supply security. Paragraph 8 of Article 6 and Paragraph 2 of Article 7 describe 
what role upgrade costs should play in infrastructure standards related implementation 
and exemption procedures. Note that in CSEE parts of these upgrades have already been 
supported by EU funds from the European Energy Programme for Recovery. Cost 
efficiency in planning for such upgrades should be crucial, although evidence indicates 
that cost efficiency might play only a secondary role in government decisions in this 
regards.
14
 This is why conditions in case of public (e.g. EU) support for such upgrades 
should contain cost-benefit and cost-efficiency measures. In sum, the Regulation, 
through the obligations of the N-1 standard and reverse flows, created very positive 
incentives for developing incentive-based demand-side regulations and for regional 
cooperation.                 
 
Preference for market-based solutions - The crisis related experience of the CSEE 
countries supports that feature of the Regulation to strictly prefer the application of 
                                                 
13
 See Silve, F. and Noel, P. (2010), Cost Curves for Gas Supply Security: The Case of Bulgaria, EPRG 
working paper 1031, September. 
14
 See about the expensive choices of Bulgaria by Silve, F. and Noel, P. (2010), Cost Curves for Gas 
Supply Security: The Case of Bulgaria, EPRG working paper 1031, September. The cost-benefit 
valuation of the recently accomplished strategic underground gas storage site of Hungary is discussed in 
Kaderjak (2011), pp 86-93.   
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market-based demand and supply side measures to non-market based ones in crisis 
planning and mitigation.
15
 While market-based supply side solutions were quick and 
successful in the case of Austria and Greece to mitigate the impacts of the gas cut, 
several problems occurred when applying non-market based measures in other cases. 
Examples are the problems encountered in enforcing firm load shedding regulations in 
Croatia and Hungary or in getting access to storage sites in Slovakia.    
 
4.2 Other infrastructure related initiatives 
 
The lessons from the 2009 gas crisis manifested in the European Commission’s 
Communication “Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond – a Blueprint for 
an integrated European energy network” adopted on 17 November, 2010. The initiative 
was warmly welcomed and supported by the Hungarian EU presidency and by the 
governments of CEE new member states early 2011. This is not by chance, since the 
Communication includes, among its proposed priority gas corridors, two significant 
projects that could significantly improve gas supply security and market liquidity in the 
region. The first is the Southern Corridor of the EU that would bring gas from the 
Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the Middle East to the EU by crossing CSEE countries 
and also bringing additional gas liquidity for these countries. The second is the North-
South Corridor in CSEE that could create the missing interconnections among the 
Visegrad 4 countries (V4: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and 
Croatia and provide new LNG entry points at the Baltic and Adriatic coasts for the 
landlocked countries of the region (see Figure 5). 
 
                                                 
15
 See e.g. Paragraph 2 of Article 6 on the preference for market-based demand-side measures. Paragraph 
7 of the same Article calls for a test of market demand first for new infrastructure investments and Article 
10 provides details on how Emergency Plans should provide preference for market-based measures.  
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Figure 5. A CEE gas market concept 
 
Source: The presentation of Rafal Wittmann at the 4th Central European Gas Congress titled ‘Regional 
Gas Infrastructure in Central Europe’, June 16, 2011. Budapest. 
 
Work on the implementation of the North-South Corridor has already started. Following 
the cooperation of V4 and SEE countries (V4+) throughout 2010 on promoting regional 
gas infrastructure development plans and the adoption of the Energy Infrastructure 
Package of the EU in November 2010, a Gas Working Group of the High Level Group 
on North-South Energy Interconnections in Central-Eastern Europe was established in 
February 2011.  
 
5 National level efforts to address the problems revealed by the crisis  
 
The 2009 gas crisis resulted in fierce political reactions in the affected countries of the 
CSEE region and prompted intensive debate on the short and long term strategies for 
improving gas supply security. Much of the national level debate has been around 
various physical development projects to enhance supply side options. Table 4 provides 
an overview of recent infrastructure development related proposals, parts of which have 
been concluded in the course of 2010. 
THE NORTH-SOUTH CORRIDOR 
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Table 4. Recently discussed gas supply security options in CSEE 
Country Proposals  Concluded since the crisis 
Bulgaria 
Reinforcement of the 
interconnections and development of 
bidirectional interconnections with 
Romania, Greece and Turkey; 
establishing projects for LNG 
import. 
 
Czech Republic 
Extension of storage capacity; 
extension of the Western 
interconnection pipeline. 
 
Croatia 
Acceleration of the KrK LNG 
project; establishment of a second 
storage facility; establishment of the 
Croatian-Hungarian gas pipeline 
connection. 
Croatia – Hungary 
interconnection concluded in 
December  2010 
Hungary 
New interconnections with Slovakia 
and Slovenia; upgrading of the HAG 
connection with Austria.  
Underground working gas storage 
capacity upgraded by 2.7 Bcm 
(from which 1.2 Bcm is strategic 
storage). 
Hungary-Romania interconnector 
concluded in October 2010. 
Hungary Croatia interconnector to 
be concluded in December 2010 
Serbia 
Development of natural gas storage 
capacity jointly with Gazprom; 
Bulgaria-Serbia interconnector. 
 
Slovakia 
Establishing a wholesale and storage 
undertaking partly owned by the 
state; regional storage cooperation; 
nuclear power production; option of 
a strategic storage.  
 
Slovenia 
Establishing a domestic gas storage 
facility; demand for further coal-
based and nuclear power production.  
 
Source: Platts reports; Hungarian Energy Office 
  
73 
 
For example, gas infrastructure investments have already resulted in a significant 
upgrade in the import pipeline and gas storage capacities of Hungary (see Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Capacity of the Hungarian gas system before and after the 2009 gas crisis 
 
Source: FGSZ, REKK 
But beyond infrastructure upgrades, gas crisis related regulations have also been 
amended in a number of countries. Taking again the Hungarian example, the 
government revised the country’s gas market emergency regulation as a response to the 
2009 January crisis. The revisions concentrated on re-defining customer categories for 
enforced firm load shedding. Also, the newly proposed long term energy strategy of the 
country considers gas infrastructure diversification as one of its key mid-term priorities.    
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The 2009 January gas crisis confirmed earlier warnings that the single important supply 
security risk that the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 brought about was the 
unilateral gas import dependence and insufficient gas infrastructure of the new member 
states.
16
 The shock of the crisis helped to learn much about the vulnerability of the 
enlarged European gas industry and, in particular, that of the CSEE region. Since the 
crisis a number of developments seem to confirm that very important lessons from the 
crisis have been learnt at the European level. A new gas supply security regulation with 
                                                 
16
 Kaderjak, P and LaBelle, M (ed) (2008), Impact of the 2004 Enlargement of the EU Energy Sector. 
Study prepared for DG TREN. Published by the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research, Budapest. 
Daily peak capacity, Mcm Annual capacity (Bcm)
2008 2010 % change 2008 2010 % change
Underground storage 51 80,1 57% 3,72 6,13 65%
Domestic production 10,2 10,2 0% 2,8 2,8 0%
Import 42,1 72,1 71% 15,3 26,3 72%
Total 103,3 162,4 57% 21,82 35,23 61%
Transit 11,3 11,3 0% 4,1 4,1 0%
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the right focus on customer protection, infrastructure upgrade and improved crisis 
preparedness had been adopted with fast speed. Also, an ambitious energy infrastructure 
development program, with a balanced focus on gas infrastructure problems in CSEE, is 
being formed right before the start of final preparations of the Union’s next budget. 
Moreover, the crisis confirmed European policy makers in their former conviction that 
security in gas supply for the community would only come together with a physically 
sufficiently interconnected and efficiently operating internal gas market. Now, the real 
question today is to what extent the national governments, especially those of the most 
affected member states, learned the same lessons and, even more, whether they are 
ready to provide persistent attention to international cooperation and able to create a 
supporting regulatory environment for gas companies in order to fix their gas market 
problems in the coming decade. We will get a first impression about the answer to this 
question when the first national and, perhaps, joint Emergency Plans are published by 
the national Competent Authorities on December 3, 2012, the latest.                    
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1 Abstract 
 
The paper introduces the Danube Region Gas Market Model, a network and contract 
constrained multi-country competitive equilibrium model and applies it to estimate the 
impacts of new gas infrastructure investments on market integration, social welfare and 
supply security in the countries of Central and South East Europe. Individual projects, 
project packages (e.g. the North-South gas corridor for Central and Eastern Europe) and 
international pipeline projects (like Nabucco West) are evaluated according to the 
Regional Cost Convergence Index. Estimates on price spill-over effects of new 
infrastructures are also presented. The model can support cost benefit analyses foreseen 
by the proposed European Infrastructure Package to identify EU projects of common 
interest.    
 
 
                                                 
1
 Originally published in Competition and Regulation 2012, pp. 256-282. MTA KRTK, Institute of 
Economics, Budapest 
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2 Introduction 
 
New EU member states and the wider Central and Southeast European region (from this 
point forward the Danube Region or DR
2
) suffer from specific gas industry problems. 
The most serious of them is the lack of sufficient interconnectivity which impedes gas 
supply source diversification for the DR, reduces the scope for gas market integration 
and supply security improvements at the regional level.
3
 
Since the shock of the 2009 January gas crisis, European energy policy has been 
attempting to remedy the above mentioned gas industry problems of the DR and Energy 
Community countries alike. A prominent example is the gas supply security regulation 
994/2010 of the EU. The new European Infrastructure Package (EIP)
4
 intends to 
identify and provide Union level support for gas infrastructure projects that will 
positively impact interconnectivity and market integration
5
 in the region. The EIP 
identifies certain priority corridors, which in the case of gas includes linking the Baltic, 
Black, Adriatic and Aegean Seas. The development of north-south interconnections in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe forms an important element of this 
corridor. In 2011 the EC commissioned a “High Level Group”6 with the mandate to 
devise an action plan for the development of interconnections in gas, electricity and oil 
by the end of 2011. The High Level Group published its action plan in December 2011. 
In 2012 this work continues with a similar High Level Group activity for the Energy 
Community countries. 
Finally, in October 2011, the EU approved the European Union Strategy for the DR that 
foresees a strengthened cooperation in a wide range of areas, including energy policy. 
                                                 
2
 The 14 Danube Region countries are: Austria (AT), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA), Bulgaria (BG), 
Croatia (HR), the Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Moldova (MV), Montenegro 
(MNE), Romania (RO), Serbia (SB), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SL) and Ukraine (UA).   
3
 The price, supply security and political risks of a lock-in situation with dominant Russian import 
dependence for the DR are assessed by Kaderják (2011a and 2011b).   
4
 COM(2011) 658 (in the followings: proposed Regulation), SEC(2011) 1233 and COM(2011) 665.  
5
 Article 4 of the proposed infrastructure Regulation defines four criteria that will apply for the evaluation 
of gas projects of common interest; their impact on market integration, security of supply, competition 
and sustainability.  
6
 The High Level Group on north-south interconnections is chaired by the EC and includes Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia as members, and Croatia as an observer. 
Austria, Germany and Slovenia also became members of this group. The High Level Group also 
established a “working group on natural gas” (GWG) consisting of representatives of the relevant 
ministries, regulatory authorities and transmission system operators (TSOs) in the participating countries, 
except for Austria and Germany. 
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Its Action Plan
7
 states that for a secure and well-functioning natural gas market in the 
DR; 
‘…the interconnections between national markets have to be improved and countries in 
the region need to gain access to new external sources. Reinforcing gas transmission 
infrastructure will be key for preventing potential supply disruption in the future. Well-
functioning networks, interconnections and interoperability are needed for energy 
security, diversification and effective energy operation.’ (EC 2011, p. 18). 
While an agreement seems to emerge that gas infrastructure development is the key to 
improve gas market integration and supply security for the DR, no solid methodology 
has yet been developed to assess the impacts of the proposed projects or project 
packages on regional gas market integration, security of supply, competition and 
sustainability. Moreover, while the proposed Regulation foresees the application of 
energy system-wide cost-benefit analysis for the evaluation of promoted projects, such a 
methodology is still to be developed – in the case of gas by the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G). 
The study by Kantoor Management Consultants (2012) develops a methodology to 
establish priorities for regional gas infrastructure developments in support of the North-
South gas working group, but the proposed methodology still leaves many problems 
unsolved. Its basis is a physical flow model, with country-level analysis, focusing 
mostly on security of supply issues. The gas market representation is rather simple and 
price formation modelling is neglected, leaving the explanation for how new 
infrastructure will impact market integration incomplete. On the whole, the Kantoor 
study provides important insights on how changes in infrastructures affect security of 
supply status of individual countries. However, the analysis does not specifically 
evaluate the impact of new infrastructure on prices, costs and benefits, or social welfare. 
This paper reports on an alternative approach to the evaluation and ranking of new gas 
infrastructure projects in a regional gas market context. We introduce the Danube 
Region Gas Market Model (DRGMM) and illustrate how model simulations can be 
used to assess the impacts of new infrastructure or infrastructure packages on regional 
gas market integration and for system-wide cost-benefit and security of supply analysis. 
If extended to include all the EU27 gas markets, the model could help the 
                                                 
7
 Com(2010) 715 and SEC(2010) 1489, respectively.  
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implementation process of the proposed infrastructure Regulation. First, it could serve 
as a potential component of the cost-benefit methodology envisioned by the proposed 
Regulation.
8
 Second, model estimates on the distribution of consumer and producer 
benefits from new infrastructure across impacted countries could also support the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in elaborating its decisions 
on cross border cost allocation for Projects of Common Interest (PCI) when national 
regulatory authorities could not reach an agreement.
9
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: After a brief literature review on gas market 
modelling, we summarize the basic assumptions and characteristics of the DRGMM. 
Then we present several simulation results to illustrate the variety of analyses the model 
allows for, including market integration, cost-benefit, and security of supply analyses. 
Finally we reflect on the limitations of the model’s present version and suggest areas for 
future research. 
2 Literature review 
 
Here we will provide a short review of commonly referenced, large-scale computational 
gas market models that have been used to analyze the security of gas supply and the 
impact of infrastructure developments in Europe. 
The main focus of the EUGAS model (Perner and Seeliger, 2004) is to analyze the 
prospects of gas supplies to the European market in the coming decades. It assumes 
perfect competition among market players and contains an extensive infrastructure 
representation. The objective function and the constraints of this model are linear across 
a five year horizon, and the annual gas consumption is split seasonally into three 
different load periods.  
Contrary to the EUGAS model, most of the gas simulation models depict the strategic 
interaction between the suppliers. The GASTALE model (Boots, 2004) was the first 
attempt to apply successive oligopoly conditions in natural gas production and trading 
in a large-scale simulation model. The model has a two-level structure, in which 
producers engage in competition a la Cournot, and each producer is a Stackelberg 
leader with respect to traders, who may be Cournot oligopolists or perfect competitors.  
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Article 12 of the proposed Regulation.  
9
 See Article 13(6) on this matter. 
  
79 
 
The extended, dynamic versions of the GASTALE model (Lise and Hobbs, 2008 and 
2009) include investments in scarce infrastructure (such as pipelines, storages and LNG 
infrastructure), but they assume market power only for producers.   
GASMOD (Holz et al., 2008) is similar in spirit to GASTALE, similarly structuring the 
European natural gas market as a two-stage-game of successive oligopolies; imports to 
Europe (first stage, upstream) and trade within Europe (second stage, downstream). As 
the model’s main focus is to examine the possible effects of liberalization on trade, the 
geographical coverage of the model is wide. On the demand side it includes all 
European markets and on the supply side it includes all major exporters to Europe. 
Egging et al. (2008) presented a more detailed complementary model of the European 
natural gas market which accounts for the market power of exporters and of the 
globalization of natural gas markets with LNG trade. The market structure that their 
model constructs is different from that of GASMOD and the static GASTALE model, 
marked by the assumption that only traders can exert market power by playing the 
Cournot game against each other, with other players assumed to be price takers. 
Based on their previous work (Gabriel et al. 2005a, b) Egging et al. (2010) presented the 
World Gas Model. It is a multi-period mixed complementarity model for the global 
natural gas market, which contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% 
of worldwide natural gas production and consumption. It also includes a detailed 
representation of cross-border pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term contracts 
in the LNG market. The model operates with five year periods and two seasons (peak 
and off-peak). Similar to the previous models, it accounts for market power in the 
upstream market between traders using both pipelines and LNG deliveries. It allows for 
endogenous capacity expansions and seasonal arbitrage by storage operators.  
The NATGAS model (Mulder and Zwart, 2006) assumes an oligopolistic producer 
market where a small number of strategic natural gas producers are facing price-taking 
traders in the downstream market. The main focus of the model is to compute long-term 
effects of policy measures on future gas production and gas prices in Europe. It contains 
long-run projections of supply, transport, storage and consumption patterns in the model 
region, aggregated in 5-year periods, distinguishing two seasons (winter and summer).  
Abada et al. (2012) developed a dynamic Generalized Nash–Cournot gas market model 
(GaMMES model). In the applied oligopolistic market structure they take into account 
  
80 
 
long-term contracts in an endogenous way, which makes the model a Generalized Nash 
Equilibrium problem. Their demand representation is specific because it captures the 
possible fuel substitution that can be made between the consumption of oil, coal, and 
natural gas in the overall fossil energy consumption. 
3 The Danube Region Gas Market Model 
 
The Danube Region Gas Market Model has been developed by REKK to simulate the 
operation of an international wholesale natural gas market in the Central and South-East 
European (CSEE) region.
10
 Figure 1 shows the geographical scope of the model. 
Country codes denote the countries for which we have explicitly included the demand 
and supply side of the local market, as well as gas storages. Large external markets, 
such as Germany, Italy or (indirectly) Russia, are represented by exogenously assumed 
market prices, long-term supply contracts and physical connections to the CSEE region. 
Figure 1. The geographical scope of the Danube Region Gas Market Model 
 
All map outlines are based on the maps of Daniel Dalet, source: http://d-
maps.com/m/europemax/europemax09.svg 
 
                                                 
10
 For an initial description and application of REKK’s Regional Gas Market Model see Kaderjak, P. 
2011a, 121-147.  
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Given the input data and subject to constraints represented by the physical gas 
infrastructure and contractual arrangements specific for the Danube Region, the model 
calculates a dynamic competitive market equilibrium, resulting in the market clearing 
prices, along with the production, consumption and trading quantities, storage 
utilization decisions, and long-term contract deliveries. 
Model calculations refer to 12 consecutive months, with a default setting of April to 
March.
11
 Dynamic connection between months are introduced by the operation of gas 
storages (“you can only withdraw what you have injected previously”) and long-term 
take-or-pay (TOP) contract constraints (minimum and maximum deliveries are 
calculated over the entire 12-month period, enabling contractual “make-up”). 
The Danube Region Gas Market Model consists of the following building blocks: (1) 
local demand; (2) local supply; (3) gas storages; (4) external markets and supply 
sources; (5) cross-border pipeline connections; (6) TOP contracts; and (7) spot trading. 
We will describe each of them in detail below. 
3.1 Local demand 
 
Local consumption refers to the amount of gas consumed in each of the local markets in 
each month of the modelling year. It is, therefore, a quantity measure.
12
 Local demand, 
on the other hand, is a functional relationship between the local market price and local 
consumption, similarly specified for each month of the modelling year. 
Local demand functions are downward sloping, meaning that higher prices decrease the 
amount of gas that consumers want to use in a given period. For simplicity, we use a 
linear functional form, the consequence of which is that every time the market price 
increases by 0.1 €/MWh, local monthly consumption is reduced by equal quantities (as 
opposed to equal percentages, for example). 
The linearity and price responsiveness of local demand ensures that market clearing 
prices will always exist in the model. Regardless of how little supply there is in a local 
market, there will be a high enough price so that the quantity demanded will fall back to 
the level of quantity supplied, achieving market equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
11
 The start of the modelling year can be set to any other month. 
12
 All quantities are measured in energy units within the model. 
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3.2 Local supply 
 
Local production is a measure of quantity similar to local consumption, so the 
corresponding counterpart to local demand is local supply. Local supply shows the 
relationship between the local market price and the amount of gas that local producers 
are willing to pump into the system at that price. 
In the model, each supply unit (company, field, or even well) has a constant marginal 
cost of production (measured in €/MWh). Supply units operate between minimum and 
maximum production constraints in each month, with the constraints being independent 
across months.
13
 Therefore production decisions in October, for example, have no direct 
effect on production possibilities in any other month. 
Any number of supply units can be defined for each month and each local market. As a 
result, local supply will be represented by an increasing step-function for which the 
number and size of steps can be chosen freely. 
3.3 Gas storage 
 
Gas storage facilities are capable of storing natural gas from one period to another, 
arbitraging away large market price differences across periods. Their effect on the 
system’s supply-demand balance can be positive or negative, depending on whether gas 
is withdrawn from or injected into storage. Each local market can contain any number 
of storage units (companies or fields). 
Storage units have a constant marginal cost of injection and a separate cost of 
withdrawal. In each month, there are upper limits on total injections and total 
withdrawals. There is no specific working gas fee, but the model contains a real interest 
rate for discounting the periods, which automatically ensures that foregone interest costs 
on working gas inventories are taken into account. 
There are three additional constraints on storage operation: (1) working gas capacity; (2) 
starting inventory level; and (3) year-end inventory level. Injections and withdrawals 
must be such during the year that working gas capacity is never exceeded, intra-year 
inventory levels never drop below zero, and year-end inventory levels are met. 
 
                                                 
13
 Minimum production levels can be set to zero. If minimum levels are set too high, a market clearing 
equilibrium may require negative prices, but this practically never happens with realistic input data. 
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3.4 External markets and supply sources 
 
Explicitly modelled local markets are limited to the countries of the CSEE region 
(including the DR), but their gas sectors are by no means closed to the outside world. 
There are comparatively large external markets and supply sources neighbouring the 
region, which can serve as import sources (e.g. Russia, LNG markets), export 
destinations, or both (e.g. Germany, Italy). 
Prices for external markets and supply sources are set exogenously (i.e. as input data) 
for each month, and they are assumed not to be influenced by any supply-demand 
development in the local markets. As a consequence, the price levels set for outside 
markets are important determinants of their trading direction with the CSEE region. 
When prices are set relatively low, CSEE countries are more likely to import from the 
outside markets, and vice versa. 
3.5 Cross-border pipeline connections 
 
Any two markets (local or outside) can be connected by any number of pipelines, which 
allow the transportation of natural gas from one market to the other. Connections 
between geographically non-neighbouring countries are also possible, which 
corresponds to the presence of dedicated transit pipelines. 
Cross-border pipelines are unidirectional, but physical reverse flow can easily be 
allowed for by adding a parallel connection that “points” into the other direction. Each 
pipeline has a minimum and a maximum monthly transmission capacity, as well as a 
proportional transmission fee. 
Virtual reverse flow (“backhaul”) on unidirectional pipelines can also be allowed or 
restricted for each connection and each month. The rationale for virtual reverse flow is 
the possibility to trade “against” the delivery of long-term TOP contracts, being that the 
reduction of pre-arranged gas flow can be considered the same type of commercial 
transaction as selling gas in the reverse direction. 
We disregard from modelling the internal gas transmission systems of local and external 
markets. 
3.6 Long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts 
 
A TOP contract is an agreement between an outside supply source and a local market 
concerning the delivery of natural gas into the latter. The structure of a TOP contract is 
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the following; each contract has monthly and annual minimum and maximum 
quantities, a delivery price, and a monthly proportional TOP-violation penalty. 
Maximum and minimum quantities (monthly or annual) cannot be breached. If the 
purchase of deliveries are below the monthly minimum, the monthly proportional TOP-
violation penalty must be paid for the gas that was not delivered. 
Any number of TOP-contracts can be in force between any two source and destination 
markets. Monthly TOP-limits, prices, and penalties can be changed from one month to 
the next. 
The delivery routes (the set of pipelines from source to destination) must be specified as 
input data for each contract, but they can also be changed month to month. It is possible 
to divide the delivered quantities among several parallel routes in pre-determined 
proportions. 
3.7 Spot trading 
 
The final building block, spot trade, serves to arbitrage price differences across markets 
that are connected with a pipeline. Typically, if the price on the source-side of the 
pipeline exceeds the price on the destination-side by more than the proportional 
transmission fee, then spot trading will occur towards the high-priced market. Spot 
trading continues until either (1) the price difference drops to the level of the 
transmission fee, or (2) the physical capacity of the pipeline is reached. 
Physical flows across a pipeline equal of the sum of long-term deliveries and spot 
trading. When virtual reverse flow is allowed, spot trading can become “negative” 
(backhaul), meaning that transactions go against the predominant contractual flow. Of 
course, backhaul can never exceed the contractual flow on a pipeline. 
3.8 Equilibrium 
 
The DRGMM algorithm reads the input data and searches for the simultaneous supply-
demand equilibrium (including storage stock changes and net imports) of all local 
markets in all months, adhering to all the constraints detailed above. 
In short, the equilibrium state (the “result”) of the model can be described by a simple 
no-arbitrage condition across space and time. However, it is instructive to spell out this 
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condition in terms of the behaviour of market participants: consumers, producers and 
traders.
14
 
Local consumers decide about gas utilization based on the market price. This decision is 
governed entirely by the local demand functions we introduced earlier. 
Local producers decide about their gas production level in the following way: if market 
prices in their country of operation are higher than unit production costs, then they 
produce gas at full capacity. If prices fall below costs, then production is cut back to the 
minimum level (possibly zero). Finally, if prices and costs are exactly equal, then 
producers choose some amount between the minimum and maximum levels, which is 
actually determined in a way to match the local demand for gas in that month. 
Traders in the model are the ones performing the most complex optimization 
procedures. First, they decide about long-term contract deliveries in each month, based 
on contractual constraints (prices, TOP quantities, penalties) and local supply-demand 
conditions. 
Second, traders also utilize storages to arbitrage price differences across months. For 
example, if market prices in January are relatively high, then they withdraw gas from 
storage in January and inject it back in a later month in such a way as to maximize the 
difference between the selling and the buying price. As long as there is available 
withdrawal, injection, and working gas capacity as well as price differences between 
months exceeding the sum of injection costs, withdrawal costs, and the foregone 
interest, the arbitrage opportunity will be present and traders will exploit it.
15,16
 
Finally, traders also perform spot transactions based on relative prices in local and 
outside markets based on the available cross-border transmission capacities to and from 
those markets, including countries such as Russia, Germany, Italy, Turkey, or LNG 
markets which are not explicitly included in the supply-demand equalization. 
 
                                                 
14
 When assessing welfare effects, we omit storage operators, since injection and withdrawal fees are set 
exogenously, and stock changes are determined by traders. 
15
 Traders also have to make sure that storages are filled up to their pre-specified closing level at the end 
of the year, since we do not allow for year-to-year stock changes in the model. 
16
 A similar inter-temporal arbitrage can also be performed in markets without available storage capacity, 
as long as there are direct or indirect cross-border links to countries with gas storage capability. In this 
sense, flexibility services are truly international in the simulation. 
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4 Simulation results 
 
This chapter presents an application of the DRGMM to assess the likely impact of all 
known gas infrastructure development project proposals
17
 on regional gas market 
integration in the DR. The types of projects we analyse are inter-region pipelines 
(interconnectors, including reverse flow projects), underground storage sites, LNG 
terminals and international long distance pipelines providing new sources of gas supply 
for the DR. 
For this purpose we create and run a reference scenario with 2011 input data and 
additional assumptions discussed below. Next we add, one by one, the proposed 
projects to the reference case infrastructure ceteris paribus and compare model 
outcomes to the reference case. Thus the outcome of regional gas trading and 
infrastructure operations can be measured according to the differences in outcomes from 
the 2011 reference case. When adding new infrastructure to the reference case, we 
disregard the cost and timing of infrastructure investment, so the model is established 
‘overnight’ and the tariffs paid by infrastructure users for transmission, storage or LNG 
terminal services remain unchanged. However, for the purpose of cost-benefit analysis 
we collected available project related investment cost data. 
After analysing individual projects one by one, we repeat the same procedure for project 
packages like the proposed project list of the north-south gas working group. Finally, 
the likely impact of new long distance pipelines on the regional gas market is assessed 
in the context of a 2020 reference scenario. 
4.1 Input data 
 
Table 1 contains the dimension and sources of technical input data used for the 
simulations. In order to create the 2011 reference scenario, we used estimated data when 
2011 data was still not available (e.g. consumption data due to delayed publication). The 
actual data used to create the 2011 and 2020 reference scenarios is summarized in the 
country profiles in Annex 1. 
                                                 
17
 Annex 1 contains the list of analysed projects. 
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Table 1. Summary of input data structure and sources 
Data  Source 
Category Unit  Actual data  Forecast / Planned 
Consumption 
 
Annual Quantity 
(bcm) 
Monthly 
distribution (% of 
annual quantity) 
Eurostat, EnC 
data 
N-S study, EnC data, Eurostat, ENTSO-G, 
own estimation 
 
Production 
 
Minimum and 
maximum 
production 
(mcm/day) 
EUROSTAT, 
EnC data 
N-S countries: N-S study, 
EnC data, ENTSO-G GRIPs, TYNDP, 
Infrastructure    
 Pipeline 
daily maximum 
flow 
ENTSO-G, 
EnC 
TSOs, N-S action plan, TYNDP, GRIPs, EnC  Storage 
Injection 
(mcm/day), 
withdrawal 
(mcm/day), 
working gas 
capacity (mcm) 
GSE 
 
 LNG 
Capacity 
(mcm/day) 
GLE 
TOP contracts 
Yearly minimum 
maximum quantity 
(mcm/year) 
Seasonal minimum 
and maximum 
quantity (mcm/day), 
Gazprom, National Regulators Annual reports, Platts 
   
EnC: Energy Community Regional Energy Strategy Task Force data; N-S Study: Kantor Management 
Consultants (2012) 
For the 2020 annual consumption and production forecast we rely on a critical review of 
the forecasts of institutions listed in Table 1. The monthly distribution of gas 
consumption for the analysed countries was estimated using historic data (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Estimated monthly distribution of consumption in the modelled countries (% of annual 
consumption) 
 
The pipeline infrastructure of the region for the 2011 reference scenario is depicted on 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Interconnector topology used for the 2011 reference scenario. Arrows show the possible 
physical flow direction and the daily maximum capacity (mcm/day) 
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Finally, in order to run the model, we also have to assume TOP and spot prices for 
external markets and tariffs paid by infrastructure users for transmission and storage 
(injection and withdrawal). 
Table 2 contains external gas product prices we use for simulation purposes in this 
paper. With regard to TOP contracts we assume a mixed pricing regime with a 20% 
weight for spot and 80% weight for oil indexed pricing, which reflects the European gas 
industry’s ability to renegotiate Russian TOP contracts in recent years due to the 
economic crisis.
18
 The assumed tolerance for TOP annual contracted quantity is ±15%. 
For the simulations with the 2020 reference scenario, we assume the renewal of the long 
term contracts expiring between 2011 and 2020, but also assume a 20% decrease in 
their annual contracted quantity. 
Table 2. External market price assumptions (€/MWh) 
Market Price in €/MWh 
Western Europe (TTF spot) 24.2 
Russia (TOP) 34.2 
Italy (spot) 28.0 
Turkey (TOP) 31.6 
LNG 24.2 
LNG BG, RO 31.6 
 
Transit contracts are taken into consideration only as far as they use infrastructure 
within the DR. In case of Germany and France we assume 50% of their Russian imports 
will come through Nord Stream from 2013, thus 2020 flows are reduced accordingly. 
Furthermore, in the case of Germany we assume that 50% of the transit requirements 
pass through the Yamal pipeline. For Turkey, we take into account only those Russian 
import contracts that are transmitted through Romania and Bulgaria. For Italy, Russian 
contracts go through Slovakia and Austria. 
We do not have a realistic representation of local market transmission tariffs for the 
DRGMM, so we set them close to zero in this paper. We think that disregarding from 
transmission tariffs will not distort our conclusions because the unit transmission cost 
for a MWh of gas is negligible compared to its product price.
19
 Another argument is that 
                                                 
18
 Note however that we assume no active pricing behaviour on external markets. 
19
 REKK has recently carried out a survey of gas transmission tariffs for an 80 MW gas fired power plant 
for 10 of the modelled countries and found a € 1.87/MWh average value for this group. This is 5.5% of 
the oil indexed and 7.7% of the German spot price we use in this study.    
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although significant differences in transmission tariffs across the region might distort 
cross-border arbitrage opportunities, including the utilization of gas storage assets, the 
advancement of EU-wide gas market regulation and integration is expected to level-off 
transmission tariffs for the region. Nevertheless, this is a point for further model 
development. 
Data on gas storage tariffs (injection and withdrawal fees) were gathered from storage 
owners or national energy regulators. Besides direct storage costs, we also account for 
the foregone interest costs on holding working gas inventories. The real interest rate for 
calculating the interest costs of gas inventories is set at 5%. 
4.2 Market integration measures 
 
The first set of our project related analyses deals with regional gas market integration 
and the impact of new interconnectors or LNG stations.
20
 Since market integration is a 
multi-dimension concept and difficult to measure per se, we have developed variations 
of a simple measure of market integration. Our Regional Cost Convergence Index 
(RCCI) is based on the assumption that an advance in market integration results in price 
convergence across the countries concerned and towards cheaper gas supply sources. 
Thereby in the ‘Danube Region 2011’ reference, a new piece of gas infrastructure will 
improve market integration by reducing local oil-indexed prices closer to continental 
spot price levels. 
Formally, 
     
      
       
  , where 
i  is an index for the DR countries, i = 1…k; 
pi is the annual weighted average gas price on local market i, calculated by the 
model; 
qi  is the annual gas consumption on local market i, calculated by the model; 
Q  is the amount of DR gas consumption (sum of qi over k), calculated by the 
model; 
pspot is the continental spot price. 
                                                 
20
 A positive impact on gas market integration is the singularly most important criterion a PCI should 
meet according to Article 4 of the proposed infrastructure Regulation.   
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The RCCI is the excess gas purchase cost (a percentage), which is the amount that the 
DR pays for its gas consumption over the same amount at a continental spot price. The 
RCCI for the 2011 reference scenario is 21.5%. Figure 4 shows the modelled 2011 
reference scenario with local prices (€/MWh, white boxes) and trade flows (arrows), 
assuming external market prices (included in the grey boxes). White arrows represent 
non-congested  and grey indicates congested interconnections. 
Figure 4. Reference scenario: 2011 current infrastructure (RCCIref = 21.5%) 
 
4.3 Analysis of individual projects case by case 
 
To calculate the project RCCIs, we added the proposed gas infrastructure projects to the 
2011 reference scenario one at a time, holding everything else constant. No single gas 
storage project had a significant regional market integration impact. Table 3 contains 
the pipeline simulations and Table 4 lists the LNG projects, in the order of increasing 
RCCI values. Those projects with lower RCCI save more gas purchase cost for the 
region than those with higher values, while the distribution across individual countries 
will vary. For example, in the 2011 reference scenario, consumers of the Danube 
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Region pay 4700 million € more than what they would pay for their consumption on a 
Western European spot market price.  
We identified seven pipeline and five LNG projects which alone can have a significant 
and beneficial regional impact on gas prices and purchase costs. While the rest of the 
pipeline projects do not have a significant regional impact individually, there are some 
that actually result in higher RCCI values (that is, increasing gas purchase cost for the 
region). The latter results might seem counter-intuitive, but they are actually consistent 
with the workings of the market. The market equilibrium maximizes total welfare, i.e. 
the aggregate welfare of all market players, i.e. consumers, producers, storage and 
interconnector, operators etc. Therefore while the addition of a new infrastructure 
element will never decrease short-term social welfare, it may well result in a welfare 
loss for one or more groups of market players. 
Table 3. Individual pipeline project ranking by RCCI 
Pipeline 
RCCI 
(ref:21,51%) 
Pipeline 
RCCI 
(ref:21,51%) 
CZ-PL2 17,10% PL-SK 21,51% 
SK-HU 18,35% BG-RO 21,51% 
GR-BG 21,13% PL-CZ 21,51% 
TR-BG 21,29% HR-IT 21,51% 
RS-BG 21,39% MK-GR 21,51% 
RS-RO 21,42% HR-HU2 21,51% 
RO-MD 21,47% RS-MK 21,51% 
BA-RS 21,50% RS-HR 21,52% 
MK-AL 21,51% BA-HR 21,52% 
HR-RS 21,51% MK-RS 21,55% 
HR-BA 21,51% RO-HU 21,56% 
HU-SK 21,51% BG-RS 21,56% 
MK-XK 21,51% RO-RS 21,56% 
AT-CZ 21,51% MK-BG 21,56% 
HR-SI 21,51% MD-RO 21,57% 
RS-BA2 21,51% SI-HU 21,67% 
HU-SI 21,51%   
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Table 4. Individual LNG project ranking by RCCI 
Project name RCCI (ref:21,51%) 
LNG-PL 16,94% 
LNG-PL2 17,04% 
LNG-HR 20,03% 
LNG2-RO 20,40% 
LNG2-BG 21,29% 
LNG-GR2 21,51% 
 
According to RCCI, the best ranking pipeline project for the region is an upgrade of the 
Czech-Polish interconnector from its present 0.4 mcm/day to 8.6 mcm/day capacity. A 
new Slovak-Hungarian interconnector ranks second, followed by three projects that 
reduce relatively high Bulgarian prices, and lastly an interconnection from Romania to 
Moldova. The best ranking LNG projects are on the Polish and the Croatian territories. 
However, project ranking by RCCI alone can be misleading from a regional perspective 
since it is neutral with regard to the distribution of price changes and cost savings across 
the countries. Impacts of some projects might be limited within those parties that are 
directly involved while benefiting others across the region. Our Regional Spill-over 
Index (RSoI) measures by how much the addition of a new piece of infrastructure will 
change the 2011 reference RCCI when we exclude the countries directly affected by the 
new project
21
 from the RCCI calculation. Table 5 contains the results for those 
interconnector projects that produce part of their cost reduction effects beyond the 
borders of the project countries. 
Table 5. The reduction of regional gas purchase costs by individual pipeline projects in peripheral 
countries, % 
Pipeline project Reduction, % 
SK-HU 1.59% 
GR-BG 0.51% 
RS-BG 0.11% 
MD-RO 0.02% 
TR-BG 0.01% 
 
                                                 
21
 One country in the case of LNG, and two in the case of a new interconnection 
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We can see that the impacts of two of the top ranking projects by RCCI, the Czech-
Poland and the Serbia-Romania interconnectors (see Table 3), are strictly limited to the 
involved countries, (their RSoI is 0). In contrast, the majority of benefits are generated 
beyond the borders of the project countries (Slovakia-Hungary and Greece-Bulgaria). 
We can identify similar differences in the case of LNG projects. The benefits of a Polish 
LNG receiving terminal, without additional cross border pipelines put in place, is 
strictly limited to Poland itself. At the same time a Croatian LNG project could bring 
reduced prices and purchase costs not only for itself but also for Slovenia, Hungary, 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina without any supplemental infrastructure. 
4.4 Analysis of project packages – the North-South gas corridor 
 
The DRGMM model can also be used to carry out similar assessment of regional gas 
market integration for project packages. In recent years a number of proposals have 
been put forward to develop a set of infrastructure projects to improve gas market 
interconnectivity of the DR. The two prominent ones were the New Europe 
Transmission System (NETS) project (a European priority project under the EU’s TEN-
E program) and the recently developed North-South gas corridor for Central and 
Southeast Europe. Since the present status of the NETS project does not allow for the 
breakdown and identification of its individual infrastructure projects, we used the 
North-South corridor project list that was published by the Commission in December 
2011 (EC, 2011). 
Adding the 17 projects of the North-South corridor to the 2011 reference case lowers 
the RCCI index from 25.1% to 6.8%. This translates into an annual gas purchase cost 
savings of 2827 million € for the DR (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. The impacts of the North-South corridor (RCCIref = 21,5%) 
 
All countries except for the Czech Republic seem to enjoy a significant drop in 
wholesale gas prices in the modelled countries. The implementation of the entire project 
seems to bring the Western part of the region very close to the German / Italian markets 
and the South-Eastern part to the Greek market, as four LNG terminals provide 
significant new supply sources for the region. 
Second, the empty black circles on Figure 4 stand for projects that are built but not 
utilized by market participants according to the model. An interesting issue for future 
analysis is how the package could be reduced while still preserving its benefits for the 
region. This requires an in-depth analysis due to the abnormal trading patterns of the 
region that are a result of significant TOP obligations and spot trading opportunities 
supported by a robust infrastructure and new LNG supply sources. We can observe 
several trade flows from high to low priced countries (e.g. Bulgaria exporting to Greece 
or Hungary exporting to Serbia) or a lack of trade between countries with a price 
differential (e.g. an empty pipeline between Slovenia and Hungary). 
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4.5 The impacts of new international gas pipelines entering the region 
 
Up to now we have investigated the impacts of intra-regional projects and project 
packages on market integration. However, in recent years discussions about how to 
increase gas supply source diversification of the DR have manifested in South Corridor 
gas pipeline project alternatives, e.g. Nabucco, Nabucco West, South Stream, TAP. 
Now we seek to analyse the potential impacts of new pipeline supply sources entering 
the DR according to the model. 
For this analysis we first create a 2020 reference scenario. Compared to the 2011 
reference case, three major changes are made to the model: first, only new infrastructure 
under construction in 2011 are added; second, load data is modified according to best 
available 2020 forecasts; third, we assume that TOP contracts expiring between 2011 
and 2020 will all be extended again but at a reduced rate of annual contracted capacity 
(80% of the former contract). External price assumptions are unchanged compared to 
the 2011 reference scenario. The RCCI index for the 2020 reference case is 29.9% 
New pipelines are represented schematically, by assuming that new gas entering the 
region is under a TOP regime. TOP is priced at Russian price minus 5%, with the 
Russian price 80% oil and 20% spot indexed.  
We compare the impacts of two pipeline business models under two different intra-
regional network configuration alternatives (four cases). The first pipeline brings 10 
bcm to the Turkish-Bulgarian border and then ships all of it to Baumgarten via Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary. Spot trading of this gas is then allowed (Project 1). This pipeline 
business model considers the DR as primarily a transit area. Alternatively, Project 2 
brings again 10 bcm to the Turkish-Bulgarian border but some of the gas is distributed 
along the way: 1 bcm for the Bulgarian and Romanian markets, 2 bcm for the 
Hungarian market, and the remaining 6 bcm reaches Baumgarten. Sufficient additional 
pipeline capacities are assumed to bring these amounts to the affected markets. We 
estimate the impacts of Projects 1 and 2 on RCCI both with the assumption of a 
complete and incomplete North-South corridor. The corresponding RCCI figures are 
summarised in Table 6. 
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Table 6. The impact of alternative 10 Bcm South Corridor projects on RCCI under alternative 
intra-regional network topology 
 
With North-South 
package 
Without North-South 
package 
2020 base scenario 19.16% 29.86% 
V1 (10 bcm TOP to AT) 16.89% 29.54% 
V2 (10 bcm distributed along the 
route) 
16.73% 27.38% 
 
We conclude that the bulk of the improvement in RCCI is due to improved intra-
regional interconnectivity along with the addition of LNG sources to the DR – 
representing the implementation of the North-South corridor projects. The more 
regionally diversified pipeline business model performs slightly better than the transit 
model. 
4.6 Allowing virtual reverse flow (backhaul) transactions on EU-EU borders of 
major transit pipelines 
 
Because of the apparent counter-incentives of transit pipeline owners, in the foregoing 
we have disregarded from allowing backhaul transactions on all transit pipelines, 
shipping Russian gas to Western and South Europe crossing the DR.
 
 However, one 
might argue
22
 that instead of building new infrastructure, the addition of a bi-directional 
component to existing infrastructure would significantly improve the integration of the 
DR with West European gas markets. 
In order to estimate the potential impact of backhaul transactions on the DR’s gas 
purchase costs, we allowed for virtual reverse flow transactions to happen at all EU-EU 
borders as – including Croatia23 - along the transit pipelines. However, no backhaul 
transactions are allowed at EU-third country borders (EU-RU, EU-TR and EU-EnC
24
). 
Table 7 contains the results of our simulations. 
                                                 
22
 The authors thank Pierre Noel for raising their attention to this point.  
23
 Croatia will be member of the EU from 01.07.2013 
24
 Allowing backhaul transactions on the EU-EnC borders does not significantly change the result, RCCI 
would be 25,01% 
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Table 7 The impacts of virtual reverse flow options on RCCI 
Backhaul 
option 
not allowed 
(base case) 
allowed on all EU-
EU borders 
Annual savings on regions gas bill 
compared to base case 
2011 21.51% 17.20% 823 million € 
2020 base 
scenario 
29.86% 25.13% 1181 million € 
 
The figures in Table 7 lead can be used to calculate an annual savings of € 823 – 1181 
million in gas purchase cost for the region. 
The realization of a new Czech-Polish interconnector (map on the left) has very similar 
results on a regional scale to the free backhaul option (map on the right). However 
prices in the Czech Republic remain unchanged in the first case while they increase 
significantly in the second. 
Figure 6. Effects of a new CZ-PL interconnector compared to free backhaul options 
 
5 Using the model for cost-benefit analysis: an illustration 
 
Up to this point we have concentrated on market integration and price impacts of 
projects and project packages and ignored project related costs. However, the 
consideration of project related investment cost coupled with calculated savings from 
the model allow for a more economically significant measurement and evaluation than 
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the RCCI or the RSoI alone. Since the availability of investment cost data for future 
natural gas infrastructure projects is very limited,
25
 we often used international 
benchmarks for this purpose. In this regard the following analyses is based on some cost 
estimations. 
First we calculate a regional payback period for the projects by dividing the project 
related investment cost with the estimated annual purchase cost reduction. Table 8 
contains the results of the calculations and also compares project rankings by RCCI 
against the payback period. 
Table 8. Individual project ranking by RCCI and regional payback period 
 
Project 
RCCI 
(ref:21.51%) 
Annual saving on 
gas bill (million 
€) 
Estimated 
investment cost 
(million €) 
Pay-back 
period 
(year) 
 
Individual 
pipeline 
CZ-PL2 17.10% 841.75 28 0.03 
SK-HU 18.35% 598.51 150 0.25 
GR-BG 21.13% 73.49 160 2.18 
TR-BG 21.29% 41.77 75 1.80 
RS-BG 21.39% 22.98 95 4.13 
RO-MD 21.47% 7.73 50 6.46 
LNG LNG-
PL 
16.94% 872.30 470 0.54 
LNG-
HR 
20.03% 281.39 240 0.85 
LNG2-
RO 
20.40% 205.51 470 2.29 
LNG2-
BG 
21.29% 41.77 470 11.25 
 
The results indicate that the four best pipeline projects could cover investment costs for 
the region within just 3 years, with the two best (CZ-PL and SK-HU) within a few 
months. The regional payback period for the Polish and Croatian LNG projects is also 
less than a year. Surprisingly, the differences in the regional payback period changes the 
RCCI ranking only slightly, e.g. the TR-BG project becomes more lucrative than the 
GR-BG pipeline. 
                                                 
25
 Investment costs are gathered from the project home page, from investors in the case of pipelines and a 
benchmark for LNG. 
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Thus the question is why these projects are not being built, or if they are planned why 
they proceed slowly when they are profitable and provide tangible benefits to the 
region? Part of the answer to this question relates to the positive network externalities of 
new interconnectors that are non-internalized because of the system of regulated third 
party access. The revenue from a new interconnector is based on investment and 
operation costs of the pipeline company. These costs are typically shared and paid by 
the consumers of those member states directly involved in the project through the 
regulated transmission tariffs. A new pipeline might include more dispersed additional 
costs and benefits for producers and consumers across a wider geographic area.
26
 
We can illustrate this point by simulating the likely impacts of building one of the top 
ranking projects, the Greece-Bulgaria interconnector. This project ranks third in RCCI 
and its estimated cost is € 160 million. By adding this interconnector to the 2011 
reference case, we can identify ten countries where the new line leads to a measurable 
change in annual weighted average wholesale gas prices and improvement in social 
welfare. Table 9 summarizes the results of this simulation. 
Aggregate welfare rises by € 190 million annually, with Greece and Bulgaria the most 
significant beneficiaries. In the meantime, Romania and Hungary suffer sizeable welfare 
losses. With regard to market players, TSOs and consumers are the beneficiaries of the 
project while DR gas producers and TOP contract holders suffer losses. In this scenario, 
excess demand for the new pipeline capacity results in significant congestion revenues 
for the participating TSOs.. A gas price decrease, on the other hand, adversely affects 
local producers and TOP gas holders (TOP gas is crowded out by cheaper Greek LNG 
sources, leaving TOP holders with a significant loss in all countries except for Greece). 
Since gas prices increase in Greece relative to the reference case (cheaper LNG flowing 
now to the North), consumers suffer a significant welfare loss while producers and TOP 
traders make gains.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Part of the benefits could be captured by tendering pipeline capacity, e.g. an open season procedure. 
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Table 9. Changes in welfare measures due from Greece – Bulgaria interconnector (million €) 
 
Net 
consumer 
surplus 
Producer 
surplus 
Storage 
operation 
profit 
Net profit from 
long-term 
contracts 
TSO auction 
revenues 
Total 
social 
welfare 
GR -76.8 41.0 0.0 43.9 114.9 122.9 
BG 60.3 -8.2 0.0 -46.7 103.8 109.2 
RO 94.8 -98.8 0.0 -24.5 -7.5 -35.9 
HU 1.7 -0.4 0.0 -1.2 -7.6 -7.5 
MK 3.2 0.0 0.0 -2.6 0.0 0.6 
SI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
AT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
HR 0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
RS 0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
BA 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
We think that model simulations of this kind might help structure the debates 
surrounding new gas infrastructure projects for the DR by identifying their 
distributional impacts. Within the EU context, ACER could potentially make use of 
such results in preparing for its decisions on cross border investment cost allocation (see 
Article 13 of the proposed infrastructure Regulation). 
6 Using the model for supply security analysis: another illustration 
 
The DRGMM model can also support sophisticated gas supply security analyses at the 
regional level. As we have noted before, the DRGMM model uses a fully dynamic 
solution algorithm over 12 consecutive months, in which we assume that traders 
optimize their use of storage assets and the flexibility of the delivery of TOP contracts. 
As a result, the model produces monthly forward prices for the entire year, which are 
“right on the spot” in the sense that if there are no subsequent changes in the input data, 
then all the outcomes (including prices) will turn out as predicted as the year unfolds. 
Of course, in reality, supply and demand conditions will deviate from forecasts 
throughout the year. To capture this, the model allows for the possibility of intra-year 
runs in which any input variable pertaining to the upcoming months can be changed.  
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Given that the gas year runs from April to March the initial model run will have to 
include forecasts for supply-demand conditions in each of the 12 months, otherwise it 
would be impossible to input optimal storage and contract delivery decisions in the 
beginning of the year.
27
 Taking the forecast as given, we can then calculate how each of 
the 12 months will “play out”. 
Now let us suppose that a supply disruption occurs in January. For the sake of the 
example, it could be another gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine that results in zero 
Ukrainian transits through the whole of January. In the model, we would represent this 
incident by setting the maximum transport capacity of the pipelines through Ukraine (to 
Romania, Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia) to zero for a month. 
An important question is, in which month do market participants know that 
interconnectors crossing Ukraine will be unavailable in January? If they already know it 
in April, they will likely have enough time to stock up gas to better adjust to the crisis. 
But, if it takes them by surprise, the price effects will be much more severe.
28
 One can 
therefore imagine that the actual effects will be highly dependent on the length of time 
that is available for preparation. 
Fortunately, the DRGMM model allows for a full exploration of these issues. Taking 
the start-of-year run as a reference for how market events occur naturally, it is possible 
to “stop” the year in any month (e.g. just before January), re-set the input parameters of 
the model for the rest of the year (e.g. interconnector capacities in January, and 
probably also the yearly TOP minimum constraints), and re-run the optimization 
procedure while taking the outcomes of the past months (e.g. storage utilization from 
April to December) as already given. The model results will then reflect the 
consequences of regional market-based responses to the supply shock, including the 
spillover effects on countries not directly affected by the shut-down of the pipeline 
(Serbia or Bulgaria in this case). 
 
                                                 
27
 The key decision variables here are those with inter-temporal consequences. 
28
 Since the model employs market mechanisms only, negative supply shocks will present themselves as 
price jumps in the affected areas. 
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Figure 7. The effect of an unexpected supply disruption of all pipelines 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the results of the crisis situation that we outlined above. The coloring of 
the markets indicates the extent of the price rise in January and the seriousness of the 
supply disruption if the market equilibrium is restored via mandatory consumption cuts. 
Light grey colored markets experience a price rise of about 4-5 €/MWh for the crisis 
month, whereas the dark grey colors indicate a price rise beyond 10 €/MWh. As the 
actual numbers show, the supply disruption is quite severe in the Eastern part of the 
Balkans, whereas it seems to be more manageable in Hungary, Serbia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Interestingly, the Czech Republic is also affected through the decrease in 
SKCZ pipeline flows.29 
As a final point, we note that the regional (and country-level) supply security effects of 
various policies and new infrastructure elements can also be assessed using this 
                                                 
29
 The same crisis situation turns out to be almost fully manageable (except in Moldova) when market 
players start preparing for it in April, instead of only reacting to the events as they take place in January. 
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methodology. One would simply carry out the supply shock analysis, such as the one 
above, with and without the policy or the new infrastructure and compare the outcomes. 
7 Model limitations and future research directions 
 
The DRGMM is a unique analytical tool that represents the natural gas industries of 
Central and South East Europe in a detailed and consistent manner. In this paper we 
have described the assumptions and logic of the model and presented several 
simulations to measure and analyse effects on market integration, cost-benefit, and 
security of supply. However, the model has limitations that need to be addressed. 
The first of these limitations is the model geography. At present, only the 17 countries 
from Figure 1 are represented in detail as ‘local’ markets in the model, leaving a 
significant part of the EU labelled as an ‘external’ market. An extension of the model to 
present ‘external’ EU markets could result in a detailed representation of the entire 
interconnected EU natural gas wholesale market. 
Second, the model lacks a sensible representation of the EU’s outside suppliers’ pricing 
behaviour. In its present form, the pricing of external markets to supply the DR is static; 
a combination of oil product price and spot price indexation by Russia, relative pricing 
from Turkey, and spot pricing in Germany, Italy and LNG. Yet in the last four years 
there were several instances of supply/demand shocks that shifted heavily oil-indexed 
contracts more towards spot price indexation (Stern and Rogers, 2011). We can also 
assume that a stronger internal and East-West integration of DR gas markets, promoted 
by a significant change in network topology in the DR, could create a basis for a more 
dynamic and market based gas pricing system in the region compared to a present, very 
rigid oil indexation. Thus, developing a more realistic representation of outside supplier 
pricing behaviour is a key future model development task. 
Third, the representation of gas transmission and storage access prices and pricing in the 
model requires refinement. This is made difficult by the lack of a consistent data, 
particularly well-documented benchmarking of gas infrastructure access costs across 
Europe. Nevertheless, since the magnitude of transmission and storage access tariffs in 
comparison to product prices is marginal, we can argue that a more accurate and 
detailed representation of infrastructure access tariffs and rules are not likely to 
significantly change model results and in fact might disrupt model algorithms. 
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Finally, one could argue that the representation of the DR gas market as existing in 
perfect competition under network and TOP contractual constraints is an unrealistic 
assumption. Beyond TOP constraints, national gas wholesale markets are often 
dominated by players with significant market power. The assumption of efficient 
utilization of cross border pipeline capacities is somewhat flawed because existing 
capacity allocation rules are far from market based mechanisms (see REKK, 2011 on a 
Hungarian example). Nevertheless, the world represented by the model is the vision of 
the European Union, including its south-eastern region, for a restructured gas industry. 
The model thus provides for a normative reference case in a European spirit and allows 
for an important assessment of the impacts, changes and distortions of projects relative 
to a baseline case. 
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Annex 1: The list of the analysed projects 
Cross-border interconnections 
Pipeline Maximum flow (mcm/day) Estimated start-up 
BG-RO 14.00 2012 
RO-BG upgrade 4.11 2012 
RO-HU 4.79 2013 
BG-RO upgrade 4.11 2013 
GR-BG 8.22 2014 
TR-BG 13.70 2014 
HU-SK 13.70 2015 
SK-HU 13.70 2015 
RS-BG 4.93 2015 
PL-SK 13.70 2016 
TR-BG upgrade 10.96 2017 
CZ-PL upgrade 8.22 2017 
PL-CZ 8.22 2017 
AT-CZ 13.70 2017 
HU-SI 3.56 2017 
SI-HU 3.56 2017 
HR-SI 31.78 2017 
RS-BA upgrade 3.29 2018 
HR-BA 6.85 2018 
BA-HR 6.85 2018 
HR-IT 41.10 2018 
HR-RS 7.40 2018 
RS-HR 7.40 2018 
MK-BG 1.23 2018 
MK-GR 2.74 2018 
MK-AL 2.47 2018 
MK-KO 1.37 2018 
MK-RS 2.19 2018 
RS-RO 4.38 2018 
RO-RS 4.38 2018 
BA-RS 3.29 2018 
RS-MK 2.19 2018 
MD-RO 2.74 2018 
RO-MD 2.74 2018 
GR-BG upgrade 5.45 2020 
HR-HU upgrade 12.98 2020 
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Storage facilities 
Market 
Injection capacity 
(mcm/day) 
Withdrawal capacity 
(mcm/day) 
Working gas capacity 
(mcm) 
Estimated start-up 
CZ 3.9 3.9 290 2012 
PL 0.54 2.36 180 2012 
RS 10 10 350 2012 
PL 5.7 5.7 150 2013 
SK 3 2.5 250 2014 
AT 1 1.2 84 2014 
AT 5.71 8.57 685 2014 
AT 2.9 2.9 100 2014 
PL 0.28 0.41 35 2014 
SK 3 2.5 250 2014 
RO 15 15 1 600 2015 
PL 7 10.8 675 2015 
GR 5 4 360 2015 
CZ 0.87 0.87 350 2016 
HR 8.256 8.256 510 2017 
CZ 1.7 1.7 195 2017 
BG 10 10 550 2017 
RO 4 4 300 2018 
RO 2 2 250 2018 
BG 9 9 600 2018 
AT 2.8 2.8 225 2018 
AT 17.3 17.3 900 2018 
AT 24.5 24.5 1600 2018 
RS 10 10 350 2018 
PL 20.6 20.6 422 2020 
 
LNG terminals 
Country Maximum flow (mcm/day) Estimated Start-up 
LNG-HR 16.44 2014 
LNG-PL 13.7 2014 
LNG2-RO 21.92 2015 
LNG2-BG 6.85 2015 
LNG-GR2 5.76 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
  
108 
 
8 References 
 
Abada, I., Briat, V., Gabriel, S. A., Massol, O., 2012. A Generalized Nash-Cournot 
Model for the European Natural Gas Markets with a Fuel Substitution Demand 
Function: the GaMMES Model. Networks and Spatial Economics, accepted, April 2012. 
 
Boots, M. G., Rijkers, F.A.M., Hobbs, B.F., 2004. Trading in the Downstream 
European Gas Market: A Successive Oligopoly Approach. The Energy Journal. 25 (3), 
73-102. 
 
EC 2011. Action plan for North-South energy interconnections in Central-Eastern 
Europe. Final. 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/doc/2011_north_south_east_action_plan.pdf  
 
Egging, R., Gabriel, S.A., Holz, F., Zhuang, J., 2008. A Complementarity Model for the 
European Natural Gas Market. Energy Policy, 36 (7), 2385-2414. 
 
Egging, R., Gabriel, S.A., Holz, F., 2010. The World Gas Model: A multi-period mixed 
complementarity model for the global natural gas market. Energy, 35, 4016-4029. 
 
Gabriel S.A., Kiet, S., Zhuang, J., 2005a. A mixed complementarity-based equilibrium 
model of natural gas markets. Operation Research, 53(5) 799–818. 
 
Gabriel S.A., Kiet, S., Zhuang, J., 2005b. A Large-scale complementarity model of the 
North American gas market. Energy Economics. 27, 639–665. 
 
Holz, F., Hirschhausen, C., Kemfert, C., 2008. A strategic model of European gas 
supply (GASMOD). Energy Economics, 30 (3), 766-788. 
 
Kaderják, P. (ed.), 2011a. Security of energy supply in Central and South-East Europe. 
Corvinus University of Budapest, Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research, 
Budapest. 
  
109 
 
Kaderják, P., 2011b. The Lessons of the January 2009 Gas Crisis in Central and Eastern 
Europe, In: Vinois, J.A. (ed), The Security of Energy Supply in the European Union, pp. 
193-219. Claeys and Casteels. 
 
Kantoor Management Consultants, 2012. Market analysis and priorities for future 
development of the gas market and infrastructure in Central-Eastern Europe under the 
North-South Energy Interconnections initiative (Lot 2). Final Report submitted to the 
Directorate-General for Energy, Unit B1: Security of supply and networks, European 
Commission. 19 January, 2012. 
 
REKK, 2011. The Baumgarten saga, in: Hungarian Energy Market Report, Volume 3, 
No.3, 9-12. 
 
Stern, J. and  Rogers., 2011. The transition to hub based gas pricing in continental 
Europe. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. NG 49. March. 
 
Lise, W., Hobbs, B. F. 2008. Future evolution of the liberalised European gas market: 
Simulation results with a dynamic model. Energy. 33 (7), 989-1004. 
 
Lise, W., Hobbs, B.F., 2009. A dynamic simulation of market power in the liberalised 
European natural gas market. Energy Journal. 30, 119–136. 
 
Mulder, M., Zwart, G. 2006. NATGAS: a model of the European natural gas market, 
CPB Memoranda 144, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. 
 
Perner, J., Seeliger, A., 2004. Prospects of gas supplies to the European market until 
2030. Results from the simulation model EUGAS. Utilities Policy 12(4), 291–302. 
 
  
110 
 
From oil-indexed to hub-based gas wholesale pricing in Hungary
1
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In Hungary natural gas has been playing an outstanding role in meeting primary energy 
demand for a long time. In 2012, 34% of final energy demand was met by natural gas 
that is 12 percentage points over EU28 average.
2
 In 2013 43% of installed electricity 
generation capacity was natural gas based
3
, 88% of households were connected to the 
gas grid and 77% (in 2012) of district heating was produced by using natural gas. 
According to recent forecasts (REKK, 2011), the share of natural gas will remain 
significant in the fuel mix of the country in the longer term. Thus the efficiency of the 
natural gas market has a major impact on the competitiveness of gas-intensive 
manufacturing, gas based electricity generation and the welfare of household customers. 
In addition, a competitive natural gas market with high supply security standards is key 
for the transformation towards a low-carbon energy system in Hungary (EC 2011)
4
. 
 
Since the political system change of 1990 the Hungarian natural gas industry has gone 
through a tremendous transformation. Corporatization and unbundling of the former, 
vertically integrated and state owned Hungarian Oil and Gas Trust (OKGT) into six 
major regional gas distribution companies and the establishment of the National Oil and 
Gas Company (MOL Rt.) took place in the early 1990s.  The 1994 Gas Act established 
a “single buyer” model for the industry and created a favourable regulatory framework 
for future privatization, the major wave of which took place between November 1995 
and March 1998. By the end of the privatization process major international gas 
companies entered the Hungarian market and the only state ownership in the industry 
remained 25%+1 share in MOL. Between 1998 and 2004 the development of the 
                                                 
1
 I would like to thank Adrienn Selei, Ákos Beöthy and Péter Kotek for their valuable assistance and 
comments that helped me preparing this Chapter. Certainly, all responsibilities with regard to the content 
of the Chapter remain with the author.    
2
 Eurostat. 
3 A. Stróbl. 
4
 The CO2 emission intensity of natural gas based electricity generation compared to coal based 
generation might be 70% lower. Gas based generation, together with pump storage, is also key in 
providing system flexibility to balance intermittent renewable (wind and solar) generation. This is why 
natural gas is commonly considered as the fuel of transformation towards a low carbon electricity system. 
This pivotal role of natural gas for a low carbon Hungarian policy roadmap was confirmed by the joint 
study of REKK and KMPL prepared for the Hungarian Ministry of National Development: A 
villamosenergia-termelés, valamint a lakossági és közületi hőfelhasználás dekarbonizációs lehetőségei 
Magyarországon. Háttértanulmány a Hazai Dekarbonizációs Útitervhez (2012). 
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industry has largely been shaped by preparations to join the European Union and, since 
the accession on May 1, 2004, to fully implement a competitive gas market in 
accordance with EU rules.  
 
1.1 The problem 
 
Despite the long standing traditions of its oil and gas industry
5
, favourable geological 
conditions and location, as well as its developed natural gas infrastructure, the 
Hungarian natural gas market is still in a fragile situation. This is reflected by the fact 
that natural gas has become the synonym of Russian dependence, high heating bills for 
households and – as a consequence of the 2009 January gas crisis and the present 
Russia-Ukraine conflict – energy supply security risk in recent years. 
 
The performance of the Hungarian gas wholesale market in the five years between the 
fall of 2008 (the beginning of the last economic recession) and 2013 reflects its 
inefficiency. On the North-West European core markets oversupply and increased 
competition resulted in wholesale natural gas prices 20-40% below the oil-indexed 
price, which has been the benchmark for Hungary
6
 (see Figure 1). In those five years 
Hungarian customers could benefit from favourable West-European market trends only 
due to regulatory intervention
7
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 See, for example, the documentary series Olaj, olaj, olaj! Fejezetek a magyar kőolaj- és földgázipar 
történetéből. KLT Kulturális Kft., 2007. 
6
 This margin remained even in the period of increasing spot gas prices after the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster on March 11, 2011 and the follow-up demand shock caused by increased Japanese demand for 
liquified natural gas (LNG). From October 2013 Gazprom finally adjusted its supply price much closer to 
market levels for its Hungarian partners (E.ON and then MVM). 
7
 Instead of allowing 100% recovery for oil indexed gas import cost in regulated Universal Service (US) 
prices for households, the regulator applied a ‘0,4*spot+0,6*oil indexed’ formula from October 2010 and 
a  ‘0,7*spot+0,3*oil indexed’ formula from October 2011. This resulted in a 23% decrease in the allowed 
cost of gas for US customers until January 2013, compared to pre-2010 October levels. In addition, since 
January 2013 the Hungarian government implemented three subsequent US end customer gas price cuts 
(January 2013: -10%, September 2013: -11,1% and January 2014: -6,5%) that resulted in an overall 43% 
decrease in the allowed cost of gas for US customers compared to pre-2010 October levels (source: 
Hungarian Energy and Public Utilities Regulatory Authority: MEKH). In addition, those traders who got 
access to the Hungarian Austrian Gas Pipeline (HAG) to ship western priced natural gas to the country 
could offer below oil-indexed priced gas for free market customers.  
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Figure 1. The development of oil-indexed, spot, and mixed natural gas prices, January 2008 – 
December 2013 
 
Source: REKK analysis 
1.2 Study objective 
 
The primary objective of this study is to identify the principal conditions for a transition 
from monopolistic (oil-indexed) natural gas wholesale pricing to hub-based pricing in 
Hungary.
8
 It is also about simulating the wholesale price impacts of policy measures to 
remove the obstacles to efficient gas wholesale competition in the country.  
 
The major hypothesis of the paper is that the major obstacles to efficient gas wholesale 
competition and related pricing to develop are the followings in Hungary:  
(i) Exclusive control over a pivotal infrastructure, the (Russia-)Ukraine-Hungary 
interconnector (in the followings: UA-HU interconnector), that ensures a 
dominant market position for the Russian supplier.  
 In the history of natural gas in Hungary annual gas import demand couldn’t 
have been served without Russian supplies through the UA-HU 
                                                 
8
 According to Stern (2012, p.7.), oil-indexed gas pricing (or oil price escalation) is when the gas „price is 
linked, usually through a base price and an escalation clause, to competing fuels, typically crude oil, gas 
oil, and / or fuel oil.” In case of hub-based gas wholesale pricing (alternatively spot or market pricing) 
„the price is determined by the interplay of supply and demand – gas-on-gas competition – and is traded 
over a variety of different time periods (daily, monthly, annually or longer). Trading takes place at 
physical hubs (for example Henry Hub in the USA) or notional hubs (such as NBP in the UK). If there are 
longer term contracts, these will use gas price indices to determine the price. Spot LNG is also included in 
this category”.      
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interconnector. Until 1996 when the Austrian-Hungarian gas pipeline (in the 
followings: HAG) was put in operation, Hungary received gas imports only 
through the UA-HU interconnector. Despite more recent investments into the 
diversification of the Hungarian gas transmission infrastructure, the annual 
import demand of the country was not possible to be fully met from non-
Russian-Ukrainian directions even by mid-2014
9
. In sum, while the 
interconnection capacity of the Hungarian natural gas transmission system in 
the Russian / Ukrainian direction is abundant relative to the country’s import 
demand, interconnection capacities in other directions used to fall well below 
the import demand of the country. The result has long prohibited the 
effective competition of non-Russia owned and priced gas to meet 
Hungarian gas demand.  
 The present natural gas transmission topology with exclusive supplier 
control over the UA-HU interconnector in itself has long ensured market 
dominance for the Russian supplier in Hungary. Between 1996 and 2015, the 
duration of the present long term gas supply contract (in the followings: 
LTC
10
) between Gazprom and its Hungarian counterpart, market dominance 
manifested in a monopolistic oil-linked natural gas wholesale pricing regime.   
 As long as the gas imported through the supplier controlled UA-HU 
interconnector remains pivotal in meeting Hungarian natural gas import 
needs, the Russian supplier will preserve a dominant wholesale market 
position even after the present LTC expires in 2015. Capacity withholding 
on the pivotal infrastructure can support monopolistic pricing by the Russian 
supplier even in the absence of a new LTC with monopolistic pricing 
arrangements (e.g. partial oil-indexed pricing). In this case the basis of 
market dominance for the Russian supplier is the exclusive control over the 
use of capacity of a pivotal infrastructure.  
                                                 
9
 The completion of new interconnections with Romania and Croatia by the Hungarian gas transmission 
system operator, FGSZ in 2010 and 2011 started to change this situation. The „National Energy Strategy 
2030 of Hungary”, accepted in 2011, also put the emphasis on diversification of supply sources and the 
physical infrastructure in case of the natural gas sector. A flagship project of this strategy is the new 
Slovakia – Hungary interconnector that is expected to start commercial operations by January 2015 at the 
latest.    
10
 In this study „LTC contract” will stand for long term (over 5 years) natural gas contracts with take-or-
pay (TOP) obligation but with a certain level of flexibility in the quantity of the TOP obligation. Short 
term contracts without quantity flexibility are called „spot” contracts.  
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 In order to ensure the basis of its market dominance (control over a critical 
infrastructure) and related monopolistic rents, the Russian supplier will have 
an incentive to block or gain control over import capacities with regulated 
third party access and alternative to the UA-HU interconnector. For the 
worse, competitively priced spot gas that could enter the Hungarian market 
through import capacities with regulated third party access also presents a 
threat to the local counterparty of Gazprom. Both Gazprom and its 
Hungarian counterparty have a shared interest in blocking or gaining control 
over import capacities with regulated third party access, thus foreclosing 
their potential competitors.        
 A final related hypothesis is that halting the pivotal nature of the UA-HU 
interconnector is a necessary but not sufficient condition to create efficient 
competition on the Hungarian gas wholesale market.   
(ii) The present major Russian long term contract, held by a single Hungarian 
wholesaler, as a principal source of wholesale market concentration. 
 MOL, then the single gas wholesaler of Hungary, entered into a major, 19 
years duration LTC with its Russian partner in 1996. Since then this contract 
has served as the principal import supply source to meet Hungarian natural 
gas demand and, at the same time, has also guaranteed market dominance for 
its actual holder
11
 on the Hungarian gas wholesale market. While the 
contract was fully compatible with the single buyer market model in place 
between 1994 and 2004, it was in conflict with the objective of creating 
efficient competition after the start of gas market liberalization on January 
2004. However, even after 2004 subsequent gas market models were 
adjusted to the existence of the contract by introducing first the Public Utility 
(PU) market segment (2004-2009) and since then the Universal Service (US) 
market segment. The PU and US market segments have provided 
preferential sales concessions for the Russian LTC holder. 
 The present LTC with Gazprom expires in 2015. Government decisions 
about the future structure of the natural gas wholesale market and related 
contractual arrangements will be crucial in determining the level of 
wholesale market concentration and related future gas pricing in Hungary. In 
                                                 
11
 1996-2006: MOL; 2006-2013: E.ON owned EFT; since 2013: MVM owned MFGK.  
  
115 
 
particular, the price impact of the terms and conditions of a potential new 
LTC between the present dominant Hungarian gas wholesaler, MVM, and 
the Russian supplier will be key in this regard. This contractual arrangement 
will also be informative about the incentives for the contracting parties to 
gain control over interconnection capacities with regulated third party 
access.      
(iii) Regulatory constraints to market development.  
 Efficient gas wholesale market competition is also constrained by a number 
of anti-competitive regulatory measures that are in place in Hungary. The 
most important of these are: 
i. the discriminative allocation of cross border interconnection capacity 
at the Austrian – Hungarian (HAG) interconnector; 
ii. distortive end-customer price regulation in the US market segment; 
iii. system use charges for transmission, distribution and strategic 
storage differentiated by customer segments (US versus non-US);  
iv. sector specific extra taxes on natural gas trading and network related 
activities (transmission, distribution). 
 This study will concentrate on identifying potentially distortive access rules 
to critical interconnectors, allowed by the present and upcoming EU 
regulations and favouring the Russian supplier and its Hungarian partner, 
and assessing their wholesale price impacts.   
Table 1 below summarises the assumed relationship between the combinations of 
obstacles (i) and (ii) above to gas wholesale market competition and gas wholesale 
pricing regimes. Assuming that the policy objective is social welfare maximization 
through creating the conditions for competitive pricing to develop, we can derive a few 
preliminary policy hypotheses from the table. The first is that without undermining an 
existing dominant market position based on the exclusive control of a pivotal 
infrastructure there is no chance to move out of monopolistic pricing regimes. Even 
without an LTC, the market player with control over the pivotal infrastructure will play 
a dominant role in price determination. Second, it is the combination of an infrastructure 
topology with no pivotal component and low wholesale market concentration (e.g. by 
entering into no or just a relatively small sized LTC) that can bring about hub-based or 
competitive pricing. A proper infrastructure topology, combined with high market 
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concentration through e.g. a relatively big sized LTC will not really lead out of the oil-
indexed world. It will also invite incentives on the side of dominant players to 
manipulate open access rules to critical interconnectors.     
       
Table 1. Assumed relationship between the combinations of obstacles to gas wholesale market 
competition and gas wholesale pricing regimes 
 
In the followings I will first review potential policy options to remove the obstacles to 
efficient gas wholesale competition in the country. First I will define a dominant market 
position based on the exclusive control of a pivotal infrastructure. I will introduce the 
leverage function that can help the analysis of policy alternatives to undermine the 
pivotal nature of a critical infrastructure (in the Hungarian case the UA-HU 
interconnector) in an integrated manner. Next I will review alternative future wholesale 
market arrangements for Hungary and their relation to a possible future LTC between 
MVM and the Russian supplier. Finally, I will analyse cross border infrastructure access 
rules in force to identify potentially distortive capacity allocation rules that, while 
complying with the rules in force could ensure market dominance for powerful market 
participants.  
        
After identifying some critical policy options that could bring Hungarian gas wholesale 
gas pricing close to hub-based pricing, I will translate some of these measures into 
modelling scenarios and will use for simulation purposes the European Gas Market 
Model to compare the wholesale price impacts of the different policy options.  
 
2 From oil-linked to hub-based gas wholesale pricing in Hungary – a literature 
survey  
 
There is a limited literature with relevance to the question, what are the principal 
conditions for a transition from monopolistic (oil-indexed) natural gas wholesale pricing 
to hub-based gas pricing in Hungary.  
With LTC Without LTC With LTC Without LTC
High market concentration level Oil indexed Monopolistic Partially oil-indexed Oligopolostic
Low market concentration level Partially oil-indexed
Dominant price 
leadership
Oligopolistic / 
Competitive
Competitive 
Pivotal infrastructure No pivotal infrastructure
MARKET 
CONCENTRATION
POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN SUPPLIER
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Soczó and Tarjáni (2007) discussed natural gas supply source diversification options for 
Hungary. Since alternative supply sources are expected to be owned and priced by new 
market participants, supply source diversification is clearly related to the wholesale 
pricing question, investigated by the present study.  
 
Some other studies have put the emphasis on investigating the potential impact of 
expanded gas import capacities from non-Russian-Ukrainian directions on wholesale 
gas prices. An early study by REKK (2011a) introduced the concept of leverage (L) in 
the following manner: 
  
      
 
 
(1) 
when C is annual gross natural gas consumption, P is for annual maximum domestic 
natural gas production capacity and Iw indicates aggregate gas import capacity from 
non-Russia-Ukraine directions. Positive values of this indicator mean that 
(unconstrained) annual consumption can’t be met from domestic production plus 
potentially non-Russia controlled import directions.
12
 The paper argued that expanding 
import capacities from non-Russian directions (Iw) is the policy option to break down 
the dominant market position of the Russian supplier by improving the leverage on the 
Hungarian side. The study carried out a social cost-benefit analysis of infrastructure 
investment options proposed by the Hungarian gas transmission system operator, FGSZ 
in March, 2011 (see Table 4). It argued that the social cost of such investments are 
simply the investment costs (recovered by customers through increased transmissions 
charges) and the social benefits are due to increased consumer surplus from an assumed 
gas wholesale price decrease from oil-indexed to hub-based levels when the value of 
leverage becomes negative. The study further argued that expanded interconnections 
could invite additional transit shipments through the Hungarian gas transmission system 
providing for the opportunity to decrease transmission tariffs at a later stage. The study 
concluded that, by assuming a 5% social discount rate, the social net present value of 
new investments into expanded non-Russian import infrastructure is in the range of 
EUR 1.9 – 2.8 Billion, depending on the chosen future gas demand development 
                                                 
12
 Certainly, the source of natural gas imported from non-Russian direction can be Russia. It is the 
ownership and pricing control and not the physical origin that matters here.  
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scenario and the size of the investment program
13
. In order to avoid the uncertainty in 
assumed future oil-indexed and hub-based gas price patterns to derive social net present 
values, the authors also estimated the minimum necessary discount of hub-based gas 
price to the oil-indexed price to make the studied infrastructure investments paying back 
from a social welfare perspective. They found that in all scenarios this discount 
remained below 3%. The policy conclusion was that if decision makers expected 
wholesale gas prices to fall more than 3% as a result of investments into non-Russian 
import infrastructures, they had to go ahead with these investments. The huge potential 
of such a strategy is reflected by the fact that hub-based gas prices have been, on 
average, 30% below oil indexed gas prices since the completion of the study (April 
2011; see also Figure 1). 
 
However, this influential study by REKK
14
 had serious shortcomings. First, it 
investigated only one potential option (new import infrastructure) to build up leverage 
with the objective of undermining oil indexed gas pricing and disregarded from demand 
side policy options and incentives for domestic gas production. Second, the study 
disregarded from critical preconditions that can make supplies via new import capacities 
from non-Russia-Ukraine directions real competitors to the Russian supplier. These 
preconditions include available supply at new entry points without Russian price 
control, the lack of Russian access to new capacities and access regulation to 
interconnectors that can prevent manipulation of these capacities by market participants, 
including the Russian supplier and its contracting European partners. Finally, the study 
only provided an intuition about the relationship of leverage values and wholesale gas 
price development.  
 
                                                 
13
 Social benefit estimates were based on consumer surplus increases due to gas wholesale price decreases 
resulting from new infrastructure investments between 2011 and 2030. Other potential benefits (e.g. from 
increased transit) were disregarded. The authors assumed that hub-based gas prices will remain 10% 
below oil-indexed levels in the forecasting period (the actual difference at the time of the completion of 
the study). Hungarian gas wholesale prices were assumed to switch from oil-indexed to hub-based once 
the value of leverage became negative.  
14
 Following the recommendations of the study, the actual Hungarian energy strategy made gas 
infrastructure diversification one of its top priorities. By 2013 the expansion of HAG capacity by an 
annual 1.1 Bcm was completed. The new Slovakia-Hungary gas interconnector became a top priority 
investment project for the government and is supposed to start commercial operations by January 2015. 
Due to gas infrastructure developments between 2005 and 2012 regulated natural gas transmission tariffs 
doubled in nominal terms. Except for HAG with close to 100% capacity utilization, the rate of utilization 
of other interconnectors was still rather low in 2012: HU-CR 2%; HU-RO 23% and UKR-HU 18%.      
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The relationship between expanded natural gas import capacities from non-Russia-
Ukraine directions and Hungarian gas wholesale prices was further investigated by 
András Kiss (2011). He assumes that the profit of the Russian supplier is determined by 
its own pricing strategy and the intensity of competition generated by expanding 
alternative import options on the Hungarian market. The Russian supplier can apply 
either an oil-indexed or a marginal cost based (competitive) pricing strategy. By the use 
of REKK’s regional gas market model the author investigated the impact of eight 
infrastructure investment alternatives on the profitability of the Russian supplier. He 
found that competitive pricing became profitable for the Russian supplier as soon as 
non-Russian import capacities exceeded the difference of demand and domestic 
production (that is, the value of leverage became negative). In the rest of these scenarios 
oil-indexed pricing brought negative profitability for the Russian supplier. Thus this 
study, while based on a more explicit model of the Russian supplier’s behaviour and by 
applying a more sophisticated simulation method, provided some support to the 
intuition of the REKK (2011a) study about the relationship of leverage, built up by 
infrastructure investments and the expected (rational) pricing pattern on the natural gas 
wholesale market. However, the pricing model of the Russian supplier is still quite 
simple in the paper (a simple choice between oil-indexed or marginal cost based 
pricing). Similar to the above referred REKK study, it also assumed perfect access to 
and competition through the alternative interconnectors to the UA-HU one with no 
manipulation by the Russian supplier and its contracting partners.  
 
The role of new infrastructures
15
 to enhance market integration and competition, and to 
undermine oil-indexed natural gas wholesale pricing in Central and South East Europe 
is in the focus of the study by Kaderják et al. (2013)16. Based on simulations by the 
regional gas market model of REKK, the study provided further support to the argument 
that certain new infrastructures might be key drivers toward more market based gas 
wholesale pricing in the region. In particular, it confirmed the new SK-HU 
interconnector’s outstanding importance not just for the Hungarian market but for the 
region as a whole in this regard. Compared to a 2011 reference case, when Hungarian 
wholesale gas prices were modelled close to oil-indexed levels, the model forecasted a 
                                                 
15
 The investigated infrastructure options were those proposed by the European Commission to complete 
North-South energy interconnectors in Central-Eastern Europe (see EC, 2011).  
16
 The paper is also included in this thesis. 
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10% wholesale price decrease as a result of the SK-HU investment. Moreover, the study 
concludes that the implementation of this interconnector with undistorted access to and 
perfect competition through it could annually save about 600 million Euro in purchasing 
natural gas for the so called Danube Region countries
17
.  Given the project cost of 150 
million Euro, its implementation pays back to the Region in a few months.       
The present paper further investigates the most important conditions for a transition 
from monopolistic (oil-indexed) natural gas wholesale pricing to hub-based gas pricing 
in Hungary. Its novelty is that it further develops the concept of leverage introduced by 
REKK (2011a) into a leverage function. The leverage function allows for a consistent 
assessment of policy measures to enhance gas wholesale market competition under 
undistorted market and regulatory conditions. The paper also applies a simulation 
methodology to assess the wholesale price impacts of demand side, production and 
infrastructure related policy options under perfect competition as well as under distorted 
market and regulatory conditions. The latter refers to high level wholesale market 
concentration and distorted access to interconnections critical for competition to 
develop. Simulations are carried out by the European Gas Market Model of REKK.  
 
3 Market dominance based on the exclusive control over a pivotal infrastructure 
 
In case of network energy industries the efficiency of wholesale market competition is 
not only affected by market structure (demand characteristics, concentration of supply, 
institutions of trade, transaction costs) but the availability of and non-discriminatory 
access to fundamental industry infrastructure (sometimes called essential facilities for 
competition). In case of the natural gas industry the latter means the gas transmission 
system (including cross border pipelines, called interconnectors) and natural gas storage 
facilities. This explains the central role that EU gas market liberalization rules
18
 put on 
unbundling transmission activities from competitive activities and introducing non-
discriminatory, regulated third party access rules to their capacities.
19
  
                                                 
17
 The 14 Danube Region countries are: Austria (AT), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA), Bulgaria (BG), 
Croatia (HR), the Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Moldova (MV), Montenegro 
(MNE), Romania (RO), Serbia (SB), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SL) and Ukraine (UA). Most important 
beneficiaries would be SB, HR, BA, SL, RO and BG.  
18
 Directive 2009/73/EC on the common rules for the internal market in natural gas, and Regulation (EC) 
No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks. 
19
 Natural gas storage is a potentially competitive activity. EU rules also require the unbundling of 
distribution from competitive activities, but this is not really relevant for wholesale competition that is the 
topic of this paper.  
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This paper argues that the lack of non-discriminative third party access to a natural gas 
infrastructure that is pivotal in supplying a given natural gas market can itself ensure 
market dominance and related oligopolistic pricing opportunities for the market 
participant with exclusive control over the capacity usage of the given infrastructure.  
 
This section of the paper first provides a brief overview of the major characteristics of 
the Hungarian natural gas transmission and storage infrastructure. Next it defines what 
to mean under pivotal infrastructure and identifies it under the present Hungarian gas 
infrastructure topology. Finally it assesses policy options to undermine the pivotal 
position of a critical infrastructure.   
 
3.1  Major characteristics of the Hungarian natural gas infrastructure 
 
This section summarises the major characteristics of the Hungarian natural gas 
infrastructure (transmission and natural gas storage) in order to support identifying 
infrastructure components pivotal for wholesale market competition in the short (one-
two weeks) and the long (annual) run. This is why the distribution infrastructure is not 
covered here.
20
   
     
3.1.1 Transmission and cross border interconnections 
 
The independent transmission operator (ITO) of the Hungarian gas sector is 
Földgázszállító Zrt (FGSZ Zrt.), the 100% subsidiary of MOL. It owns and operates a 
transmission network of 5,300 km length with five compressing stations. Tables 2 and 3 
summarise the main characteristics of the cross border interconnectors of this 
transmission system between 2007 and 2013. By mid-2014 the interconnectors only 
support uni-directional physical operations except for the UA-HU interconnector, 
although the Hungary-Romania and Hungary-Croatia interconnectors, commissioned in 
2010, were already designed to support bi-directional physical operations.
21
       
 
                                                 
20
 For additional information on Hungary’s natural gas infrastructure the reader should consult with 
www.fgsz.hu. 
21
 Making the HU-RO and HU-CR interconnectors bi-directional is required by Regulation 994/2010. 
Their implementation is also urged, as a short term measure, by the European Energy Security Strategy, 
recently proposed by the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (COM, 
2014) as a response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.    
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Table 2. Annual physical capacities of interconnectors between Hungary and its neighbours, Bcm / 
year 
 
 
IMPORT EXPORT 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Ukraine 10.9 10.9 21.9 21.9 26 26 26 - - - - - 1.7 6.1 
Austria 
(HAG) 
4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 5.2 5.2 5.2 - - - - - - - 
Croatia - - - - (6.5) (6.5) (6.5) - - - - 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Serbia 
(transit) 
- - - - - - - 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Romania* - - - (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8) - - - 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
TOTAL 15.3 15.3 26.4 26.4 31.2  31.2 31.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 6.5 13 14.7 19.1 
* The first reverse gas flow happened to take place in the RO>HU direction in February 2014. After the 
test operation the Romanian TSO, Transgas, reported technical difficulties on the Romanian side and has 
halted capacity allocations since then. FGSZ is working on the significant expansion of the above 
capacity with its Romanian partner. 
Source: Annual Reports of FGSZ 
 
Table 3. Daily physical capacities of interconnectors between Hungary and its neighbours, Mcm  
/ day 
 IMPORT EXPORT 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Ukraine 30.0 30.0 60 60 71.3 71.3 71.3 - - - - - 4.8 16.8 
Austria 
(HAG) 
12.1 12.1 12.1 12.1 14.4 14.4 14.4 - - - - - - - 
Croatia - - - - (19.2) (19.2) (19.2) - - - - 19.2 19.2 19.2 
Serbia 
(transit) 
- - - - - - - 11.3 11.3 11.3 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 
Romania* - - - (4.8) (4.8) (4.8) (4.8) - - - 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
TOTAL 42.1 42.1 72.1 72.1 85.7 85.7 85.7 11.3 11.3 11.3 18 37.2 42 54 
Source: Annual Reports of FGSZ 
 
Apparently the capacity of the Ukraine-Hungary interconnector far exceeds present and 
forecasted future natural gas import demand of Hungary.
22
 However, import capacities 
from non-Russia-Ukraine directions (only HAG by mid-2014) are not sufficient to meet 
annual import demand.  
 
In 2011 FGSZ proposed the further diversification of the Hungarian gas transmission 
system by implementing the investments described in Table 4. 
                                                 
22
 REKK (2011) forecasted natural gas import demand of the country to fall between 8 and 13.5 Bcm by 
2030. The upgrade of the Ukraine-Hungary interconnector in 2009 was not motivated by expected fast 
increase of gas demand in Hungary but by gas transit plans in the Ukraine – South East Europe direction.  
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Table 4. Investment options proposed by FGSZ to increase natural gas import capacities from non-
Russia-Ukraine directions. March, 2011. 
 
Estimated investment cost, 
Billion HUF 
Expansion of 
import 
capacity, Bcm 
/ year 
Cost of an 
additional m
3 
 
of import 
capacity, HUF 
Year of 
commissioning 
Investment options 2011 2012 2013 2016 2018    
(1)     Upgrade of the 
Mosonmagyaróvár 
compressing station 
(HAG) 
0.4     1.1 0.3 2011 
(2)     Slovakia – Hungary 
(Vecsés-Gödöllő-
Balassagyarmat)* 
1.9 19.2 26.9   4.0 9.2 2014/2015 
(3)     HAG upgrade    21.7 75.7 4.4 22.3 2018/2019 
Source: Ten years network development plan, FGSZ (2011).  
The most recent energy strategy of Hungary, Energy Strategy 2030 (approved in 2011), 
made further gas market diversification an energy policy priority. As a follow up, the 
upgrade of the Mosonmagyaróvár compressing station was completed and resulted in an 
increase of the HAG import capacity from 4.4 to 5.2 BCM per year form 2011. Also, 
the new Slovakia – Hungary natural gas interconnector project got approval for a 
priority status by the government, in accordance with the Energy Strategy 2030 
economic impact assessment conclusions by REKK (2011a). However, on the 
Hungarian side this project is implemented by Hungarian Gas Transit Ltd. (Magyar Gáz 
Tranzit Rt: MGT), a subsidiary of MVM and the state owned Hungarian Development 
Bank, instead of FGSZ
23
. The new interconnector is already built and is under test 
operations by mid-2014. It is expected to start commercial operations by January 2015 
by the latest, with an annual 4 Bcm capacity to the Hungarian and 1.6 Bcm to the 
Slovakian direction.   
      
                                                 
23
 Whether MGT is to gain the status of the second Hungarian natural gas transmission system operator 
from the European Commission is still unclear. In its decision adopted on 17th September 2013 (C(2013) 
6159 final), the European Commission requested several amendments from the Hungarian Energy and 
Public Utility Authority regarding its decision on the exemption of the Slovakian-Hungarian natural gas 
interconnector from ownership unbundling rules in Article 9 of Directive 2009/73/EC.  
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3.1.2 Underground storage (UGS)24  
 
Hungarian gas storage facilities have been created on depleted gas fields. By mid-2014 
five commercial and one strategic gas storage facility is operational in the country, from 
which only a smaller one (Pusztaederics) is located in western Hungary. Table 5 
summarises the major technical characteristics of the underground natural gas storage 
facilities.       
 
Table 5. The technical features of Hungarian natural gas underground storage facilities 
 Injection, mcm/day Withdrawal, mcm/day Working gas capacity, mcm 
 2003
-
2007 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2003-
2007 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2003-
2007 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Zsana 10.8 10.2 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 24 28 28 28 28 28 28 1300 1540 2170 2170 2170 2170 2170 2170 
Puszta-
ederics 
2.2 2.15 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 330 330 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Hajdú-
szoboszló 
16.8 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 11.5 11.5 11.5 19.2 19.7 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.8 20.8 20.8 1400 1440 1440 1440 1440 1640 1640 1640 
Kardos-
kút 
2.2 1.92 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 180 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
Maros-1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 - - - 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 - - - 150 130 110 110 110 - - - 
Szőreg 
commerci
al 
- 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 - - 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - 700 700 700 700 700 700 
Szőreg 
strategic 
- 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 - 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 - 1200 1200 1200 915 815 615 615 
Szőreg 
US* 
- - - -     - - - -     - - - - 285 385 585 585 
TOTAL 33.1 38.57 45.9 45.9 45.9 46.45 46.45 46.45 44.2 71 80.2 80.2 80.2 80.1 80.1 80.1 3360 4920 6240 6240 6240 6330 6330 6330 
*Capacities made available to US providers from strategic stocks 
Source: MEKH decisions 
 
In 2012 the two players on the commercial UGS market were E.ON Földgáz Storage Zrt 
with the dominant market share (70% on working gas capacity basis) and the majority MOL 
owned MMBF Zrt (30%). Based on their share in annual withdrawal, they had similar 
shares.  
The Hungarian strategic storage facility at Szőreg, together with its physically linked 
Szőreg commercial UGS facility was put into operation by MOL in 2009. The strategic 
storage facility with 1.2 Bcm working capacity was operated by MMBF, while the owner of 
                                                 
24
 For a detailed description of the Hungarian natural gas storage market, see the study by Tóth et al. 
(2009).   
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the gas was the Hungarian Hydrocarbon Storage Association (MSZKSZ). It is the minister 
responsible for energy to decide about the quantity and the usage of the strategic storage. 
In the course of 2013 the state owned electricity company MVM purchased all the USG 
facilities from E.On Földgáz Storage, while the Hungarian Development Bank acquired 
majority ownership in MMBF. 
 
The above figures reflect that, due to significant investments by E.On Földgáz Storage and 
the completion of the combined strategic and commercial storage facility at Szőreg, the 
Hungarian UGS industry went through a significant expansion between late 2008 and 2012. 
Between the end of 2007 and 2012 working gas capacity increased by 88% (from 3360 
mcm to 6330 mcm), from which commercial storage capacity increase accounted for 60% 
and the strategic storage for 40%. In the same time period the daily withdrawal capacity of 
the Hungarian UGS system increased by 81%.  
 
The present 6330 mcm working gas capacity seems abundant to manage the seasonality of 
Hungarian gas demand. As a joint result of capacity increases and reduced demand for 
commercial UGS capacity, the annual average utilization of Hungarian UGS capacities has 
been decreasing since 2010 (Figure 2).25 
 
The significant increase in the daily withdrawal capacity of the UGS system has increased 
short term gas supply security of the Hungarian gas market. The present 80 mcm 
withdrawal capacity in itself is sufficient to serve 100.2% of the daily peak consumption of 
78.8 mcm of 2012.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 For a recent assessment of the Hungarian UGS market in a regional context see REKK (2013b). 
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Figure 2. Monthly commercial working gas storage capacity and working gas stock in Hungary, 
January 2009  – December 2013. 
 
 
Source: REKK (2014) 
 
3.1. The pivotal nature of the Russian supplier to meet natural gas demand in 
Hungary 
 
In this section I first define the short- and long term measures to assess the pivotal 
nature of the UA-HU interconnector (the Hungarian natural gas infrastructure 
component with the largest capacity and lacking non-discriminatory third party access 
to its capacity) to meet Hungarian import demand. Exclusive control over the capacity 
of this infrastructure has long ensured market dominance for the Russian supplier in 
Hungary.   
 
3.1.3 Pivotal position in the short term (1-2 weeks) 
 
I use the slightly modified Residual Supply Index, proposed by the California 
Independent System Operator, to investigate the pivotal nature of the UA-HU 
interconnector and related Russian supplies in meeting short term peak demand in 
Hungary. The RSI index will indicate whether the remaining natural gas infrastructure 
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will be able to meet winter peak demand in case of a shutdown of the UA-HU 
interconnector.
26
 The RSI is calculated in the following way:     
    
                         
     
    (2) 
where Cpeak is winter daily peak consumption, Pdom is domestic daily peak production 
capacity, Sext is daily peak underground storage withdrawal capacity, Lext is daily peak 
LNG regasification capacity, Itotal is total pipeline import capacity of the country and IRU 
is the maximum import capacity of the UA-HU interconnector. RSI values greater than 
1 indicate that the remaining infrastructure can potentially serve winter peak demand in 
case of the shutdown of the UA-HU interconnector. Figure 3 shows the development of 
winter peak demand, remaining infrastructure capacities and the RSI index between 
2007 and 2013. 
 
Figure 3. The development of winter peak demand, remaining infrastructure capacities and the 
RSI index between 2007 and 2013 
 
 
The data indicate that infrastructure developments since 2007 undermined the pivotal 
nature of the UA-HU interconnector to meet winter peak demand, given that sufficient 
supply of natural gas is available to fill the capacities of the remaining infrastructure 
elements (storage, interconnectors and production wells) and that those capacities aren’t 
                                                 
26
 Since the UA-HU interconnector is the piece of the Hungarian natural gas infrastructure with the largest 
capacity, the index also indicate whether Hungary complies with the N-1 standard prescribed by the 
994/2010 gas supply security regulation.  
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/ can’t be blocked by the Russian supplier. Both the decrease of winter peak demand 
(especially between 2008 and 2011 and in 2013) and increased capacities of the 
remaining infrastructure (in the period 2007-2009) contributed to this improvement.  
     
3.1.4 Pivotal position on the long term (> year) 
 
While in the short term lost Russian shipments through the UA-HU interconnector can 
be replaced by storage withdrawal, stored working gas can’t be considered as additional 
supply source on an annual or longer basis. Thus, when judging the pivotal nature of the 
UA-HU interconnector and related Russian supplies in meeting annual or longer term 
demand, I disregard from storage and, by following REKK (2011a), use formula (1) in 
section 2 of this paper. 
 
Figure 4 indicate the development of the components of the leverage measure and its 
values for Hungary between 2007 and 2013.   
 
Figure 4. The development of the components of the leverage (L) measure and its values for 
Hungary between 2007 and 2013 
 
Source: own calculations based on FGSZ data 
 
For the period 2011-2013 the values of the measure are 0.37, 0.35 and 0.27, 
respectively. This means that for these years 37%, 35% and 27% of annual natural gas 
consumption could only be covered from the UA-HU direction. For comparison, the 
share of imports through the UA-HU interconnector in annual consumption was 37%, 
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32% and 35% for these years. This indicates that recent gas infrastructure developments 
were less successful to undermine the longer term pivotal nature of the UA-HU 
interconnector and related Russian shipments. 
 
This might change with the start of commercial operations of the new Slovakia-Hungary 
(SK-HU) interconnector. By recalculating the formula in (1) when adding the planned 
SK-HU import capacity, we arrive at a value of –0.21 for 2013.     
 
3.2 The leverage function 
 
For policy making a more dynamic and fruitful application of formula (1) is to consider 
it as an energy policy objective function. I call it the leverage function, where the policy 
objective is to undermine, at minimum cost, the pivotal nature of a critical infrastructure 
that ensures a dominant market position for a supplier with exclusive rights to use the 
given infrastructure.
27
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     (3) 
The pivotal position is undermined when the value of L reaches a non-marginal negative 
value, say -0.2. At that point the supplier will know, with a fair level of certainty, that 
the infrastructure it controls is not any more pivotal in serving a given market. This 
poses a credible threat that monopolistic (e.g. oil-indexed) priced supply through the 
pivotal infrastructure
28
 will face effective competition from gas shipped to the market 
from alternative directions.      
 
The domain of the L function is [-∞; 1] and its value depends on both demand and 
supply side variables.  
 
First, it depends on the demand for natural gas (C), which in turn depends on the price 
of gas for end-customers ( ) and the level of exogenous energy efficiency investments 
                                                 
27
 In the Hungarian context this is, of course, the UA-HU interconnector. 
28
 When monopolistic pricing arrangements (e.g. oil-indexed pricing) cancel due to e.g. the termination of 
long term contracts, this can be replaced by monopolistic pricing based on capacity withholding on the 
pivotal infrastructure.   
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(E)
29
 that result in reduced natural gas consumption. End customer natural gas price is 
composed of the wholesale price of gas (p), regulated gas price components (e.g. system 
use charges, denoted by r) and taxes (t). The partial derivatives of C with regard to both 
  and E are negative. 
 
Second, the value of L depends on the level of domestic natural gas production. Within 
the constraints of principal gas reserves in a country, the level of production activity (P) 
will depend on the wholesale price of gas (p) in relation to production marginal cost and 
the level of government taxation on gas production ( ). The partial derivative of P with 
regard to p is non-negative, since increased gas prices will encourage increased 
exploration and production activities ceteris paribus, but the outcome of such activities 
is inherently uncertain. The partial derivative with regard to  is negative.  
 
Finally, an increase of gas import capacity from non-pivotal directions (Iw) will 
decrease the value of L. When gas transmission is a regulated business, which is the rule 
for the European Union, investments into additional natural gas transmission (including 
interconnectors) critically depend on the level of capital cost remuneration (e.g. 
weighted average cost of capital: WACC) provided through regulated transmission 
tariffs for the investors by the regulator ( ).          
 
The leverage function clearly indicates those policy options and control variables that 
are available for a government
30
 when it is to undermine dominant market positions 
based on the control of pivotal infrastructures.   
 
The easier cases are for energy efficiency, domestic production and additional non-
pivotal infrastructure capacities. It involves social welfare costs when the government 
decides to encourage additional investments into such assets and activities: the cost of 
                                                 
29
 An increase in relative gas prices will encourage an increase in energy efficiency investments by 
increasing their profitability. These investments will decrease gas demand ceteris paribus and will be 
reflected in empirical gas demand functions. I will call these investments endogenous energy efficiency 
investments because they are related to changes in end customer gas prices. Exogenous energy efficiency 
investments, on the other hand, are energy efficiency investments largely independent from changes in 
relative gas prices. Typical examples are government subsidised building refurbishments programs.       
30
 For simplicity in the followings I mean government and regulatory measures together when I talk about 
„government measures”, although important price regulatory decisions are in the authority of regulatory 
institutions largely independent from the government.   
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additional taxation to ensure subsidies for exogenous energy efficiency investments
31
, 
potentially lost government revenues from exploration concessions or gas production 
excise taxes due to decreased production tax levels, and increased regulated natural gas 
transmission tariffs to ensure increased WACC for transmission investors. 
 
The source of the social benefit to gain from incurring these costs is wholesale gas price 
decrease that a stronger leverage against a pivotal supplier (indicated by lower L values) 
can bring about. The p(L) function, denoted by Figure 5 illustrates the assumed 
relationship between p and L: the path stronger leverage can undermine monopolistic 
gas wholesale pricing (denoted by po: oil-indexed) and enforce market based gas prices 
(denoted by pp: hub-based).  
 
Figure 5. The assumed form of the wholesale price function, p(L) 
 
We can see that the government has no direct influence on the wholesale gas price level: 
it is determined by demand and supply conditions, the latter having either a competitive 
(the case of pp) or concentrated structure (the case of po). What the government has 
                                                 
31
 In a closed economy the marginal cost of public funds, λ is the cost of raising 1 unit of public fund. 
This cost includes in particular the deadweight loss caused by distortionary taxes. According to Laffont 
(2005, p.1-2.) the range of  λ for developed countries is around 0.3, meaning that it costs for citizens 1.3 
units of currency every time when the government raises 1 unit of tax revenue. In developing countries 
the range for the value of λ is estimated around 1.2 – 2.5. A special case is when a country can receive 
external funds to support such energy efficiency investments (e.g. European development fund sources 
for Hungary).  
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control over is to combine its powers over end-customer gas prices, energy efficiency 
subsidies, gas production related taxation and infrastructure investment related 
regulatory incentives so that their combined effect puts the pivotal supplier under 
competitive pressure.      
          
Note that according to (3) the partial impact of falling gas wholesale prices will be 
decreased domestic production and exploration activity that will in turn weaken the 
leverage. Moreover, if falling wholesale price levels directly pass through to end 
customer prices, this impact is further enhanced by increased gas demand. A conclusion 
is that to delink wholesale and end customer gas prices in times of falling wholesale 
prices might be a desirable temporary policy measure to support the government 
objective to undermine a pivotal market position concerned by this study. 
 
Indeed, the government has control over the difference between wholesale and end-
customer prices by either direct end-customer price control
32
, the regulation of system 
use charges and/or taxation. While distorted end customer prices or system use charges 
might be socially very costly policies to delink wholesale and end customer prices, extra 
taxation on wholesale gas transactions might be, from a social welfare point of view, a 
neutral supporting policy to undermine a pivotal market position.  
 
For example, a coordinated end customer price regulation and taxation policy to support 
undermining a pivotal market position could be the following: 
[1] t = - dp, when dp < 0; in this case  1= p1 + r + t = p1 + r - dp = p0 + r 
[2] t = 0, when dp = 0; in this case  1 = p1 + r = p0 + r, and   
[3] t = dp, that is a full pass through of wholesale price increase into end 
customer prices when dp > 0; in this case  1 = p0 +  r + dp = p1 + r, 
 where t is the (temporary) tax rate and dp = p1 – p0. Tax revenue in case [1] could 
compensate vulnerable customers. Such a policy could ensure that   becomes 
                                                 
32
 While wholesale natural gas pricing is more and more market determined in the EU (See Stern and 
Rogers, 2012), government control over end customer gas prices are still overwhelming in the EU. 
According to ACER (2013), 15 member states still applied regulated retail natural gas prices for 
households, 11 member states for small and medium sized enterprises and 5 member states even for large 
industrial customers in 2012. We can add Croatia to all this, which was not yet an EU member at the time 
of the ACER survey but applies regulated end customer tariffs for natural gas.  
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independent from changes in p except for wholesale price increases. Certainly, the tax 
could be cancelled once the pivotal position is gone. 
 
Furthermore, the government can fully separate the development of wholesale and end-
customer prices by taxation. In this case t is set so that   becomes constant without 
regard to changes in p thus demand will only be affected by energy efficiency 
investments. The case is similar in case of production: while the government has no 
direct control over wholesale gas prices, it can compensate a decrease in wholesale 
prices with adjusting  so that production activity remains unaffected.  In order to make 
those variables under government control more explicit, we can reformulate (3) in the 
following way:   
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4 Market dominance and wholesale market concentration  
 
According to my hypothesis, in addition to the unfavourable topology of the natural gas 
transmission infrastructure, the second obstacle to the transition from monopolistic, oil-
indexed to hub-based pricing is high level concentration of the gas wholesale market in 
Hungary.
33
 High wholesale market concentration has long been caused by the 
combination of a very limited number of alternative supply sources, the terms of the 
major LTC and the gas wholesale market model applied by legislation. 
 
4.1  Major wholesale gas supply sources 
 
Domestic production, Russian import and other imports are the gas supply sources 
available for meeting Hungarian gas demand. Figure 6 illustrates the recent monthly 
structure of gas supply to meet demand (including export demand)
34
 in Hungary. In 
2013 local production accounted for 27% of overall supply sources, Russian imports 
from Ukraine for 49% and imports from Austria for 24%. 
 
 
                                                 
33
 According to the definition of the Gas Act XL/2008 and the gas wholesale market analysis by the 
Hungarian Energy Office (MEH, 2010), gas wholesale includes those transactions when gas is sold for re-
sellers and not for end users. In the Hungarian context this means that gas wholesale consists of 
transactions when gas is sold for re-sellers, including public utility or universal service suppliers. 
34
 Export includes shipments to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Ukraine. 
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Figure 6. The structure of monthly Hungarian gas supply, April 2013 – March 2014 
 
Source: FGSZ, REKK Energy Market Report, 2014/2 
4.1.1 Natural gas production 
 
In terms of domestic production, MOL has long been the dominant market participant. 
In 2013 its market share in production was 96%. Since the mid-1990s some smaller 
independent producers have been active on the market with an aggregate market share 
below 10%. The government started tendering new exploration and production 
concessions for conventional natural gas by late 2013.  
The Carpatian Basin (including Hungary) is also assumed to have significant non-
conventional gas reserves, but according to the Energy Information Administration of 
the USA, the geological characteristics of the Pannonian-Transylvanian basin seems not 
to be favourable for significant future shale production.
74
  
Table 6 contains available information about likely conventional gas reserves as well as 
on actual annual natural gas production activity in Hungary. 
 
 
                                                 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/chaptersviii_xiii.pdf 
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Table 6. Natural gas reserves and production in Hungary, 2007-2012, mcm 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Proven and possible reserves 21,544 22,351 21,143 21,959 21,398 
MOL production 2,620 2,751 2,679 2,179 1,907 
Independent production 188 339 259 107 165 
Total production 2,808 3,090 2,938 2,286 2,072 
Sources: MOL Annual Reports 2008-2012, MEH 
Recent estimates by ENTSO-G and REKK assumes a further decline in annual natural 
gas production in Hungary down to around 1 Bcm by 2020 and 0.3 – 0.8 Bcm by 2030 
(REKK, 2011). 
MOL’s discretion over selling and pricing its own produced natural gas is limited by 
contracts and regulatory measures. When selling its gas wholesale and storage business 
to E.ON Ruhrgas International AG (ERI) in 2005-2006, MOL also contracted to sell its 
domestic production to ERI. However, as a precondition for agreeing to the MOL – ERI 
transaction, DG Competition obliged ERI to sell half of MOL’s production (1-1.5 Bcm 
per year) through a contract release program in order to reduce its market dominance 
(see more details in section 4.2.) A result of the program was the entry of two active 
new wholesale market participants: ENI owned TIGÁZ and Budapest municipality 
majority owned FŐGÁZ. Both got access to about a quarter of MOL’s annual gas 
production between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2015.
75
 The original objective of the 
contract release program was to increase diversity and liquidity on the free retail market 
segment.  
Beginning from 2011, the pricing of domestic gas produced from wells opened before 
1998 became regulated. Today MOL delivers (contract release) gas to TIGÁZ and 
FŐGÁZ, while the other two universal service suppliers (E.ON and GDF) receive 
domestic produced gas from MVM/MFGK at cost based regulated tariffs (about a third 
of import cost by the end of 2013).  
 
                                                 
75
 A detailed assessment of the MOL-ERI related contract and gas release programs can be found in Pató 
et al. (2008). For contract release see pp. 17-20.  
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4.1.2 Russian import 
Russian import is based on a ‘historic’ or ‘legacy’ bilateral long term contract, including 
a take-or-pay (TOP) obligation with some flexibility for an annual contracted quantity 
(ACQ) to be purchased by the Hungarian partner. The quantities of the Hungarian 
contract is shown and compared to others in the region by Table 7. In 2013, annual 
contracted quantity accounted for 87% of annual gas consumption in Hungary. From 
September 30, 2013 the Hungarian counterpart to the Panrusgaz contract is Magyar 
Földgázkereskedő Zrt (MFGK), a 100% subsidiary of MVM.   
Table 7. Long term contracts and some of their characteristics in selected CEE countries 
 
ACQ, 
mcm/year 
Expiration 
Annual 
consumption, 2013 
(mcm/year) 
ACQ/2013 
cons. 
Importer 
company 
Majority 
owner 
Bulgaria 2900 
 
2022 
3134 93% Overgas Gazprom76 
Czech 
Republic 
7500 
 
2035 
9138 82% Wemex Gazprom77 
Poland 10250 2037 18731 55% 
PGNIG, 
Europol 
(transit) 
Polish state; 
Gazprom78 
Hungary 9900 2015 11372 87% Panrusgaz 
 
Hungarian 
state/ 
Gazprom79 
Romania 3500 2030 15321 23% 
WIEE 
Romania 
Romanian state/ 
Gazprom80 
Slovakia 6500 2028 5855 111% SPP 
Slovakian 
state81 
Slovenia 830 
2018 
(2035) 
879 94% Geoplin 
Slovenian 
state82 
Source: compiled by author 
Historic long term contracts like the present Hungarian one have some common 
characteristics. 
 
                                                 
76
 Gazprom Export 49.51%, Gazprom 0.49%, DDI Holdings Ltd. 50% (possibly a Gazprom-owned 
company, registered in 1999 in London) 
77
 Gazprom owns 50%; Centrex owns 33% (possibly a Gazprom-subsidiary) 
78
 Gazprom owns 48% of shares in Europol and another 4% through Gas-Trading S.A. (possibly a 
Gazprom-subsidiary) 
79
 Gazprom Export 40%, MVM 50%, Centrex 10% (possibly a Gazprom-subsidiary) 
80
 Owned by WIEE (50% Gazprom, 50% BASF) 
81
 51% state, 49% E.On and GDF Suez 
82
 Slovenian state 39.6%, Petrol Ljubjana 32%, others 28.4 
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 Take-or-pay (TOP) obligations define the minimum annual contracted 
quantity (ACQ) the buyer agrees to purchase and the seller is obliged to 
deliver in a given year. The parties also agree to the level of flexibility (e.g. ± 
10%) they allowed to divert from ACQ without extra payments. However, if 
the purchased quantity falls below ACQ minus agreed flexibility, the buyer 
has to pay for that minimum quantity (ACQ-flex) anyway.   
 LTCs also include delivery clauses that define the location where imported 
gas has to be delivered by the exporting country. Typically, these delivery 
locations used to be at the borders of the importing countries. In order for the 
exporter to get a certification of delivery to issue its bill, gas has to 
physically pass a metering point installed with an electronic meter. The 
ownership of gas changes only when the gas passed the meter.  
 The pricing formula included in the Panrusgaz contract is a typical oil 
product linked one. Gas price depends on a starting price escalated by a 
weighted average of historic gasoline and fuel oil price changes.   
 The typical contract used to restrict the buyer to re-sell LTC gas by applying 
so called destination clauses.  
In the course of creating the EU internal market and fostering within-EU spot trading in 
gas, the EU prohibited the implementation of destination clauses by its Third Energy 
Package in 2009. However, TOP obligations, delivery clauses and a pricing formula is 
still part of legacy LTCs. 
The present flexibility in the Hungarian contract is ± 15%. Due to decreasing demand 
and increased competition from spot priced gas through HAG the actual sales conditions 
for TOP gas have deteriorated dramatically since 2009. At the end of 2012 MVM 
estimated the amount of TOP gas that the dominant wholesaler (E.ON owned EFT and 
from late 2013 MVM owned MFGK) had to take over but could sell only at a loss being 
18.4 Bcm between 2012 and 2015. That is, in these four years 46% of the ACQ (4.6 
Bcm per year) would be sold at a 30% discount to the LTC purchase price.
83
 The 
analysis estimated TOP related financial loss at a gigantic HUF 553 Billion ($ 2.5 
Billion).
84
 The purchase of these excess TOP quantities might have been agreed by the 
                                                 
83
 The estimated loss is 30,1 HUF/m
3
.  
84
 The MVM report is published at  
http://atlatszo.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/08mell_osszefoglalas.pdf. 
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Russian partner to be realized only after the present contract expires in 2015. This might 
help the restructuring of, but not to avoid, expected financial losses of MFGK / MVM 
over time.  
By mid-2014 MFGK was reported to have a 66% market share on the Hungarian gas 
wholesale market.
85
 Its major portfolio elements are the Panrusgaz and E.ON (0.5 
Bcm/year until 2015) legacy contracts, part of MOL domestic production and 
preferential access to a significant share of the HAG capacity.    
At present the delivery point for 80% of the gas is the UA-HU border and for 20% the 
HAG. Access to the UA-HU interconnector is not open and also discriminatory. 
Temporary access to capacity at the UA-HU interconnector to ship gas to the Hungarian 
market for other than Gazprom has been provided only for a small number of selected 
market participants in an in-transparent manner.
 86
         
4.1.3 Alternative imports  
 
By mid-2014 alternative gas imports can flow to the Hungarian market only through 
HAG.
87
 The utilisation of HAG’s AT>HU capacity has been among the highest in 
Europe in recent years, indicating the significant and permanent gas wholesale price 
difference between Western Europe and Hungary.  
Beyond contract release gas for TIGAZ and FŐGÁZ, HAG import could, in principle, 
provide the only alternative supply source to promote the entry of wholesale market 
participants alternative to EFT and more recently MFGK.    
However, access to the capacity of HAG is still discriminative. While according to the 
Business Code (ÜKSZ) of the gas system the rule for cross border gas transmission 
capacity allocation is auctioning in case of congestion, preferential access have been 
                                                 
85
 See slide 9 of the presentation by Kralik, G. L. (2014). 
http://www.magyarfoldgazkereskedo.hu/hu/tevekenysegunk/Documents/Napi%20Gazdas%C3%A1g%20
Konferencia_Kr%C3%A1lik%20G%C3%A1bor.pdf 
86
 These market participants were temporarily allowed to market alternative Russian (Turkmen, Kazakh) 
or Ukrainian gas in Hungary by using the UA-HU capacity (e.g. EMFESZ, Eurobridge).   
87
 In recent years the Hungarian gas transmission system operator initiated and completed with its partner 
TSOs important new interconnections, which at the first time opened up possibilities for North-West 
South-East and North-South gas cooperation in the CEE region. The HU>RO (4.8 mcm/day) and HU>HR 
(19.2 mcm/day) interconnectors were commissioned in 2010. Both of these interconnectors were 
designed to provide bi-directional services. However, the implementation of these physical reverse flow 
projects is delayed.  
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provided for E.ON and MVM to the HAG capacity since 2011 by the government. For 
example, for the gas year 2011/12, 20,4% of HAG capacity was allocated on the basis 
of former long term capacity booking, 33-33% of HAG capacity was allocated for E.ON 
and MVM respectively at normal transmission capacity charges, 4% was put on an 
annual auction and 10% was reserved for monthly auctions. Note that the winners of the 
yearly auction paid 6 times the normal transmission capacity charge the regulation 
established for the preferred companies (REKK, Energy Market Report, 2011/3). Since 
April 2012 the relevant ministerial decree
88
 kept the overall volume of preferential 
allocation for E.ON and MVM unchanged but modified their shares to 16.5% and 
49.5% of overall HAG capacity, respectively.   
Provided the above distortions in cross border capacity access, HAG’s contribution to 
improve the efficiency of gas wholesale market competition falls much below its 
potential role at present in Hungary. Two third of its capacity provides access 
opportunity to alternative supply sources for the two largest wholesale market players, 
also controlling LTC quantities. Nevertheless, a limited auctioning has already allowed 
for the market entrance of alternative wholesalers (e.g. GDF Suez, MET, Global NRG, 
AXPO).
89
 Due to the lack of market transparency, the impact of that limited competition 
on wholesale and retail prices is unclear.          
4.2  Former gas market model characteristics  
 
Former Hungarian gas market models had long managed the price risks inherent in the 
concentrated gas supply structure by creating monopoly or dominant gas wholesalers 
that fell under price regulation.  
Up to 1991, natural gas production, transmission, storage and distribution were 
organized into a single state owned, vertically integrated company, OKGT.   
Later distribution was unbundled from OKGT, organized into regional companies and 
privatised in 1995. The Gas Act of 1994 created a single buyer market model, when 
MOL got the exclusive right and obligation to supply gas distribution companies. MOL 
was also the single buyer of locally produced and imported gas. In 1996 MOL 
transformed former intergovernmental agreements into a LTC up to 2015 with Russia 
                                                 
88
 Ministerial Decree 13/2011/ NFM and its modifications.   
89
 The entry of MET to the market was made possible by MVM allowing MET to use its pre-allocated 
HAG capacity rights at a suspiciously low price. see: http://index.hu/gazdasag/2014/01/27/mol/  
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(Panrusgaz of 9 bcm/year until 2015). It also concluded alternative, smaller Western 
LTCs; with E.ON Ruhrgas (0.5 bcm/y until 2015) and with Gaz de France (0.6 bcm/y 
until 2012). MOL sold gas to the regional distribution companies on a long term 
contract basis at regulated prices. Distribution companies served retail customers also at 
regulated prices (MEH, 2010).   
The Gas Act of 2003 provided the framework for the first phase of gas market 
liberalisation in Hungary and replaced the single buyer model with a hybrid market 
model.
90
 This model was based on the co-existence of the free and captive retail market 
segments. Eligible (mostly larger industrial) customers got the right to opt out from the 
incumbent supplier but also to get back under regulated tariffs at any time. In this model 
the dominant wholesale market player was called the Public Utility Wholesaler (PUW). 
It got the exclusive right and obligation to serve Public Utility Suppliers (PUS), which 
were obliged to serve the gas needs of captive retail customers. PUW and PUS sales 
prices were regulated. While the PUW was allowed to compete for eligible customers, 
free market traders were not allowed to enter the PUS market segment. Until the end of 
2005 MOL was the PUW and also had exclusive control over gas supply sources. 
In 2005 an E.ON-MOL transaction significantly reshaped the structure of the Hungarian 
gas market. As part of the deal, E.ON Ruhrgas International AG (ERI) purchased the 
gas wholesale business of MOL (later called E.ON Földgáz Trade Zrt; in the followings: 
EFT), 100% of MOL Földgáztároló Rt., the owner and operator of Hungarian 
underground gas storage assets and 50% of Panrusgaz, EFT’s largest supplier. MOL 
retained the gas transmission system operator company FGSZ and its production 
activities. As a consequence of the transaction EFT became the dominant gas 
wholesaler company in Hungary. It took over the control of LTCs and also entered into 
a 10 years contract with MOL to purchase its domestically produced gas. The decision 
of the European Commission that allowed for the deal to happen
91
 also put gas and 
contract release obligations on EFT to mitigate its dominant wholesale market position. 
Under the gas release program EFT had to offer 1 Bcm of its gas per year for alternative 
suppliers through an open, non-discriminatory auction between 2006 and 2013. Under 
the contract release program EFT had to re-contract 50% of its 10 years contract to 
                                                 
90
 For a review on the implementation details of the Second Energy Package under the Hungarian context, 
see Kaderják and Antall (2005).  
91
 Decision of the European Commission No. 21/XII/2005 (December 21, 2005) 
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purchase MOL gas production. Under the two programs EFT provided an annual 2.2-
2.4 Bcm gas from its portfolio to alternative market participants (see more details in 
Pató et al, 2008). 
By implementing the EU Third Package requirements, the Gas Act of 2008
92
 removed 
the remaining barriers from free market competition and retained the option to purchase 
gas at regulated prices only for a more limited group of retail customers (so called 
Universal Service or US customers).
 93
 However, the dominant wholesale position of 
EFT with 50-60% share in purchasing available supply sources has prevailed until the 
end of 2013, when MFGK (MVM) purchased its portfolio. Other significant wholesale 
market participants beyond EFT and MVM are MOL, TIGÁZ (ENI), FŐGÁZ and 
GDF-Suez (see Figure 7).  
Figure 7. Market share of gas wholesale traders from purchased supply sources (production + 
import), 2010-2013* 
 
*For 2010 II., the MVM figure involves MVM Partner and, from September 1 2013, also Magyar 
Földgázkereskedő Zrt (MFGK).  
Source: MEKH (2014), p. 52 
                                                 
92
 Act XL of 2008 about Gas Supply.  
93
 As of August 2013, households, other consumers with a buying capacity not exceeding 20 m
3
/hour, and 
municipalities up to the quantity of providing gas for those living in municipality-owned rentals were 
entitled to Universal Service. The quantity of natural gas sold under Universal Service was 3.7 billion m
3
 
in 2012, 34% of gross domestic consumption. 
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It seems apparent from the above brief assessment that the primary structural problem 
of the Hungarian gas wholesale market is related to the LTC with Russia that has been 
providing the majority of supply sources to the market since 1996. The Hungarian 
counterparty to this contract (MOL, then EFT and now MFGK) has always had a 
dominant (over 50%) wholesale market share. The subsequent market models that 
implemented the EU gas market liberalization rules under the Hungarian context have 
always been adjusted to acknowledge the existence of this LTC by first introducing the 
Public Utility market segment between 2004 and 2009 and then the Universal Service 
market segment. The LTC holder has always had a preferential supply right to serve 
these market segments.       
A final note is that LTC pricing has always had a decisive impact on wholesale gas 
price development on both the regulated and the free market segments in Hungary. In 
the regulated Universal Service segment this influence is direct since the regulator has 
established the justified cost of gas for US customers on the basis of the Weighted 
Average Cost of Gas of the US wholesaler.
94
 However, the LTC price also has a 
significant, though indirect influence on free market gas wholesale prices. The dominant 
market position of the LTC holder has long allowed oligopolistic pricing on this market 
segment. The marginal cost of the dominant wholesaler has also been determined by the 
LTC price. So free market gas price arrangements has long considered the (assumed) 
WACOG of the dominant wholesaler that is the oil indexed gas price as their starting 
point. It is just in the last 1-2 years that decreasing demand and increased spot imports 
started to undermine this traditional pricing regime on the free market.      
4.3  Future scenarios for wholesale market arrangements  
 
As we have seen, the combination of a pivotal infrastructure controlled by the Russian 
supplier, limited alternative supply sources, the features of the major Russian LTC, 
most notably its pricing regime and relative quantity-wise inflexibility (TOP clause) and 
the chosen gas wholesale market liberalization models has long ensured the dominance 
of oil-indexed gas pricing on the Hungarian gas wholesale market.   
However, the breakdown of oil indexed gas pricing already started with increased short 
term trading through HAG. The change in the dominant pricing regime might further 
                                                 
94
 Since 2011 the regulator applies a mixed oil-indexed – spot price ratio to calculate justified WACOG 
from LTC purchases. The present mix is 0.7*spot + 0.3*oil indexed.  
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accelerate from 2015 due to at least two major developments. First, the present LTCs 
(both Panrusgaz and E.ON) expire in 2015. While it is assumed that 18.4 Bcm TOP gas 
will have to be purchased by MFGK after 2015 (see section 4.2), it is not clear under 
what kind of arrangement this will take place (time allowed for purchase; pricing 
conditions, etc). Second, the new Slovakia-Hungary interconnector will become 
commercially operational and thus the pivotal nature of the Ukraine-Hungary 
interconnector will be gone.  I assume these developments create a unique opportunity 
to shift the nature of gas wholesale competition from an oligopolistic towards a more 
efficient one in Hungary. This could also mean a shift from oil-indexed dominated 
towards spot gas pricing.  
Related to these developments, in the turn of 2012 and 2013 the Ministry of National 
Development carried out an analysis and conducted a related consultation with market 
participants about possible future gas wholesale market alternatives beyond 2015 for 
Hungary. The analysis and the conclusions of the consultation are reported in REKK 
(2013). The study compares three alternative futures for the Hungarian gas market. The 
major characteristics of the three high level models are summarized in Table 8. In terms 
of the wholesale market structure what makes the most significant difference among the 
investigated future options is the existence and volume of a potential future LTC. The 
Wholesale Competition model assumes no dedicated LTC to the Hungarian market after 
2015, while the Universal Service + Competition and the Dominant Wholesaler models 
assume a smaller (2-3 Bcm/year) and larger (5-9 Bcm) contract, respectively. Since the 
study presents the up-to-date most comprehensive assessment of the relationship 
between future market models and related gas wholesale price developments, I use the 
REKK (2013) scenarios as in inspiration when formulating the policy simulation 
scenarios in Section 7 of this paper.    
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Table 8. Post-2015 gas wholesale market model scenarios by REKK (2013) 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
WHOLESALE COMPETITION UNIVERSAL SERVICE + COMPETITION DOMINANT WHOLESALER
Wholesale market structure
No new LTC after the expiring of 
legacy LTCs in 2015. Demand is 
served by competing international and 
local gas companies from their 
international portfolios (LTC and 
spot). Well functioning market 
institutions.   
Shares major features of the 'Wholesale 
competition' model but a special Universal Service 
market segment added. 
Continuation of the pre-2015 market 
model. New and large sized (5-9 
Bcm per year) LTC with Russia is 
concluded. A single wholesale 
market participant dominates the 
market. International companies are 
discouraged from the market. Small 
competitive fringe.
Universal service, domestic production
No US market segment retained. 
Retail customer price regulation 
cancelled. No regulatory constraint on 
the sale of domestic production.  
US wholesaler allowed to enter into new LTC up 
to 50-60% of the demand of US customers (cc 3 
Bcm). US wholesaler is appointed or selected on 
an open tender for 3-5 years. US wholesaler 
obliged to serve US supplier(s). Financial risk from 
changing US market size due to supplier switcing is 
on US customers. Domestic production from wells 
opened before 1998 can be chanelled into the US 
wholesaler's portfolio.  US supplier is not allowed 
to directly participate the free market segment. 
US market segment retained. 
Dominant wholesaler serves US 
supplier(s). US wholesaler is allowed 
to directly compete on the free 
market segment. Domestic 
production from wells opened before 
1998 chanelled into the US 
wholesaler's portfolio. 
Infrastructure access
Non-discriminatory rules for 
connection, capacity booking and 
congestion management. Market 
based capacity allocation. 
Same as in 'Wholesale competition'
In order to reduce the financial risk 
from its large LTC protfolio, the US 
wholesaler is allowed to deliver LTC 
gas by booking cross border capacity 
on other than the Ukrainian 
interconnectors (HAG, SK-HU).  
Supply security
Large number of active wholesale 
market participants bring supply and 
contractual diversification. HUB 
function strenghtened. Better 
utilization of infrastructure. Too much 
exposure to spot transactions is a risk.
Basic competitive feature of the wholesale market 
and resulting source and contractual diversification 
remains. Additional security is provided by the - 
limited size - LTC and the regulatory control over 
the US supply segment. 
High level security in gas volumes 
terms. High risk of single supply 
source remains.
Regulatory environment
Ex post price control. Regulator 
respects rules, withholds from 
unexpected interventions (e.g. price 
caps)
Regulated US prices reflect the purchase cost of 
the US wholesaler and additional US costs.
Significant regulatory involvment in 
US price regulation due to potential 
cross financing between the US and 
free market segments. Regulation 
largely substitutes lacking market 
signals. Inherent incentives for 
'market protection' type regulatory 
measures. 
Likely market outcome
Move closer to European spot prices. 
Highly dependent on progress in 
regional supply source diversification 
efforts (e.g. Nabucco)
Efficient competition on wholesale level retained. 
Move closer to European spot prices. US 
wholesaler is under competition from free market 
traders for US customers.
Dominant wholesaler have price 
setting power. Free market 
wholesale price outcome less 
dependent on spot price signals but 
rather on LTC pricing conditions. 
Significant financial risk on dominant 
wholesaler. 
Industry consultation conclusion
Supported by most as a long term 
objective. Risky in short term due to 
lack of diverse supply sources. 
Most preferred short term option. Opposed, except one respondent.
MODEL NAME
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5 Distortive access rules to critical interconnectors 
 
Cross border interconnection capacities with third party access are the single most 
serious threat to a dominant gas wholesaler under the market conditions prevailing in 
Hungary. Certainly, this threat translates to real competition only when competitively 
priced gas becomes available to be shipped to the market and access is allowed to cross 
border pipeline capacities.  
It is the history of the company EMFESZ that best illustrates that competition can hit 
the dominant wholesaler even when competitors are granted discriminatory access to 
cross border capacities that are otherwise non accessible for third parties. Between 2005 
and 2010 EMFESZ could import alternative Russian / Turkmen gas to Hungary through 
the UA>HU interconnector and gain about 10% of the Hungarian retail market 
predominantly on the basis of this supply source (MEKH 2014, p. 53). Since EMFESZ 
gas was competing with Gazprom LTC gas, marketed by EFT, this was the period of a 
strange Russian-Russian gas-to-gas competition in Hungary. However, the real and 
long-lasting competitive threat comes through cross border capacities that fall under 
non-discriminatory regulated third party access rules.  
An underlying hypothesis of this study is that a major market precondition of moving 
from oil indexed to spot gas pricing in Hungary is improved liquidity and integration of 
our region’s gas markets with those of North and South West Europe. This could ensure 
that the supply of spot priced gas becomes available in significant amounts West to our 
region. Without regard to whether it is of Russian origin or not, this creates the 
possibility to ship spot priced gas from Austria or Slovakia
95
 to Hungary. From Croatia 
and Romania Hungary could get access to alternative supply sources once physical 
reverse flow capabilities are implemented on these interconnectors.   
The regulatory precondition of moving towards spot pricing is to guarantee a 
transmission access regime in Hungary and the EU countries critical in supplying 
natural gas to Hungary (Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Slovakia and 
                                                 
95
 In June 2014 physical reverse flow capacity from Germany to the Czech Republic was 10 times, from 
the Czech Republic to Slovakia was 5 times the capacity of the SK>HU interconnection towards 
Hungary.  
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Slovenia) that does not allow for strategic booking or withholding of transmission 
capacities, including cross border capacities.   
However, a dominant market player always has an incentive to keep competitors away. 
The import of competitively priced gas could impose significant financial losses on a 
LTC holding, incumbent dominant gas wholesaler due to TOP clauses (see discussion in 
section 4.2 on estimated losses for MFGK). In order to reduce its sales and financial 
risks from selling large LTC gas quantities, the dominant wholesaler might try to deliver 
LTC gas through interconnectors that fall under regulated third party access thus 
foreclosing competition from spot gas on the downstream market. The incumbent 
wholesaler also has an incentive to put pressure on the regulator to implement “market 
protection” measures of this kind in order to reduce quantity and price risks inherent in 
LTCs under competitive pressure.
96
 The incumbent’s pressure on the national regulator 
can be assumed more effective once the dominant wholesaler is state-owned.        
The above risks hold under the Hungarian context. Gazprom and its local contracting 
partner (at present MFGK) have a shared interest in blocking non-Russian-Ukrainian 
cross border capacities thus reducing spot gas availability for the market. The 
government, as an owner of MFGK faces the dilemma of promoting the spread of spot 
pricing at the risk of significant financial losses on the side of MFGK or protecting the 
company by implementing “market protection” measures. Among the most effective of 
these measures is to distort cross border access conditions for independent market 
participants thus foreclosing competition.     
The remaining of this section reviews cross border access rules in force in Hungary and 
the main provisions of Commission Regulation 984/2013 on establishing a Network 
Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems.  It tries to 
identify the room existing and upcoming regulations might allow for potentially 
distortive access to critical interconnectors. In particular, the question is asked whether 
present and potential future Russian LTC holders (or their affiliates) could, within the 
EU regulatory framework, book significant amounts of interconnection capacities at 
EU-EU borders in order to foreclose competition on downstream markets. 
                                                 
96
 I owe this idea to my colleague Lajos Kerekes. 
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5.1 Existing Hungarian access rules 
 
By mid-2014 no regulated third party access is provided to the UA-HU interconnector 
in the Hungarian direction. The implementation of EU gas market rules in Ukraine due 
to obligations under its Energy Community membership might change this situation in 
the future.  
As discussed in section 4.2, access to HAG capacity is discriminative today. Although 
LTC holder Panrusgas and MFGK have full access to the UA>HU interconnector 
without regulated third party access, capacity is also booked on HAG for the delivery of 
20% of the LTC quantity. 
A recent incident illustrates that the competition for long term bookings on HAG 
already started, right before the upcoming EU Capacity Allocation Regulation for cross 
border interconnectors should come into force (see later in this section). In May 2014 
FGSZ initiated a long term capacity allocation procedure for HAG capacities for gas 
years from 2015/16 up to 2024/25. The TSO’s priority was for the longest and largest 
volume capacity booking needs. By its Decision 1993/2014 (May 12, 2014) the 
Hungarian regulator, MEKH obliged the TSO to immediately halt the procedure. It 
referred to Article 156 (1) of Government Decree 19/2009 about the implementation of 
the Gas Act. This Article states that up to March 15, 2015 cross border gas transmission 
capacity can only be booked until September 30, 2015. The exception to this rule of the 
Government Decree is only new infrastructure that applies for an exception to regulated 
third party access and related tariffs to the regulator. Neither HAG nor the new SK-HU 
interconnector belongs to the latter category. This means that the framework for future 
capacity allocation on HAG will be Regulation 984/2013. 
It is critical for gas wholesale market development in Hungary, but still unclear, what 
capacity allocation rules will apply to the new SK-HU interconnector. The project 
developing companies (MGT on the Hungarian and Eustream on the Slovakian side) did 
not apply for an exemption to third party access rules for this new infrastructure. 
According to non-official information, MGT plans for an open season type of capacity 
allocation round where bidders for the highest volumes and longest contracting periods 
would get preference in capacity booking. It is also unclear whether this would comply 
with present Hungarian regulations and the upcoming EU Capacity Allocation 
regulation.  
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5.2 Provisions of Regulations 715/2009 and 984/2013 
 
Starting from 7 March, 2016 it will be Commission Regulation 984/2013 on 
establishing a Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas Transmission 
Systems (in the followings: CA Regulation) together with Regulation 715/2009 that will 
serve as an EU-wide framework for cross border transmission capacity allocation. The 
CA Regulation shall apply from 1 November 2015 and the first capacity auction will 
take place in early March 2016.  
The main provisions of the CA Regulation is about to ensure that from early March 
2016 available gas interconnection capacity products are better defined, as far as 
possible harmonized on the two sides of the interconnectors (bundled capacity products) 
and auctioned in a harmonized manner all across Europe. The CA regulation sets out the 
framework for capacity calculation and maximization by TSOs and defines yearly, 
quarterly, monthly, daily and intra-day auction methodologies, calendars and 
transparency requirements with regard to publishing their results. 
However, the CA Regulation has not much to say about how to prevent capacity 
bookings to foreclose downstream markets. It makes an effort to oblige TSOs to reserve 
20% of the technical capacity of interconnectors for shorter term bookings (10% for 
maximum 1, 10% for maximum 5 years)
97
 and also puts a 15 years limit on the length 
of possible capacity booking on annual yearly auctions.
98
 It urges national regulators to 
increase actual reserved capacities for shorter term bookings at certain critical 
interconnection points.
99
 However, it also respects existing transport contracts, many of 
them based on LTCs and only push for that all transmission capacity related to the 
execution of LTCs “shall be bundled at the earliest opportunity”.100  
                                                 
97
 Article 6 and 8 (6-8)  
98
 Article 11 (3) 
99
 „The exact proportion of capacity to be set aside in relation to paragraphs 6 and 8 shall be subject to a 
stakeholder consultation, alignment between transmission system operators and approval by national regulatory 
authorities at each interconnection point. National regulatory authorities shall in particular consider setting 
aside higher shares of capacity with a shorter duration to avoid foreclosure of downstream supply markets”. 
Article 8 (9) 
100
 Article 20 (5) 
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EU transmission access regulations are also very soft on how to manage contractual 
congestions. Regulation 715/2009 only requires that in the event of contractual 
congestion, the transmission system operator shall offer unused capacity on the primary 
market at least on a day-ahead and interruptible basis.
101
 This is not of much help for 
shippers intended to enter a downstream market and to face competition from 
incumbent, dominant wholesalers. 
It is paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the CA Regulation that is the most explicit on how to 
address the risk of foreclosure of downstream supply markets: 
“In order to prevent foreclosure of downstream supply markets, competent 
national authorities may, after consulting network users, decide to take 
proportionate measures to limit up-front bidding for capacity by any single 
network user at interconnection points within a Member State.” 
This section provides for a very broad authorization, but no obligation, for competent 
national authorities (mostly national regulatory authorities) to limit up-front the 
participation of certain network users in bidding for specific capacities or to limit the 
share of capacities a single network user might receive at the auctions. In case of those 
LTC holders that can deliver gas to a certain EU market through an interconnector for 
which EU-like regulated third party access rules do not apply, such limitation could be 
easily justified on the basis of reciprocity. This case clearly holds for any Russian LTC 
a Hungarian market participant might have until no regulated third party access rules 
implemented for the UA>HU interconnector. However, the CA Regulation delegates 
the full authority to establish any limitation of this kind to the competent national 
authority. Neither ACER nor the Commission has any authority in this regard.     
                                                 
101
 Article 13 (3)(a) 
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The conclusion of this brief regulatory review is that nothing in existing and upcoming 
transmission capacity allocation regulations explicitly rules out the possibility that 
Gazprom, its affiliates or their LTC holder incumbent partner book significant amounts 
of available capacity for long term (up to 15 years) on EU-EU interconnectors 
(including HAG and the SK-HU interconnector) in the course of the capacity auctions 
foreseen by the CA Regulation. Once this happens, gas wholesale competition was 
foreclosed on the Hungarian market. It is the Hungarian regulator, HEPURA that got a 
general authorization by the CA Regulation to limit such bookings up-front. However, it 
is early to tell to whether MEKH will use its powers in this regard.            
6 Modelling methodology: the EGMM102 
 
For the upcoming simulations in section 7 I will use the European Gas Market Model 
that has been developed by my colleagues and myself to simulate the operation of an 
international wholesale natural gas market in whole Europe. Figure 8 shows the 
geographical scope of the model. Country codes denote the countries for which we have 
explicitly included the demand and supply side of the local market, as well as gas 
storages. Large external markets, such as Russia, Turkey, Libya, Algeria and LNG 
exporters are represented by exogenously assumed market prices, long-term supply 
contracts and physical connections to Europe.  
Figure 8. Post-2015 gas wholesale market model scenarios by REKK (2013) 
 
 
                                                 
102
 The following description was provided by the gas modelling team of REKK, composed of András 
Kiss (principal model author), Borbála Tóth (team leader), László Paizs, Adrienn Selei and Péter Kotek.  
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Given the input data, the model calculates a dynamic competitive market equilibrium 
for 35 European countries, and returns the market clearing prices, along with the 
production, consumption and trading quantities, storage utilization decisions and long-
term contract deliveries. 
Model calculations refer to 12 consecutive months, with a default setting of April-to-
March.
103
 Dynamic connections between months are introduced by the operation of gas 
storages (“you can only withdraw what you have injected previously”) and TOP 
constraints (minimum and maximum deliveries are calculated over the entire 12-month 
period, enabling contractual “make-up”). 
The European Gas Market Model consists of the following building blocks: (1) local 
demand; (2) local supply; (3) gas storages; (4) external markets and supply sources; (5) 
cross-border pipeline connections; (6) long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts; and (7) 
spot trading. Each of them is described in detail below. 
6.1  Local demand 
 
Local consumption refers to the amount of gas consumed in each of the local markets in 
each month of the modeling year. It is, therefore, a quantity measure.
104
 Local demand, 
on the other hand, is a functional relationship between the local market price and local 
consumption, similarly specified for each month of the modeling year. 
Local demand functions are downward sloping, meaning that higher prices decrease the 
amount of gas that consumers want to use in a given period. For simplicity, we use a 
linear functional form, the consequence of which is that every time the market price 
increases by 0.1 €/MWh, local monthly consumption is reduced by equal quantities (as 
opposed to equal percentages, for example). 
The linearity and price responsiveness of local demand ensures that market clearing 
prices will always exist in the model. Regardless of how little supply there is in a local 
market, there will be a high enough price so that the quantity demanded will fall back to 
the level of quantity supplied, achieving market equilibrium. 
                                                 
103
 The start of the modeling year can be set to any other month. 
104
 All quantities are measured in energy units within the model. 
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6.2  Local supply 
 
Local production is a similar quantity measure as local consumption, so the 
corresponding counterpart to local demand is local supply. Local supply shows the 
relationship between the local market price and the amount of gas that local producers 
are willing to pump into the system at that price. 
In the model, each supply unit (company, field, or even well) has either a constant, or a 
linearly increasing marginal cost of production (measured in €/MWh). Supply units 
operate between minimum and maximum production constraints in each month, and an 
overall yearly maximum capacity.
105
 
Any number of supply units can be defined for each month and each local market. As a 
result, local supply will be represented by an increasing, stepwise linear function for 
which the number, size, and slope of steps can be chosen freely. 
6.3  Gas storages 
 
Gas storages are capable of storing natural gas from one period to another, arbitraging 
away large market price differences across periods. Their effect on the system’s supply-
demand balance can be positive or negative, depending on whether gas is withdrawn 
from, or injected into, the storage. Each local market can contain any number of storage 
units (companies or fields). 
Storage units have a constant marginal cost of injection and (separately) of withdrawal. 
In each month, there are upper limits on total injections and total withdrawals. There is 
no specific working gas fee, but the model contains a real interest rate for discounting 
the periods, which automatically ensures that foregone interest costs on working gas 
inventories are taken into account. 
There are three additional constraints on storage operation: (1) working gas capacity; (2) 
starting inventory level; and (3) year-end inventory level. Injections and withdrawals 
must be such during the year that working gas capacity is never exceeded, intra-year 
inventory levels never drop below zero, and year-end inventory levels are met. 
                                                 
105
 Minimum production levels can be set to zero. If minimum levels are set too high, a market clearing 
equilibrium may require negative prices, but this practically never happens with realistic input data. 
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6.4  External markets and supply sources 
 
Prices for external markets and supply sources are set exogenously (i.e. as input data) 
for each month, and they are assumed not to be influenced by any supply-demand 
development in the local markets. In case of LNG the price is derived from the 
forecasted Japanese spot gas price, taking into account the cost of transportation to any 
possible LNG import terminal. As a consequence, the price levels set for outside 
markets are important determinants of their trading direction with Europe. When prices 
are set relatively low, European countries are more likely to import from the outside 
markets, and vice versa. 
6.5  Cross-border pipelines 
 
Any two markets (local or outside) can be connected by any number of pipelines or 
LNG routes, which allow the transportation of natural gas from one market to the other. 
Connections between geographically non-neighboring countries are also possible, which 
corresponds to the presence of dedicated transit routes. 
Cross-border linkages are directional, but physical reverse flow can easily be allowed 
for by adding a parallel connection that “points” into the other direction. Each linkage 
has a minimum and a maximum monthly transmission capacity, as well as a 
proportional transmission fee. 
Virtual reverse flow (“backhaul”) on unidirectional pipelines or LNG routes can also be 
allowed, or forbidden, separately for each connection and each month. The rationale for 
virtual reverse flow is the possibility to trade “against” the delivery of long-term take-
or-pay contracts, by exploiting the fact that reducing a pre-arranged gas flow in the 
physical direction is the same commercial transaction as selling gas in the reverse 
direction. 
Additional upper constraints can be placed on the sum of physical flows (or spot trading 
activity) of selected connections. This option is used, for example, to limit imports 
through LNG terminals, without specifying the source of the LNG shipment. 
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6.6  LNG infrastructure 
 
LNG infrastructure in the model consist of LNG liquefaction plants of exporting 
countries, LNG regasification plants of importing countries and the “virtual pipelines” 
connecting them. “Virtual pipelines” are needed to define for each possible transport 
route a specific transport price. LNG terminals capacity is aggregated for each country, 
which differs from the pipeline setup, where capacity constraints are set for all 
individual pipeline. LNG capacity constraints are set as a limit for the set of “virtual 
pipelines” pointing from all exporting countries to a given importing country, and as a 
limit on the set of pipelines pointing from all importing countries to a given exporting 
country.  
6.7  Long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts 
 
A take-or-pay contract is an agreement between an outside supply source and a local 
market concerning the delivery of natural gas into the latter. The structure of a TOP 
contract is the following.  
Each contract has monthly and yearly minimum and maximum quantities, a delivery 
price, and a monthly proportional TOP-violation penalty. Maximum quantities (monthly 
or yearly) cannot be breached, and neither can the yearly minimum quantity. Deliveries 
can be reduced below the monthly minimum, in which case the monthly proportional 
TOP-violation penalty must be paid for the gas that was not delivered.  
Any number of TOP-contracts can be in force between any two source and destination 
markets. Monthly TOP-limits, prices, and penalties can be changed from one month to 
the next. Contract prices can be given exogenously, indexed to internal market prices, or 
set to a combination of the two options. 
The delivery routes (the set of pipelines from source to destination) must be specified as 
input data for each contract. It is possible to divide the delivered quantities among 
several parallel routes in pre-determined proportions, and routes can also be changed 
from one month to the next. 
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6.8  Spot trading 
 
The final building block, spot trade, serves to arbitrage price differences across markets 
that are connected with a pipeline or an LNG route. Typically, if the price on the source-
side of the connection exceeds the price on the destination-side by more than the 
proportional transmission fee, then spot trading will occur towards the high-priced 
market. Spot trading continues until either (1) the price difference drops to the level of 
the transmission fee, or (2) the physical capacity of the connection is reached. 
Physical flows on pipelines and LNG routes equal the sum of long-term deliveries and 
spot trading. When virtual reverse flow is allowed, spot trading can become “negative” 
(backhaul), meaning that transactions go against the predominant contractual flow. Of 
course, backhaul can never exceed the contractual flow of the connection. 
6.9  Equilibrium 
 
The European Gas Market Model algorithm reads the input data and searches for the 
simultaneous supply-demand equilibrium (including storage stock changes and net 
imports) of all local markets in all months, respecting all the constraints detailed above.  
In short, the equilibrium state (the “result”) of the model can be described by a simple 
no-arbitrage condition across space and time.
106
 However, it is instructive to spell out 
this condition in terms of the behavior of market participants: consumers, producers and 
traders.
107
 
Local consumers decide about gas utilization based on the market price. This decision is 
governed entirely by the local demand functions we introduced earlier. 
Local producers decide about their gas production level in the following way: if market 
prices in their country of operation are higher than unit production costs, then they 
produce gas at full capacity. If prices fall below costs, then production is cut back to the 
minimum level (possibly zero). Finally, if prices and costs are exactly equal, then 
                                                 
106
 There is one, rather subtle, type of arbitrage which is treated as an externality, and hence not 
eliminated in the model. We assume that whenever long-term TOP contracts are (fully or partially) linked 
to an internal market price (such as the spot price in the Netherlands), the actors influencing that spot 
price have no regard to the effect of their behavior on the pricing of the TOP contract. In particular, 
reference market prices are not distorted downwards in order to cut the cost of long-term gas supplies 
from outside countries. 
107
 We leave out storage operators, since injection and withdrawal fees are set exogenously, and stock 
changes are determined by traders. 
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producers choose some amount between the minimum and maximum levels, which is 
actually determined in a way to match the local demand for gas in that month. 
Traders in the model are the ones performing the most complex optimization 
procedures. First, they decide about long-term contract deliveries in each month, based 
on contractual constraints (prices, TOP quantities, penalties) and local supply-demand 
conditions.  
Second, traders also utilize storages to arbitrage price differences across months. For 
example, if market prices in January are relatively high, then they withdraw gas from 
storage in January and inject it back in a later month in such a way as to maximize the 
difference between the selling and the buying price. As long as there is available 
withdrawal, injection and working gas capacity, as well as price differences between 
months exceeding the sum of injection costs, withdrawal costs, and the foregone 
interest, the arbitrage opportunity will be present and traders will exploit it.
108,109
 
Finally, traders also perform spot transactions, based on prices in each local and outside 
market and the available cross-border transmission capacities to and from those 
markets, including countries such as Russia, Turkey, Libya, Algeria or LNG markets, 
which are not explicitly included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108
 Traders also have to make sure that storages are filled up to their pre-specified closing level at the end 
of the year, since we do not allow for year-to-year stock changes in the model. 
109
 A similar intertemporal arbitrage can also be performed in markets without available storage capacity, 
as long as there are direct or indirect cross-border links to countries with gas storage capability. In this 
sense, flexibility services are truly international in the simulation. 
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Table 9. Summary of modelling input parameters and data sources 
7 Category                                         Data Unit Source 
Consumption  
Annual Quantity 
Monthly distribution (% of annual quantity) 
Energy Community data,  
Eurostat, ENTSO-G 
Production  Minimum and maximum production 
Energy Community data,  
ENTSO-G 
Pipeline 
infrastructures 
Daily maximum flow 
GIE, ENTSO-G, 
Energy Community data 
Storage 
infrastructures 
Injection, withdrawal, 
working gas capacity 
GSE 
LNG 
infrastructures 
Capacity GLE, GIIGNL 
TOP contracts 
Yearly minimum maximum quantity  
Seasonal minimum and maximum quantity 
Gazprom, National Regulators 
Annual reports, Platts, Cedigaz 
 
7 Simulation scenarios and results 
 
This section defines the simulation tasks and scenarios to test my hypotheses by the use 
of the EGMM. Controlled experiments are executed so that hypothetic scenarios or 
market/policy settings for Hungary are developed and their wholesale price outcomes 
are derived in a European market context that best represent actual supply, demand, 
infrastructure and contractual conditions. The scenarios are built around changes in few 
policy variables that are assumed to have the most significant wholesale price impact 
while the rest of the variables are controlled (unchanged). The Hungarian scenarios are 
not intended to be ‘realistic’ in terms of representing actual market conditions. Their 
aim is to represent stylised, sometimes extreme market settings in order to test the 
responsiveness of wholesale pricing outcomes to changes in some critical policy 
variables.             
 
 
7.1  Simulating the partial impacts of marginal policy changes on Leverage and gas 
wholesale prices under contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition   
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Section 2 identified available government measures to undermine pivotal infrastructure 
positions. Demand side measures include those affecting end-customer prices (like the 
tax wedge between retail and wholesale gas prices or regulated tariff components) and 
exogenous energy efficiency investments. An important supply side measure is to 
encourage domestic gas production by a favourable investment environment, e.g. by 
setting low relative extraction taxes (royalty). An additional government measure is to 
encourage investment into gas import capacity from non-pivotal directions, e.g. by 
providing sufficiently high regulated return for such investments. According to the 
hypothesis, once the pivotal infrastructure position is undermined, oligopolistic (oil-
linked) gas prices will also be undermined. This hypothesis assumes a functional 
relationship between the measure to identify a pivotal infrastructure, namely the 
Leverage index as defined in (1) and gas wholesale prices, ceteris paribus (see Figure 
5).  
One way to test the above hypothesis would be to carry out the econometric estimation 
of the invers of the leverage function in (4):
110
 
p(L)  = p (r, t, E,  , ).     (5) 
However, the lack of sufficient data prohibited to follow this way.  
Instead, this section provides estimates on the functional relationship between p and L 
based on EGMM simulation values.  
The process of simulation is as follows. I start to run the model with a Hungarian 
reference case with a relatively high L value. In the reference case 2012 consumption 
and production data and 2014 infrastructure and tariff data is used for all countries 
endogenously modelled by EGMM. In the reference case the value of L is 0.35 for 
Hungary, Russian LTC is 100% oil-indexed priced and no spot Russian gas is available 
for the market.
111
  
                                                 
110
 Note that in (4) t and  helps to delink end-customer prices and production levels from wholesale gas 
price fluctuations respectively, thus resolving the endogenity of p and L apparent in (3). 
111
 In light of recent Russian LTC renegotiations and the spreading practice of mixed spot-oil indexed 
LTC pricing the assumption of 100% oil indexed pricing by Russia might seem unrealistic. However, my 
objective here is to test the capacity of alternative policy measures to put pressure on oil indexed pricing. 
To develop a theory on Russian gas pricing under regulatory and competitive pressures is a topic for 
another study. 
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The hypothesis is that due to the high positive L value for the reference case, the 
modelled wholesale gas price for Hungary will be closer to the oil-linked price. Next I 
generate (p;L) value pairs or observations by introducing marginal changes in the 
determinants of the L function: gas demand, domestic gas production and aggregate gas 
import capacity from non-Russia-Ukraine directions. I derive the partial impact of 
marginal policy changes on L and p values as follows:  
[1] From the reference case I start to reduce reference demand (110.75 TWh in 
2012)
112
 in marginal blocks (5 TWh) until the L value reaches -0.2, ceteris 
paribus and derive related wholesale price estimates.  
[2] From the reference case (25.2 TWh annual maximum production capacity) I 
start to increase maximum capacity of domestic production in marginal blocks 
(5 TWh) until the L value reaches -0.2, ceteris paribus and derive related 
wholesale price estimates. 
[3] From the reference case I start to increase import capacity from non-Russia-
Ukraine directions in marginal blocks (5 TWh/year) until the L value reaches  
-0.2, ceteris paribus and derive related wholesale price estimates. Two 
alternative sub-scenarios have been developed to test the impact of alternative 
development options. 
 [3A] In the first case only the HAG capacity was expanded by marginal 
blocks (5 TWh/year) until L reached a sufficiently low value  
(< -0.2). 
[3B] In the second case the SK-HU interconnector was implemented first in 
marginal blocks (5 TWh/year) until it reached the actual planned capacity 
(127 GWh/day SK-HU capacity) and then HAG expanded until L reached a 
sufficiently low value (< -0.2). To reach  
L= -0.2 ceteris paribus next to the SK-HU capacity an extension of AT-HU 
capacity with 40 GWh/day was also necessary.     
The EGMM derives yearly average wholesale price estimates under contract (LTC) and 
infrastructure (interconnection capacity) constrained perfect competition. Thus the 
results of the above simulations will be informative on the partial wholesale price 
                                                 
112
 During the calculations it is assumed that 1 Bcm = 9.77 TWh 
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impacts of different policy measures to improve leverage for Hungary under the specific 
assumptions about contract and infrastructure constrained perfect competition inherent 
for the EGMM model. 
 
7.1.1 Simulation results 
 
Figures 9-12 summarise the results of the first simulation round. The results illuminate 
the capacity of policies discussed in the context of the Leverage function in (3) to 
undermine Russian oil-indexed gas pricing when Russia is not willing to adjust its 
pricing policy to apparent competitive pressure. Modelled German prices plus 
transmission tariffs from Germany to Hungary are used as an approximation for hub-
based pricing.  
Figure 9. Modelled impact of marginal demand reductions on leverage and gas wholesale prices 
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Figure 10. Modelled impact of marginal domestic production increases on leverage and gas 
wholesale prices 
 
Figure 11. Modelled impact of marginal HAG capacity expansions on leverage and gas wholesale 
prices 
 
 
  
162 
 
Figure 12. Modelled impact of marginal SK-HU and follow up HAG capacity expansions on 
leverage and gas wholesale prices 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the above results. 
 In the reference case the modelled Hungarian wholesale price (34.1 €/MWh) is 
only 6% below the oil-indexed price (36.2 €/MWh). The oil indexed price is 
24%, the reference price is 17% over the hub-based price (29.2 €/MWh).    
 The above simulation results reproduce the hypothetic functional form 
illustrated on Figure 5. All three policies by themselves (and most probably in 
combination) can lead to a gradual move from close-to oil-indexed to close-to 
hub-based gas wholesale pricing.  
 At L ≈ 0 values all partial policies result in 10% wholesale price decrease 
compared to the reference case.  
 To encourage domestic production to increase and the implementation of the 
SK-HU interconnector seem to be the most efficient policies to arrive at hub-
based wholesale prices at L values around -0.2.    
 The least effective policy seems to be the expansion of only the HAG capacity 
due to congestion at the German Austrian interconnector.     
An overall conclusion is that under only contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition, policies that result in an L value ≈ -0.2 are sufficient to manage an almost 
  
163 
 
full transition from oil-indexed to hub based gas wholesale pricing in Hungary. An 
exception is when only the HAG capacity is expanded. The partial impact of demand 
reduction policies seems to be a bit slower to produce close-to hub based gas wholesale 
prices.   
 
7.2  Simulation of the impact of additional market and regulatory distortions on gas 
wholesale prices in Hungary  
 
In the second round of simulations additional market and regulatory distortions are 
introduced and their impacts on gas wholesale price development investigated. The 
simulations are related to the testing of the hypothesis formulated in the Introduction 
about the major obstacles to moving from oil-indexed to spot gas wholesale pricing in 
Hungary. The existence of a pivotal infrastructure, gas wholesale market concentration 
and distortive cross border capacity access rules were assumed to be the most 
detrimental market characteristics for spot pricing to develop on the Hungarian market 
(see also Table 1 on the assumed relationship between the first two obstacles and likely 
gas wholesale pricing regimes).  
For simulation purposes I define two possible, stylised states with regard to each of the 
three market/policy characteristics and thus create 8 possible market/policy scenarios 
for Hungary to compare. As in the case of previous simulations, the reference case 
includes 2012 consumption and production data and 2014 infrastructure and tariff data 
for all countries endogenously modelled by EGMM except for Hungary. For the 
Hungarian market I will control for demand, production and underground storage 
characteristics so that they will remain unchanged in all the subsequent simulations.  
In the eight simulation scenarios the following alternative states will apply with regard 
to the investigated market/policy characteristics: 
 Pivotal infrastructure. In the Hungarian context, the potential pivotal 
infrastructure is the UA>HU interconnector. I will represent the existence versus 
the lack of its pivotal position by two alternative infrastructure settings. The first 
will reflect interconnection conditions in the reference case with an L value of 
0.35 (UA>HU is pivotal). In the alternative case L = -0.2 due to the 
implementation of the fully bi-directional SK>HU interconnector and further 
extension of HAG.    
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 Market concentration. The concentration of the Hungarian wholesale market is 
represented by two alternative LTC volumes. High concentration translates to a 
8 Bcm (78.16 TWh)/year, 100% oil-indexed (36.2 €/MWh) LTC with ± 15% 
flexibility (see dominant wholesaler model in section 4.2). Low market 
concentration is represented by a 2 BCM (19.54 TWh)/year, 100% oil-indexed 
LTC with the same flexibility (see Universal Service + Competition scenario in 
the same section). Russian spot gas is not available in any of the two scenarios 
(having a very high price). 
 Distortive access to interconnectors. With regard to capacity booking for LTC 
holders two alternatives are considered again. In the first type of scenario (see 
Scenarios 1, 2, 5 and 6 below) LTC gas can only be delivered to the Hungarian 
market through the UA>HU interconnector. This is the stylized case when the 
regulator prohibits capacity booking for LTC holders on interconnectors falling 
under regulated third party access rules (see discussion in section 4.2). In the 
second type of scenario regulated third party access interconnectors are used first 
for delivering LTC gas and if needed for larger contracts, the remaining amount 
flows to the Hungarian market through the UA>HU interconnector. More 
precisely, in Scenario 7 70% of contracted quantity is delivered through HAG 
(up to full capacity) and for the delivery of the remaining 30% UA>HU capacity 
is used. In Scenario 8 100% LTC gas flows on HAG, in Scenario 3, 55% flows 
on SK-HU (up to its full capacity) and the remaining 45% on HAG. Finally, in 
scenario 4 100% LTC gas flows on the SK-HU interconnector. Only remaining 
capacity, if any, is available for spot trading on these interconnectors in case of 
second type Scenarios.    
Table 10 summarises the major characteristics of the simulation scenarios.  
Since Scenario 2 is the closest to a competitive market/policy setting (strong leverage, 
low market concentration, no cross border capacity blocking), I expect this scenario to 
result in a gas wholesale price closest to hub-based prices (approximated by modelled 
German wholesale prices). On the other end, being the least competitive setting, I 
expect Scenario 7 (low leverage, high market concentration, cross-border capacity 
blocking) to result in closest to oil-indexed prices.     
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Table 10. Alternative market/policy setting simulation scenarios 
 
 
7.2.1 Simulation results 
 
Tables 11 summarises the results of the second simulation round by individual 
scenarios. Hungarian and German wholesale prices and profits from LTC gas sales are 
indicated. Profit from LTC is the difference between the revenue of the LTC holder 
from selling the TOP (at least ACQ-flexibility) volume at equilibrium market price and 
the cost of purchasing it at 100% oil indexed prices.     
 
Table 11. Wholesale prices and LTC profits in the different market/policy simulation Scenarios 
  
Scenar
io 1 
Scenar
io 2 
Scenar
io 3 
8 Scen
ario 
4 
9 Scen
ario 
5 
10 Scen
ario 
6 
11 Scen
ario 
7 
12 Scen
ario 
8 
HU price (€/MWh) 30.7 30.2 31.8 31.6 30.8 31.0 34.9 35.0 
DE price (€/MWh) 27.4 27.5 27.5 27.4 27.4 27.6 27.2 27.4 
HU-DE price spread 
(€/MWh) 
3.3 2.7 4.3 4.2 3.4 3.4 7.7 7.6 
Annual profit from 
long-term contract 
(m€) 
-574 -152 -267 -29 -580 -139 -297 -89 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results. 
 All the scenarios result in negative profits for LTC contract holders. This 
indicates that 100% oil indexed gas is already under heavy competition in the 
EU and also the Hungarian market.  
 As expected, Scenario 2 provides for the wholesale price closest to hub based 
pricing at moderate LTC loss. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8
L =  0,35 (2011) x x x x
L =  - 0,2 x x x x
LTC: 8 Bcm x x x x
LTC: 2 Bcm x x x x
UA>HU: 100% x x x x
UA>HU: 0%, SK>HU (HAG) x x x x
Leverage
Market concentration
Capacity blocking
Assumptions
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 Scenario 4 is a version of Scenario 2 with distortive access of LTC holders to the 
SK-HU interconnector. The results indicate that distortive access in case of a 
small LTC and abundant interconnection capacity falling under regulated third 
party access rules results in minimum LTC related negative profits at moderate 
price increase compared to Scenario 2. Thus this could be considered as a loss 
minimization scenario. 
 Scenarios 5 and 7 indicate that large volume LTCs produce the highest negative 
profits for LTC holders. As for Scenario 5, the combination of low leverage, 
high LTC volume and full spot competition through HAG creates the largest 
LTC related financial loss. 
 The lesson from Scenario 7 is that the gigantic financial loss of Scenario 5 can 
be reduced by distortive access to HAG at the cost of a very high wholesale 
price increase on the Hungarian market. Scenario 7 indeed provides for the worst 
combination of market/policy conditions and indeed results in close to oil-
indexed wholesale prices.  
 Scenario 8 is a version of Scenario 7 with reduced LTC contract volume. While 
this scenario also results in a close to oil-indexed wholesale price, the reduced 
contract volume significantly decreases LTC related financial losses under 
conditions of low leverage and full spot competition through HAG.      
Next we can compare the performance of Scenarios along the major investigated policy 
dimensions in terms of the average wholesale price and the average LTC profit they 
result in. Again, a few conclusions can be drawn from the data presented in Table 12.    
 
Table 12. Wholesale prices and LTC profits in the different market/policy simulation Scenarios 
Scenarios 
Average price 
(€/MWh) 
Average annual 
LTC profit (m€) 
L = 0.35  32,9 -276,3 
L = -0.2  31,1 -255,5 
LTC = 8 Bcm  32,05 -429,5 
LTC = 2 Bcm  31,95 -102,3 
UA>HU 100% 30,7 -361,3 
Distortive access 33,3 -170,5 
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First, there is a significant trade-off between wholesale price levels and the extent of 
distortive access to regulated third party access interconnectors. Distortive access 
moderates the financial loss of the LTC holder company at the cost of increasing 
wholesale prices. To the contrary, undistorted competition through regulated third party 
access interconnectors brings wholesale prices closest to hub-based levels at the cost of 
significant financial loss for the incumbent wholesaler.  
Second, a small LTC seems to help minimizing LTC related losses while large LTC 
scenarios produce the highest financial losses for incumbents.  
Finally, better leverage matters mostly pricewise. Scenarios with L= -0.2 value 
produced an average wholesale price being the second closest to the hub-based price.     
8 Final conclusion and recommendations for future research 
 
This study identified the principal obstacles to a transition from monopolistic (oil-
indexed) natural gas wholesale pricing to hub-based pricing in Hungary as (i) the 
exclusive control over a pivotal infrastructure (namely the UA-HU interconnector), (ii) 
high level market concentration and (iii) the foreclosure of the Hungarian gas wholesale 
market by blocking capacities of regulated third party access interconnectors.  
It introduced the leverage function to help the consistent analysis of available 
government measures to undermine dominant market positions based on the control of 
pivotal infrastructures. It also assumed a functional relationship between leverage and 
the prevailing gas wholesale price so that under contract and infrastructure constrained 
perfect competition a sufficiently low leverage value (<-0.2) would bring about close to 
hub-based gas wholesale prices. However, when high level market concentration and 
additional regulatory distortions in the form of distortive interconnection access spoil 
perfect competition, the relationship between leverage and the prevailing wholesale gas 
price becomes unclear.  
In order to assess the efficiency of available supply side, production and infrastructure 
development related policy measures to undermine a dominant market position and to 
encourage a transition from oil-linked to hub-based gas pricing in Hungary, controlled 
experiments or simulations were carried out with a contract and infrastructure 
constrained perfect competition gas market model, the European Gas Market Model. 
Additional simulations tested the wholesale price impacts of 8 stylised market/policy 
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settings for Hungary defined along the dimensions of leverage, wholesale market 
concentration and access rules to critical interconnectors. 
The simulation results provided strong support for the research hypotheses. They could 
reproduce the hypothetic functional form between leverage and related gas wholesale 
price outcomes. It was found that under contract and infrastructure constrained perfect 
competition those policies resulting in a leverage value around -0.2 are sufficient to 
manage an almost full transition from oil-indexed to hub based gas wholesale pricing in 
Hungary. To encourage domestic production and the implementation of the SK-HU 
interconnector seem to be the most effective policies to arrive at hub-based wholesale 
prices.   
Once the possibility of high level market concentration (in the form of a large volume 
LTC) and distortive access to non-Russian-Ukrainian interconnectors is introduced, the 
market/policy setting with strong leverage, low market concentration and no cross 
border capacity blocking results in a gas wholesale price closest to hub-based prices. 
The higher market concentration (i.e. the volume of a LTC) becomes, the higher the 
financial risk the LTC holding dominant gas wholesaler is facing. Simulations also 
found a significant trade-off between wholesale price levels and the extent of distortive 
access to regulated third party access interconnectors. Distortive access moderates the 
financial loss of the LTC holder company at the cost of increasing wholesale prices. To 
the contrary, undistorted competition through regulated third party access 
interconnectors brings wholesale prices closest to hub-based levels at the cost of 
significant financial loss for the incumbent wholesaler.  
Finally, two future research tasks are proposed. The present paper lacks an explicit 
theory of Russian gas pricing and its transition as competitive pressure on monopolistic 
(oil-linked) gas pricing increases. Such a theory could significantly contribute to the 
forecasting of realistic market outcomes in terms of price and trade developments in the 
EU. 
Second, the analysis of policy measures in the context of the leverage function could be 
expanded to include the assessment of the relevant marginal costs of the investigated 
policy measures. This could allow then for defining minimum cost policies to manage a 
transition from oil-linked to hub-based gas pricing in Hungary and elsewhere.    
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